Court Decisions

Waterbury Reidville Drive, LLC v. City of Waterbury (CV 23 6071171 S) February 27, 2026

Real Property Assessment Appeal

As of October 1, 2022 (Valuation Date), the defendant valued the Property at $24,407,000 and assessed taxes based upon seventy percent of the foregoing valuation and the applicable mil rate. The defendant kept the valuation of the Property at $24,407,000 on the 2022; 2023, 2024 and 2025 grand lists. 

The Property was purchased by the plaintiff in April of 2020 for $21 million. The plaintiff owns the property, and one of the plaintiffs affiliated companies, Raymour & Flanigan is a tenant on the Property.

Twenty Two GC2012. LLC v. Town of Simsbury (CV 23 6078705 S) February 9, 2026

Real Property Assessment Appeal

The plaintiff, Twenty Two GC 2012, LLC (Twenty Two), appeals the real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the Town of Simsbury, on the real property and improvements located at 828 Hopmeadow Street in the Town of Simsbury (the subject property). The plaintiff proceeds pursuant to General Statutes §12-117a and 12-119. As set forth below, the court finds that the fair market value (FMV) of the subject property is $4,074,927 as of October 1, 2022, the date of assessment.

The subject property consists of a single 54,382 square foot multi-tenant strip mall building built on approximately 3.5 acres. The building at the subject property was built in 1954 and has leasable frontage on Hopmeadow Street in Simsbury and, in the rear of the building, on Iron Horse Boulevard in Simsbury.

Original Appeal

Loch View, LLC v. Town of Windham (CV 16 6149827 S) December 11, 2023

This case arises out of the redevelopment of Windham Mills in Willimantic, Connecticut. The plaintiff and current owner of the property, Loch View, LLC, claims that the defendant, Town of Windham, breached a seven-year tax fixing agreement formed in accordance with General Statutes § 12-65b by cancelling the agreement and retroactively reassessing and taxing the property after the agreement had expired.

The plaintiff further challenges the amount of the retroactive assessments and the October, 2015 assessment pursuant to General Statutes § 12-119, and challenges the assessments from October, 2015 to October, 2022 pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a.

Reidville Drive LLC v. City of Waterbury (CV 23 6070559 S) January 29, 2026

Real Property Assessment Appeal

This matter is a real property tax appeal by Reidville Drive LLC (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the City of Waterbury (defendant) of certain real property located at 344 Reidville Drive in Waterbury. The court held a trial starting on January 23, 2026.

The Property comprises 19.568 acres and two buildings. One building houses a BJ’s warehouse club store and has 115,695 square feet of gross leasable area. The other building houses a Texas Roadhouse restaurant and has 7,297 square feet of gross leasable area. A small portion of the Property is leased to an outdoor sign company with a lease that currently runs into 2026 and generates currently $102,000 per year in rent.

The Property is well situated for its current use being easily accessible, having frontage on a well-traveled road, and being clearly visible from an interstate.

Fifteen Lewis Street Associates, LLC v. City of Hartford (CV 22 6073518 S) January 22, 2026

Real Property Assessment Appeal

The plaintiff, Fifteen Lewis Street Associates, LLC, appeals the real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the City of Hartford, on the real property and improvements located at Fifteen Lewis Street in Hartford, Connecticut (the subject property). The complaint was brought in three counts, the first two counts pursuant to General Statutes §12-117a and §12-119 and the third count alleging an improper income and expense penalty. The appeal was tried before the court on September 30, 2025.

The subject property is located in the central business district (CBD) of downtown Hartford. In their appraisals, the two experts used one property in common, 60 Gillette Street located in the Asylum Hill neighborhood, and two sets of different properties in the central business district. But they used different methodologies in their sales comparison analysis. Mr. Cunningham adopted what he called the "paired sales analysis" that compares similar properties with a key difference, to which the differential in sales price is then attributed. Mr. Donegan adjusted each of the comparison properties upwards or downwards percentage wise for specific differences.

Southwood Gardens, LLC v. Town of Naugatuck (CV 23 6070548 S) January 21, 2026

Section 8 Housing Complex - Assessment Appeal

This matter is a property tax appeal by Southwood Gardens LLC (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Naugatuck (defendant) of certain real property located at 933 Rubber Avenue in Naugatuck. The court held a multi-day trial starting on November 25, 2025

Of the 168 units, 128 are two-bedroom units and 40 are three-bedroom units. Further 92 of the two-bedroom units and 32 of the three-bedroom units are benefitted by a long-term Section 8 Housing Assistance (HAP) contract with the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The remainder of the units are rented at market rates. The Property is subject to and benefitted by a long-term HAP contract with HUD which subsidizes the rents being paid.

Centurion Holdings 1, Inc. v. Town of South Windsor (CV 22 6073236 S) December 16, 2025

Healthcare Facility Tax Exempt Appeal

The defendants, the Town of South Windsor and Mary Huda, Assessor of the Town of South Windsor (together, South Windsor), move for summary judgment on the complaint of the plaintiff, Centurion Holdings 1, Inc. (Centurion), alleging that the real property and improvements located at 1559 Sullivan Avenue in South Windsor, Connecticut (the subject property) are exempt from taxation. South Windsor argues that the subject property is taxable under General Statutes 12-66a because the subject property has been acquired via lease by a qualifying healthcare system (Hartford Healthcare Corporation (HHC)) under 12-66a.

Balise CW New Britain, Inc v. City of New Britain (CV 23 6078626 S) December 3, 2025

Personal Property Penalty Appeal

Balise filed the Personal Property Declaration on November 10th, 2022 and requested an extension. New Britain denied the extension request. Balise acknowledges they filed late and claims it was because the City did not send a blank declaration. New Britain argues that due to the fact that Balise had a car wash in the city as of October 1st, 2022, it was not required to send a blank form since they were not a “nonresident” taxpayer.

Twenty Five Germantown Road LLC v. City of Danbury (CV 23 6081124 S) November 24, 2025

Real Property Assessment Appeal

The subject property is located at 25 Germantown Road in Danbury, Connecticut. On October 1, 2022, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Twenty Five Germantown Road LLC. The subject property is a 2.86 acre parcel of land containing two medical office buildings totaling some 124,625 square feet.

The subject property is well located near Route 7 in Danbury and is very near Danbury Hospital. The subject property has a total of 43,567 square feet of rentable space and both buildings are in very good condition (A-/B+ space). On the date of assessment, the subject property was fully leased by a variety of medical providers and the testimony at trial was that the subject property had been fully leased since the early 2000’s.

The City of Danbury set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $16,855,500 as of October 1, 2022, the date of assessment.

Procurement, LLC v. City of Stamford (CV 23 6061037 S) November 13, 2025

Real Property (Mixed Use) Assessment Appeal

The plaintiff, who is the owner of property located in the City of Stamford, known generally as 816-820 High Ridge Road, brings this action pursuant to C.G.S. 12-117a, alleging that the City of Stamford Tax Assessor established a fair market value for the subject property of $11,238,470 as of October 1, 2022. The plaintiff further alleges that the valuation of the property as determined by the Assessor, was grossly excessive, disproportionate, and unlawful.

The critical issue before the Court is the determination of what the fair market value of the subject property was on October 1, 2022, based upon the evidence presented to it. The plaintiff’s appraiser testified that the fair market value of property on October 1, 2022, was $9,400,000. The defendant’s appraiser testified that the fair market value of the property on October 1, 2022, was $11,400,000.

Target Corporation v. City of Waterbury (CV 23 6070462) November 6, 2025

Real Property Assessment Appeal

This matter is a real property tax appeal by Target Corporation (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the City of Waterbury (defendant) of real property and improvements thereon located at 300 Chase Avenue in Waterbury as of October 1, 2022. The court held a trial on October 27 and 31, 2025.

As of October 1, 2022 (Valuation Date), the defendant valued the Property at $15,546,500 for the 2022 through 2024 grand lists.

The plaintiffs expert, Gregory Curtis, produced a report and testified that he used the sales comparison and income valuation approaches, and he valued the Property, as of the Valuation Date, at $7,950,000 for the 2022 through 2024 grand lists.

The defendant’s expert, William Kane, has produced a report and testified that, he used the cost and income valuation approaches, and he valued the Property as of the Valuation Date at $16,400,000 for the 2022 through 2024 grand lists.

Candlewood Lake Road, LLC v. Town of Brookfield (CV 22 6074472 S) November 5, 2025

Shopping Center – Assessment Appeal

The subject Property is located at 14, 38, and 42 Candlewood Lake Road in Brookfield, Connecticut. On October 1, 2021, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Candlewood Lake Road, LLC. The date of valuation in this matter is October 1, 2021.

The subject property consists of a 217,238 square foot shopping center built on an approximately 34-acre site. The three buildings at the subject property were built between 1973 and 2019.

Both sides submitted appraisals of the subject property. The Brookfield assessor set the fair market value (FMV) of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $31,822,550 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2021. Candlewood’s appraiser, Mr. Lemp, found the FMV of the subject property to be $25,600,000 as of the date of valuation.

MOB 300 New Britain, LLC v. City of New Britain (CV 23 6080141 S) November 3, 2025

Medical Office Building – Assessment Appeal

The subject property is comprised of a 56,878 square foot medical office building located on a 5.32 acre site. The office building at the subject property was built in 1966 and is in average condition, with average functional utility for the current use as a medical office building. Both appraisers concluded that the highest and best use of the subject property is its continued use as a medical office building.

The Seaspray Condominium Association, Inc v. Town of Clinton (CV 21 6070289 S) October 17, 2025

Time Share Development – Writ of Mandamus

The dispute revolves around the issuance of tax bills to every time share owner or the management company. Seaspray is responsible for the management of the subject property and its membership consists of all the individuals who have ownership interests in the apartment units at the subject property.  All unit owners are members of the Association, which is responsible for the management of the Condominium.

Bank of America NA v. Town of West Hartford (CV 22 6073246 S) September 26, 2025

Bank Building – Assessment Appeal

The subject property is located at 4 North Main Street in West Hartford, Connecticut. On October 1, 2021, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Bank of America (BoA). The subject property is located within West Hartford’s central business district, immediately adjacent to the West Hartford Center retail and dining area. The subject property consists of approximately 1.07 acres of land improved with a single 15,942-square-foot building, originally constructed in 1927, and subsequently expanded in 1971. The building at the subject property houses a 3,600- square-foot BoA branch bank facility, plus there is 12,342 square feet of office space which is less intensively used and is primarily used as back-office space for BoA.

Stew Leonard’s Danbury LLC v. City of Danbury (CV 23 6081704 S) September 25, 2025

Real Property Assessment Appeal

The plaintiff, Stew Leonard’s Danbury LLC (Stew Leonard’s), appeals the real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the City of Danbury, on a building operated as a Stew Leonard’s grocery store as part of a shopping center located at 99 Federal Road in Danbury, Connecticut (the subject property). Stew Leonard’s proceeds pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119. Stew Leonard’s argues that it is challenging only Danbury’s assessment on the building housing its popular grocery store (the grocery store building) and not Danbury’s assessment of the 35.81 acres of land at the subject property, or the assessment of two other commercial buildings at the subject property.

In response, Danbury points to the holding of Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of E. Windsor, 84 Conn. App. 473, 481, 854 A.2d 58 (2004), for the proposition “that a 12-117a tax appeal provides a taxpayer a forum to contest the assessment of its property, not portions of that assessment.”

Mchenry Solar, LLC v. Town of Hampton (AC 47636) September 23, 2025

Solar Equipment claimed as Manufacturing – Exemption

Both parties agree that the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly concluded that the generation of electricity is not manufacturing within the meaning of the property tax exemption under 12-81 (76).

The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he fact that electricity involves manufacturing is embedded in various Connecticut legislation.”

However, the Court disagrees “On the basis of the foregoing, we are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that Public Act 92-193 overruled the holding of Groppo by broadening the definition of manufacturing to include the generation of electricity.”

Goodwin Square Building LLC v. City of Hartford (CV 21 6080124 S) September 5, 2025

Highrise Office Building – Assessment Appeal

The plaintiff, Goodwin Square Building, LLC (Goodwin Square), appeals the-real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the City of Hartford, on the real property and improvements located at One Goodwin Square/225 Asylum Street in Hartford, Connecticut (the subject property). The plaintiff proceeds pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119. As set forth below, the court finds that the fair market value (FMV) of the subject property is $21,756,505 as of October 1, 2021, the date of assessment.

This matter was tried to the court on August 14, 2025. The court heard from David Fagone, who until recently managed the subject property and who testified on behalf of Goodwin Square; Patrick Lemp, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of Goodwin Square; and Brian Donegan, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the City of Hartford.

Greenwich Retail, LLC v. Town of Greenwich (AC 46825) June 10, 2025

Income and Expense Penalty

The plaintiff property owner appealed from the trial court’s judgment rendered for the defendant town upholding a municipal tax assessment of a penalty imposed pursuant to 12-63c (a) and (d). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court incorrectly determined that the word ‘‘provided’’ in 12-63c (a) does not require that an income and expense form actually be received by the property owner and/or its agent.

The Trial Court decision was upheld by the Appellate Court.

Original Appeal

Greenwich Retail LLC v. Town of Greenwich (CV 21 6052214 S) August 1, 2023

In this case, the assessor imposed a statutory 10% penalty for the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the statute (12-63c).  The application of the law to this case is complicated by a number of factors, including the fact that the year in question was 2020, such that the COVID pandemic impacted on a number of levels.  The June 1, 2020 deadline was extended to August 15.  The operation of the Assessor’s office and the operation of the designated representative of the property owner were affected in terms of staffing and what otherwise might be normal operations.

The plaintiff is challenging the imposition of the statutory 10% penalty, claiming that the statutory requirements for imposition of the penalty have not been satisfied. The plaintiff contends that the requirement of 45 days in which to comply – triggered by the assessor providing a suitable form – has not been satisfied. Further, to the extent that there was a follow-up mailing by the Assessor in August, reminding affected property owners of the need to meet the August 15 deadline, the plaintiff contends that it did not receive that notice until more than a week after the August 15 deadline, notwithstanding the assessor’s contention (and evidentiary submission) that there had been approximately two weeks between the date of mailing and the August 15.

A key issue – if not the critical determinative issue – centers on the address to which the Assessor sent notices and other communications.

CFC-Hban Solar Trust v. Town of Stonington (CV 22 6075999 S) June 6, 2025

CFC-Hban Solar Trust v. Town of North Stonington (CV 22 6075998 S) June 6, 2025

Solar Installation – Personal Property Exemption

The plaintiff, CFC-HBAN Solar Trust c/o The Huntington National Bank (CFCHBAN Solar), appeals the denial of a real property tax exemption sought by CFC-HBAN Solar under General Statutes 12-81(57)(D). The two defendant towns, the Town of Stonington and the Town of North Stonington, denied CFC-HBAN Solar’s application for a tax exemption for certain solar panels and related equipment (the subject solar equipment) located at 35 Taugwonk Spur Road in Stonington and 227 Boombridge Road in North Stonington (the subject properties).

All of the subject solar equipment has been approved by PURA for participation in the Virtual Net Metering (VNM) program. See Exs. 6-10; 36-41. All of the subject solar equipment has been approved by Eversource for the generation of excess electrical power for transfer to the general power grid. See Exs. 11-25; 42-59; Tr., 57.

General Statues 12-81(57) exempts certain solar equipment from local personal property taxes. For all the stated reasons, the court finds that the plaintiff, CFC-HBAN Solar Trust c/o The Huntington National Bank, has proven that the subject solar equipment meets the requirements of General Statutes 12-81(57)(D) for Grand List Years 2022 to the present.

AFL-Hban Solar Trust v. Town of Hampton (CV 21 6076299 S) May 23,2025

Solar Installation – Personal Property Exemption

All of the subject solar equipment participates in Connecticut’s Virtual Net Metering (VNM) program pursuant to General Statutes 16-244u. See Doc. Entry No. 118.00, Affidavit of Chris Little (“Little Aff.”), at p. 29. The VNM program is administered by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA).

In 2011, the Connecticut legislature allowed municipalities to contract with owners of certain solar equipment to purchase the billing credits generated when solar equipment produces excess electricity redistributed to the general power grid. General Statutes 12-81(57) exempts certain solar equipment from local personal property taxes.

AFL-HBAN Solar filed an affidavit in support of its motion for summary judgment stating that the subject solar equipment at the subject property qualifies as a Class I renewable energy source as defined in General Statutes 16-1. Thus, the court concludes that the decision of whether summary judgment is appropriate in this matter depends on whether AFL-HBAN Solar can present undisputed material facts demonstrating that it meets the requirements of subsections (II) of 12- 81(57)(D)(iii).

As set forth in the decision, the court concludes that the plaintiff, AFL-HBAN Solar Trust The Huntington National Bank, has met its initial burden to present material facts demonstrating that it meets the requirements of 12-81(57)(D) and that Hampton has failed to present any material facts rebutting AFL-HBAN Solar’s initial showing. Therefore, AFLHBAN Solar is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the subject solar equipment at the subject property is exempt from taxation under General Statutes 12-81(57)(D).

Country Village Apartments LLC v. City of Waterbury (CV 23 6070118 S) May 7, 2025

Assessment Appeal – Section 8 Apartments

The Property consists of a project based section 8 apartment complex with 232 apartment units in 31 buildings on 30.46 acres of land. 229 units are subject to a section 8 contract and 3 units are market based units. The Property has been suitably maintained and is in good condition. The Property is benefitted by a long term section 8 contract covering 229 of its 232 units. The Property contains a mixture of one, two, three and four bedroom units.

As of October 1, 2022 (Valuation Date), the defendant valued the Property at $19,900,800 and assessed taxes based upon seventy percent of the foregoing valuation and the applicable mil rate.

Using a net operating income of $1,991,061 and a loaded capitalization rate of 9.7% the court finds that the value of the Property as of the Valuation Date was $20,526,402, which the court rounds to $20,500,000. Accordingly, the plaintiff is not aggrieved by the defendant’s valuation of $19,900,800. Since the plaintiff has failed to establish aggrievement, the court must dismiss counts one and two.

Prospect Plaza LLC v. Town of West Hartford (CV 22 6073232 S) May 6, 2025

Real Property Valuation Appeal

The subject property is located at 245 Prospect Avenue in West Hartford, Connecticut. On October 1, 2021, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Prospect Plaza. Improvements LLC (Prospect Plaza). The subject property is a 142,212 square foot, open air, retail strip mall. The subject property includes three buildings and has space for 15 tenants.. The subject property is approximately 13.4 acres in size and was built in 1967 and 1971. The subject property is well located for its intended purpose at the comers of Kane Street and Prospect Avenue in West Hartford.

Prospect Plaza submitted an appraisal of the subject property. West Hartford’s appraisal was precluded due to untimely submission. (Motion to preclude). Mr. Cunningham is an experienced, licensed appraiser who is well qualified to offer his opinion of value and opined that the income approach to value was the most appropriate method.

West Hartford set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $26,727,800 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2021. Mr. Cunningham found the FMV of the subject property to be $22,400,000 as of the date of assessment.

After closely reviewing all of the evidence presented at trial and the appraisal analysis of Mr. Cunningham, the court finds that Mr. Cunningham’s appraisal presents the most persuasive opinion of the subject property’s fair market value and that judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff.

143 Murphy Road Realty v. City of Hartford (CV 11 6073514 S) April 25, 2025

Real Property Valuation Appeal

The subject property is located at 143 Murphy Road in Hartford, Connecticut. On October 1, 2021, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Murphy Road. The subject property is a.5.22 acre, flat, generally square, industrial site in the South Meadows area of Hartford. The subject property is not leased; it is owner occupied.

Both sides submitted appraisals of the subject property. The Hartford assessor set the fair market value (FMV) of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $3,186,800 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2021. Murphy Road’s appraiser, Mr. Cunningham, found the FMV of the subject property to be $2,240,000 as of the date of assessment. Hartford’s appraiser, Mr. Vimini, appraised the FMV of the subject property at $9,100,000 using the sales comparison approach.

Both parties also agree that the highest and best use of the subject property is as a transfer station. It seems likely to the court therefore that potential buyers of the subject property would be purchasers experienced in operating transfer stations and that such purchasers would arrive at a potential purchase price of the subject property assuming that continued use.

Finally, the court finds that Murphy Road has not met its initial burden of demonstrating that the subject property was over assessed, and, therefore, that Murphy Road was aggrieved. Having rejected Mr. Cunningham’s appraisal, and also finding that there is no other creditable evidence presented at trial that the subject property was over assessed by Hartford, there is no creditable evidence upon which the court can conclude that Murphy Road was aggrieved.

Distinctive Tree Care LLC v. Town of South Windsor (CV 23 6087616 S) April 25, 2025

Manufacturing Facility Exemption

The plaintiff, Distinctive Tree Care LLC (Distinctive Tree), and the defendant, the Town of South Windsor, cross move for summary judgment on the complaint of Distinctive Tree. Distinctive Tree sought a manufacturing equipment exemption under General Statutes 12-81(72) and (76). South Windsor denied the exemption and Distinctive Tree appeals. The court grants summary judgment in favor of South Windsor. The court denies Distinctive Tree’s motion for summary judgment.

The parties’ dispute centers on 12-81(72)’s and (76)’s requirement that exempt machinery be “installed in a manufacturing facility.”

The court holds that the material facts are not in dispute and that the Town of South Windsor is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no material factual dispute that Distinctive Tree’s tree clearing equipment is not “installed in a manufacturing facility” as required by General Statutes 12-81 (72) and (76).

Judgment shall enter in favor of the defendant.

David & Magdelena Besterfield v. Town of Fairfield (CV 21 6066226 S) April 8, 2025

Residential Valuation Appeal

The present matter is a real property tax appeal brought by the plaintiffs, David Besterfield and Magdalena Besterfield, pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a, of the decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Town of Fairfield (BAA). The matter concerns the real property and improvements of property commonly known as 1648 Fairfield Beach Road in Fairfield, Connecticut (the subject property). The BAA denied the plaintiffs’ appeal of the October 1, 2020 assessment by the assessor of the Town of Fairfield (town).

For the following reasons, the court finds that the plaintiffs are aggrieved and that the fair market value of the subject property was $350,000 as of October 1, 2020, the date of assessment.

Lasry, Mark, Et Al v. Town of Westport (CV 21 6066776, 777, 778 S) April 8, 2025

Residential Waterfront Properties

The present matter consists of three appeals brought pursuant to General Statutes 12- 117a by the plaintiffs, Marc Lasry and Cathy Lasry, of the decisions of the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Town of Westport (BAA). The BAA denied the plaintiffs’ appeals of the October 1, 2020, assessments by Paul Friia, the Assessor of the Town of Westport, (assessor), on three properties owned by the plaintiffs. Those properties are located in the Beachside neighborhood in Westport, Connecticut at 100 Beachside Avenue (100 Beachside), 102 Beachside Avenue (102 Beachside3 and 104 Beachside Avenue (104 Beachside Avenue (the subject properties).

The court credits the testimony and valuation of the assessor and therefore finds the plaintiffs are not aggrieved. Accordingly, the appeals docketed as HHB-CV-21-6066776-S, HHB-CV-21-6066777-S and HHB-CV-21-6066778-S are dismissed.

Campelli, Mario Et Al V. Town of Mansfield (CV 22 5031515 S) March 13, 2025

Forest Land Classification

The Campellis purchased the Hickory Lane property in June of 2005. In August of 2005, the Campellis applied to the Town of Mansfield to have the Hickory Lane property classified for municipal real property tax purposes as forest land pursuant to General Statutes 12-107d (the application). The application submitted to the Town of Mansfield by the Campellis listed the Hickory Lane property as 25 acres in size as certified to by a licensed state forester. General Statutes 12-107b (2) requires real property classified as forest land for municipal tax purposes to be at least 25 acres in size.

On September 6, 2005, the Campellis’ application to have the Hickory Lane property classified as forest land for municipal tax purposes was approved by the then Town of Mansfield Assessor, Irene LaPointe. Id. In fact, the Hickory Lane property is not 25 acres in size. It is approximately 22.5 acres in size. In December 2021, the Town removed the forest land classification and the taxpayer appealed.

Park Seymour & Park Squire Associates, LLC v City of Hartford (AC 47132) February 4, 2025

Tax Abatement Agreement

The following facts, as found by the trial court, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. ‘‘On February 21, 1997, Seymour Associates Limited Partnership (SA) entered into a written tax abatement agreement (1997 abatement agreement) with the [city] concerning the real property and improvements at 142, 158-170, 167, 169-171 and 180 Seymour Street in Hartford (Seymour Street proerties). The 1997 abatement agreement had an express term of fifteen consecutive fiscal years. ‘In July of 2003, Park Squire Associates Partnership (PSAP) entered into a written tax abatement agreement (2003 abatement agreement) with the [city] concerning the real property and improvements at 23-31 Squire Street in Hartford and 457-495 Park Street in Hartford (Squire/Park Street properties). Both of the properties were subsequentially sold to Park Broad Associates.  They requested that the City honor the prior tax abatements.

The court, Budzik, J., held a trial on May 11, 2023. Valinho testified, and eleven exhibits were entered into evidence. The court also reviewed stipulations of facts. On November 2, 2023, the court issued a Memorandum of Decision. The court stated that ‘‘[ ] 32-12 (b) (9) of the Hartford Code of Ordinances requires . . . all tax abatement agreements to be approved by the city council. The court stated that ‘‘[t]here was no evidence presented at trial that the mayor . . . ever provided written consent to transfer or assign any rights under any abatement agreement to Seymour or Squire.’’

The judgments are affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.

7 Germantown Road, LLC v. Danbury (SC 21024) January 28, 2025

Failure to submit Appraisal by Deadline

The defendant town appealed to this court, upon certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to statute ( 52-265a) that a matter of substantial public interest was involved, from certain decisions issued by the trial court in the course of adjudicating the plaintiff property owners’ tax appeals. The trial court had initially granted the defendant’s motions to dismiss five of the six underlying tax appeals for the plaintiffs’ failure to timely file appraisals of their respective properties with the court, as required by the relevant statute ((Rev. to 2023) 12-117a (a) (2)). The trial court subsequently granted motions to open the judgments of dismissal and for re-argument, and it denied the defendant’s corrected motion to dismiss the sixth tax appeal. On appeal from the trial court’s decisions granting the motions to open and denying the corrected motion to dismiss, the defendant claimed that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ tax appeals because the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the appraisal filing require­ment set forth in 12-117a (a) (2)

We conclude, therefore, that the appraisal filing requirement in 12-117a (a) (2) is nei­ther a condition precedent to the commencement of a tax appeal nor a requirement that implicates the Supe­rior Court’s subject matter jurisdiction; the filing of the appraisal is a mandatory requirement that arises after the commencement of a tax appeal, with the time period for filing it subject to extension by the Superior Court for good cause.

The judgments are affirmed.

LIXI Hospitality Norwalk, LLC v. City of Norwalk (CV 23 6061693 S) December 17, 2024

Real Property Appeal – Motion to Dismiss

The defendant City has moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s action due to the plaintiff’s alleged noncompliance with Gen Stat 12-117a (b). More specifically, the City claims that the plaintiff failed to file a property appraisal with the court required by Gen Stat 12-117a (a) (2). The City argues that as a result thereof, the plaintiff has no standing, and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Feralcare Inc. v. Town of Stratford (CV 22 6073377 S) December 20, 2024

Tax Exempt Status of Real Property

The plaintiff, Feralcare, Inc. (Feralcare), and the defendant, the Town of Stratford (Stratford), cross move for summary judgment on Feralcare’s municipal real property and personal property tax appeal alleging that Feralcare’s real and personal property located at 616 and 626 Surf Avenue in Stratford, Connecticut (the subject property) is exempt from taxation under General Statutes 12-81(7) because Feralcare qualifies as a charitable organization in that it runs a spay and neutering clinic for cats at the subject property.

It is well settled that merely accepting a fee for a charitable service does not undermine the charitable character of that service. “This court never has held that accepting payment or charging a fee, without more, alters the character of a charitable or otherwise tax-exempt organization”.

The court grants the motion for summary judgment in favor of Feralcare and against Stratford.

Wakefern Food Corp v. Town of Orange (CV 20 6060016 S) December 18, 2024

Retail Grocery Store Assessment Appeal

The subject property is a 6.4 acre, flat, rectangular site upon which is situated a roughly 73,000 square foot, stand-alone grocery store. Wakefern purchased the subject property on September 8, 2016 for $10,800,000. The on-site grocery store was formerly a Stop & Shop grocery store, but Wakefield refurbished and rebranded the store to be a Shoprite grocery store. Wakefern made substantial investments in the subject property to convert the store to a Shoprite grocery store.

Both sides submitted appraisals of the subject property. Both appraisers testified that the income approach to value was the best way to determine the FMV of the subject property and the court credits that testimony.

Although both appraisers are well qualified to offer their opinions of value, the court concludes that the Plaintiff’s appraisal was sloppily done and largely relies on untested, unverified and unexplained information. As a result, the court does not give the appraisal any weight.

As the trier of fact, the court may reject expert testimony in whole or in part if it concludes it is reasonable to do so. Here, for the reasons set forth above, the court makes that conclusion. The court does not attach any weight to the Plaintiff’s appraisal and finds that Wakefern has not presented any other credible evidence that the subject property was over assessed.

Colchester Estate Ventures v. Town of Colchester (CV 22 6074575 S) December 18, 2024

Apartment Complex Assessment Appeal

The plaintiff, Colchester Estate Ventures LLC (CEV), appeals the real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the Town of Colchester, on the real property and improvements located at 12 Balaban Road in Colchester, Connecticut.

This matter was tried to the court on November 26, 2024. The court heard testimony from Stuart Zelmanovitz, one of the owners of the subject property, Ronald Diorio, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the plaintiffs, and John Chaponis, the Assessor for the Town of Colchester.

Colchester assessed the subject property at a fair market value (FMV) of $12,396,400 as of the date of assessment, October 1, 2021. Mr. Diorio found the FMV of the subject property to be $10,800,000, as of the date of assessment. Colchester did not submit a formal appraisal at trial. Instead, Mr. Chaponis testified based on his experience as Colchester’s long-time assessor.

Here, the court finds that CEV has not met its initial burden of demonstrating that the subject property was over assessed, and, therefore, that CEV was aggrieved. Having rejected Mr. Diorio’s appraisal and also finding that there is no other creditable evidence presented at trial that the subject property was over assessed by Colchester, there is no creditable evidence upon which the court can conclude that CEV was aggrieved.

Concettina Capasso v. Town of Glastonbury (CV 23 6080021 S) December 17, 2024

Single Family Home Assessment Appeal

The plaintiff, Concettina Capasso, appeals the real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the Town of Glastonbury, on the real property and improvements located at 305 Country Club Road in Glastonbury, Connecticut.

The court heard testimony from Joseph Capasso, the husband of the subject property’s owner, Mark Gottesdiener, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the plaintiff, and Laura Callahan, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the Town of Glastonbury.

Both Mr. Gottesdiener and Ms. Callahan are well qualified to offer their opinions of value. After reviewing the various comparable sales/properties proffered by the two appraisers, the court concludes there are three properties that are best to compare the subject. Each appraiser made a series of subjective adjustments to the sale prices of the comparable properties to reach a FMV price comparable to the subject property.

After reviewing each of the appraisals submitted into evidence and reviewing the characteristics of the comparable properties as compared to the subject property, the court concludes that the comparable properties are in the aggregate, broadly comparable to the subject property.

Therefore, the court uses the actual sale prices of the comparable properties as the best estimate of FMV for the subject property and therefore averages the sale prices to determine the FMV.

DMG Partners-Rye LLC v. Town of Orange (CV 20 6060015 S) December 18, 2024

Orange Improvements Partnership v Town of Orange (CV 6060017 S) December 18, 2024

Retail Plaza Assessment Appeal

The plaintiffs in the above captioned cases, DGM Partners-Rye LLC and Orange Improvements Partnership, (together simply DGM), appeal the real property municipal tax assessments levied by the defendant, the Town of Orange, on the real property and improvements located at 80 Boston Post Road in Orange, Connecticut (the subject property). The plaintiffs appeal in two separate cases because the land and improvements at the subject property were assessed separately by Orange.

Both sides submitted appraisals of the subject property. DGM’s appraiser, Mr. Quaresima, found that the FMV of the subject property (both land and improvements) was $17,055,000, as of the date of assessment. Orange’s appraiser, Mr. Franke, appraised the FMV of the subject property at $21,300,000, as of the date of assessment. Both Mr. Quaresima and Mr. Franke testified that the income approach to value was the best way to determine the fair market value of the subject property and the court credits that testimony.

Although both Mr. Quaresima and Mr. Franke are well qualified to offer their opinions of value, the court concludes, for the reasons set forth below, that Mr. Franke’s appraisal is more credible and more thoroughly supported. Therefore, in reaching a FMV of the subject property, the court relies on Mr. Franke’s analysis.

Sun New Cambridge Apartments 1 LP Et Al v. City of Bristol (CV 22 6072394 S) December 17, 2024

Income & Expense Penalty Appeal

Cambridge owns the real property and improvements located at 1175 Farmington Avenue in Bristol, Connecticut (the subject property). On January 29, 2020, Mr. DeNoto signed the Grand List for the City of Bristol for the 2019 Grand List year (the 2019 Grand List). When Mr. DeNoto signed the 2019 Grand List, it did not include any penalty assessment against the then owner of the subject property.

On or about June 8, 2020, see Ex. 5, Bristol imposed a lien on the subject property pursuant to the penalty provision of General Statutes 12-63c because the subject property owner did not timely file and income and expense report for the 2019 Grand List year pursuant to General Statutes 12-63c. On September 20, 2021, Cambridge acquired the subject property. Cambridge has paid, under protest, the penalty assessed by Bristol and reflected in the June 8, 2020 lien on the subject property.

We conclude that the deadline for imposing penalties under 12-63c (d) must be the deadline articulated in 12-55 (b)—i.e., the penalties must be imposed before the assessor signs the grand list for the applicable assessment year.

Martha’s Ridge LLC v. Town of Greenwich (CV 23 6061289 S) December 17, 2024

Filing Timely Appraisal

The defendant, Town, has moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s action due to the plaintiff’s alleged noncompliance with Gen. Stat. 12-117-a (b).  More specifically, the Town claims that the plaintiff failed to file a property appraisal with the court.  The plaintiff claims that any delay in filing the appraisal had been occasioned, at least in part, by the circumstances that the Town had been delinquent in filing its appearance.  Plaintiff’s counsel finally did file an appraisal on or about October 1, 2024.

Fiore, Richard Et Al v Town of Stonington (CV 22 5032670 S) December 9, 2024

Personal Property Appeal

Pursuant to General Statutes 12-71, the Town of Stonington assessed personal property tax for the 2019 Grand List year on the equipment and furnishings owned by Two Penguins LLC.  Mr. Fiore is the sole member of Two Penguins LLC.  Mr. Fiore formed Two Penguins LLC in approximately 2017 for the purpose of opening and operating a convenience store.

Mr. Fiore argues that because his envisioned convenience store never actually opened, it was never a “store” as that term is used in 12-41 and thus Mr. Fiore does not owe any taxes under 12-71.

Read together to form one uniform and harmonious body of law, the court holds that 12-71’s express authorization for Stonington to tax goods and chattels includes the equipment and furnishings at issue in this case, and that the express authorization in 12-71 is not limited by the merely illustrative list of the personal property that ought to be listed on the personal property declaration as set forth in 12-41.

Thus, the court finds in favor of the defendant, the Town of Stonington. This appeal is dismissed.

Bedford Hall Investors NCM, LLC v. City of Stamford (CV 18 6048491 S) October 24, 2024

Overvaluation – Apartment Building

The subject property is located at 545 Bedford Street in Stamford. On October 1, 2017, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Bedford Hall. The subject property is .55 acres in size upon which is situated a modern, multi- family apartment building consisting of 82 one and two bedroom units. Seven units are below market value rentals, the remainder of the units are market value rentals. The apartment building is a Class A residential apartment building and has the amenities typical of that class of apartment buildings. On the date of valuation, the apartment building was well rented with a vacancy rate of approximately 3%.

Both sides submitted appraisals of the subject property. Stamford set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $22,753,000 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2017. The taxpayer’s appraiser found the FMV of the subject property to be $19,800,000 ($19,760,000 via the comparable sales approach/$19,830,000 via the income approach) as of the date of assessment. Stamford’s appraiser appraised the FMV of the subject property at $24,500,000 ($24,518,000 via the comparable sales approach/$24,143,000 via the income approach) as of the date of the assessment.

It is undisputed that the subject property was purchased by Bedford Hall on September 29, 2017, for $24,500,000. This sale price was supported by a Cushman & Wakefield appraisal dated August 23, 2017 valuing the subject property at $24,500,000. The taxpayer’s appraiser did not account for the sale in his analysis. The inescapable conclusion the court reaches is that he did not use the September 29, 2017 sale of the subject property because it did not support the plaintiff s preferred positionFor all the reasons laid out in the full decision, this appeal is dismissed. Judgment may enter in favor of the defendant.

The Lauren Investment Corp v. City of Waterbury (CV 20 6054164 S) July 5, 2024

Overvaluation – Restaurant Building

This matter is a property tax appeal by the Lauren Investment Corporation (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the City of Waterbury (defendant) of certain real property located at 544 Reidville Drive in Waterbury. The court held a trial on June 25, 2024 and July 3, 2024.

As of October 1, 2017 (Valuation Date), the defendant valued the Property at $2,031,480 and assessed taxes based upon seventy percent of the foregoing valuation and the applicable mil rate.

The plaintiff s expert produced a report and testified that, using the income and sales comparison valuation approaches, he valued the Property, as of the Valuation Date, at $1,475,000. The defendant’s expert produced a report and testified that, using the income and sales valuation approaches, he valued the Property as of the Valuation Date, at $2,000 000.

As of the Valuation Date the Property was subject to an amended lease with Friendly’s restaurant which amended lease was then most recently dated November 26, 2014 and had a term ending on March 31, 2036 (Friendly’s Lease). The highest and best use of the Property is as a restaurant.  As of the Valuation Date Friendly’s had leased the Property since about 1980. The restaurant subsequently closed in 2019 and Friendly’s Lease was terminated in the bankruptcy proceedings. The building that was present on the Valuation Date was torn down in 2021 and new building was erected and leased to Starbucks.

Brass Mill Center Mall, Et Al v. City of Waterbury (CV 18 6040421 S) August 15, 2024

Overvaluation of a Regional Mall

This matter is a property tax appeal by Brass Mill Center Mall LLC and Brass Mill Center Realty Holding LLC (collectively, plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the City of Waterbury and Board of Assessment Appeals of the City of Waterbury (collectively, defendant) of certain real property located at 495 Union Street in Waterbury. The court held a trial on August 7-8, 2024.

The Property is a portion of a retail shopping mall comprising all of its mall in-line stores, JC Penney, Burlington Coat Factory, Shoppers World and a movie theatre and containing 539,522 square feet of gross leasable area and 31 acres of land.

As of October 1, 2017 (Valuation Date) and for each fax year at issue in this litigation, the defendant valued the Property at $97,880,528 and assessed taxes based upon seventy percent of the foregoing valuation and the applicable mil rate.

The Properly has a trade area with a radius of approximately 9.5 miles and faces substantial competition from other malls which are outside of the trade area but nearby. As of the Valuation Date, there were signs that financial risks for the mall anchors (Sears, JC Penney and Macy’s) were rising. PWC, on page 24 of plaintiff s exhibit 15, states that 2017 was then poised to be the worst year on record for store closures and that the number of 2017 store closings was triple of that for 2016.

In view of the court’s factual findings, the court finds that the Property was overvalued by the defendant and the plaintiff is aggrieved. The proper valuation of the Property for all challenged tax periods is $86 million.

Fuel Cell – Do they constitute “Class One Renewables” for exemption 12-81 (57)

Supreme Court Decision July 24, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the exemption denial and retroactive assessment to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119. From 2017 to 2019, the plaintiff continued to file additional applications for tax exemptions under 12-81 (57). The defendant denied each subsequent exemption application and added 25 percent penalties for failure to declare the property.

Decision: We uphold the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff was not required to declare the property because it was exempt from taxation under 12-81 (57) and, by extension, that the penalties levied by the defendant under 12-81 (50) were not permitted. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred

Supreme Court Oral Argument: https://ct-n.com/ctnplayer.asp?odID=22580

Original  Appeal

Fuelcell Energy Inc. v. Town of Groton (CV 17 6038440 S) October 18, 2022

Personal Property Appeal.  Four Fuel Cell Modules – Exemption application not timely filed

December 22, 2021 Memorandum of Decision (counts three through eight)

The property at issue is certain personal property (ID No. 299473) comprising four fuel cell modules and related equipment designed to produce 5.6 megawatts of electrical power located at the Pfizer Inc (Pfizer) campus at 445 Eastern Point Road in Groton (Property).

The defendant taxed the Property as of October 1, 2016, as construction in progress and assigned a value of $8,192,800 on the 2016 grand Notice of the foregoing valuation and taxation was issued on January 31, 2017. On February 6, 2017, the defendant issued a Personal Property Change Notice adding an additional $2,048,200 to the valuation of the Property on the 2016 grand list, representing a 25% penalty for the plaintiff s failure to file a personal property declaration for the Property.

In its December 22, 2021 decision on summary judgment, this court (Klau J) determined that the Property, as of the 2017 though 2019 grand lists, was a fuel cell exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statute 12-81 (57).  The plaintiff did not file a written application for exemption from taxation with the defendant on or before the first day of November 2016, but instead first filed its application for exemption on February 14, 2017.

In view of the foregoing, the court finds that, as of October 1, 2016, the Property was exempt from taxation by the defendant pursuant to 12-81 (50). Accordingly, the assessment on the 2016 grand list by the defendant, both the basic assessment and the penalty was improper.

The William W. Backus Hospital v. Town of Stonington

Withdrawal of Appeal to Decision, September 3, 2024

Supreme Court Decision July 12, 2024

We agree with the town’s argument that the rehabilitation facility had been ‘‘acquired’’ by Hartford Healthcare for purposes of 12-66a, thus negating the charitable and hospital tax exemptions provided by General Statutes 12-81(7) and (16), respectively, that otherwise would be applicable to the personal property at issue. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Town appeals ruling that Backus Hospital is exempt from taxes at an outpatient rehab facility

Date Argued: 2/14/2024

Supreme Court Oral Argument:  https://ct-n.com/ctnplayer.asp?odID=22612

Original Appeal

The William W Backus Hospital v. Town of Stonington (CV 21 6067052 S) October 7, 2022

Decision has been appealed by the Town of Stonington October 24, 2022

Tax Exempt Status of Personal Property in an Outpatient Rehabilitation Facility

This matter is a property tax appeal by The William W. Backus Hospital (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Stonington (defendant) of certain personal property owned by the plaintiff and located at 100 Perkins Farm Drive, Suite 201, in Mystic, Connecticut. The plaintiff is a general hospital and is licensed as such by the Connecticut Department of Health and provides outpatient medical services which consist of medical rehabilitation services including physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, and specialized therapies to address neurological conditions, movement disorders, musculoskeletal conditions and sports medicine (collectively, “Rehabilitative Services”).

The parties have each filed motions for summary judgment which the court has ruled on through this memorandum of decision.

Conclusion: The court grants the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denies the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court enters judgment for the plaintiff on all counts. The Personal Property may not be taxed on the grand lists for 2020 and 2021.

Stonington has 20 days to determine if they will appeal.

Big Sky Properties, LLC v. Danbury (CV 23 6046287 S) March 12, 2024

RE: Failure to submit Appraisal by Statutory Deadline – Motion to Dismiss

Order On Pre-Appeal Application for Certification pursuant to G.S. 52-265a SC230305 June 27, 2024

Big Sky Properties, LLC Opposition to Defendant’s Application for Certification for a Public Interest Appeal June 25, 2024

Pursuant to Practice Book 66-2 and 83-1, Big Sky Properties LLC (“Big Sky Properties”) opposes the Defendant’s application for certification for a public interest appeal (the “Application”).

The trial court’s June 12, 2024 order clearly explains that its March 12, 2024 order conflicted with that trial court’s prior decisions involving essentially identical fact patterns and in which the trial court held that there cannot be a loss of jurisdiction when the statute gives the court discretion to dismiss. This Application has no merit and should be denied.

Motion to Open Judgment as amended and Motion to Reargue June 12, 2024

The court believes the interests of justice warrant the reopening of the judgment and the re-argument of the matter which was allowed at the short calendar hearing. The court notes that should future matters with similar fact patterns come before it, the court still retains the ability to exercise its discretion to dismiss such matters where it is argued that there has been a failure to comply with statutory deadlines for the filing of appraisals. This is true given that similarly situated plaintiffs are now acutely aware of the language of General Statutes 12-117a (as may be amended).

Application for Certification to File Public Interest Appeal June 20, 2024

The City is filing applications for certification of public interest appeals in each of these seven cases. If these applications are granted, the City respectfully requests permission to pursue a single joint appeal under Practice Book 61-7.

The original decision includes six additional cases; March 12, 2024.  7 Germantown Road, LLC v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-604628 2-S; BDN Property, LLC et al v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-6046285-S; Best Enterprises, LLC v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-6046290-S; H D Danbury, LLC v. City of Danbury, DBD-CV-23-6046280-S; Stetson Development Corporation v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-6046284-S; Route 6 Plaza, LLC v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-6046281-S.

Gary Beach Et Al v. Town of Hamden (CV 20 6106243 S) March 27, 2024

Due Process and Equal Protection Appeal – Revaluation Company Documentation

Each of the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were appealing from a June 3, 2020 action by the defendant board. They each specifically alleged their property address in the Town of Harnden and the amount of the town’s assessment for their property. They each alleged that the basis of their appeal was:

“The assessment has been based on secret formulae created and used by the Town’s agent, Vision Appraisal, which the Town has refused to disclose to my clients despite several proper requests for such information. Specifically:

• The Town has refused to provide a comprehensive description and explanation of the algorithm used to determine the value of the properties;
• The Town has failed to provide the methodology used to determine the geographic boundaries of Neighborhood 40 and the data relied upon to justify the fixing of those boundaries.

The assessment . . . because of this unlawful secrecy, manifestly deprives them of property without procedural due process of law and constitutes an arbitrary, and presumptively irrational, use of municipal taxing power.

The defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs have not established that they are aggrieved such that they have standing to bring their claim under Section 12-117a. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs only can be statutorily aggrieved for purposes of Section 12-117a if the plaintiffs’ properties have been over-assessed.  Because these plaintiffs do not  claim that  their properties  were  over-assessed,  the  defendant  argues  that  they  are not statutorily aggrieved.

Prior FOIA case regarding Revaluation Company files and documents.  Devine v. City of Middletown (Docket #FIC 1998-373) June 30, 1999

FPP, LLC v. Town of West Hartford (CV 22 6072391 S) June 6, 2024

Overvaluation – Large Single Family Home

The subject property consists of 3.91 acres of flat, well landscaped, and generally open land that abuts the Hartford Golf Club. Ledyard Street is a quiet, residential road. The private home situated on the subject property is a stone house constructed in 1919 in the style of an English manor house. The house has 12,971 square feet of gross living area. The house consists of eighteen total rooms, eight bedrooms, numerous bathrooms, eight fireplaces, a 6,700 square foot finished basement (including a bar area, wine cellar, sauna, gaming area, and exercise room), a roof top patio with jacuzzi, a pool, and a three-car garage.

Both parties submitted appraisals of the subject property.  Both Mr. Gottesdiener and Mr. Franke are experienced, licensed appraisers who are well qualified to offer their opinions of value.  West Hartford set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $2,400,000 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2021.

Mr. Gottesdiener found the FMV of the subject property to be $1,500,000 as of the date of assessment.  West Hartford’s appraiser, Mr. Franke, appraised the FMV of the subject property at $2,400,000 as of the date of the assessment. Both appraisers considered the comparable sales method to be the most appropriate method of valuing the subject property.

The court finds that the fair market value of the subject property is $2,000,000, as of the date of the assessment, October 1, 2021.

James R. Brennan v. Town of Seymour BAA (AC 46258) June 6, 2024

On the basis of our careful review of the record, we conclude that there is ample evidence in it to support the court’s determination that the current use of the plaintiff’s excess property did not constitute farm use. The judgement is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Original Appeal

James R. Brennan v. Town of Seymour BAA (CV 21 6042688) January 26, 2023

Declassification of Farm Land

The plaintiff, James R. Brennan, brought this administrative appeal challenging the assessment of his residential property and the declassification of his farm property.  The plaintiff appealed these decisions to the defendant, the Town of Seymour Board of Assessment Appeals, which upheld the assessor’s decision.  The plaintiff has abandoned count one of this appeal.  The parties also agreed that the only decision for the court to make is whether there was a change of use of the 7.26 acres of the plaintiff s property located at 124 Bungay Road in Seymour, Connecticut (Seymour property).

Property designated as farm land is assessed based on its current use. General Statutes 12-63(a). “The fact that a tax assessor makes no actual change in the classification for many years after the occurrence of one of the triggering events in 12-504h is irrelevant.”

In this present case, “it would be in direct conflict with the statutory scheme to retain a farm land classification on land that no longer qualifies as such and then assess it based on its non-farm current use.”

Lee Memorial United Methodist Church of Norwich v. City of Norwich (CV 22 6074602 S) June 5, 2024

Partial Exemption of a Religious Property

The plaintiff, The Lee Memorial Church of Norwich, Connecticut a/ka/ Lee Memorial United Methodist Church (Lee Memorial), appeals the decision of the defendant, the City of Norwich, denying Lee Memorial a tax exemption under General Statutes 12-81 (14) for that portion of Lee Memorial’ s property which is owned by Lee Memorial, but leased to an unaffiliated, for-profit company for use as a daycare facility (the subject property). Norwich argues that because Lee Memorial does not operate the daycare center, the subject property is not exempt from taxation under 12-81 (14). By its plain terms, and as relevant to this appeal, 12- 81 (14) requires only that exempt property be owned by a religious organization and that it be used exclusively as a daycare facility. Section 12-81 (14) includes no additional requirement that the day care center also be operated by the religious organization.

Because it is undisputed that the subject property is owned by Lee Memorial, that Lee Memorial is a religious organization, and that the subject property is exclusively used as a daycare facility, the court holds that the subject property is entitled to the tax exemption set forth in General Statutes 12- 81 (14). Therefore, the court sustains this appeal.

Jeffrey A Reiner, Trustee and JAR Partners v. Town of West Hartford (CV 22 6072277 S) April 24, 2024

Overvaluation – 18 Unit Apartment Building

The subject property consists of a .41 acre, rectangular parcel of land on which sits a 12,879 square foot, 18 unit, residential apartment building.  The apartment building on the subject property was constructed in 1962 and consists of one and two bedroom market rent apartments.  The building is reasonably well maintained, but its interior fixtures and amenities are somewhat dated.  It is a C class building.  There is limited parking at the subject property. Rents include heat and hot water, but not electricity.

It is not disputed that the highest and best use of the property is as a residential apartment building.

West Hartford set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $1,692,700 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2021.  Mr. Lo Monte found the FMV of the subject property to be $1,335,000 ($1,450,000 via the comparable sales approach $1,260,000 via the income approach) as of the date of assessment.  West Hartford’s appraiser, Mr. Kerin, appraised the FMV of the subject property at $1,855,000 ($1,870,000 via the comparable sales approach $1,850,000 via the income approach) as of the date of the assessment.

As set forth in the case, the court finds that the fair market value (FMV) of the subject property is $1,850,000 as of October 1, 2021, the date of assessment.

Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Town of Canterbury (CV 23 6026705 S) April 10, 2024

Motion to Strike a portion of the original appeal

The original complaint included allegations for the years of 2019-2021 and included three counts alleging excessive valuation, disproportionate tax burden and wrongful assessment. On November 6, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to strike (#104) alleging that counts two, five and eight of the amended complaint are legally insufficient. Count two alleges disproportionate tax burden for the year 2019, count five alleges disproportionate tax burden for the year 2020 and count eight alleges disproportionate tax burden for the year 2021.

H D Danbury, LLC v. City of Danbury (CV 23 6046280 S) March 12, 2024

RE: Motion to Dismiss – Failure to submit Appraisal by Deadline

Presently before the court is the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Docket Entry No. 108. The defendant argues that the plaintiff s complaint must be dismissed on the ground of a lack of statutory standing pursuant to General Statutes 12-l l 7a. The plaintiff objects to the defendant’s motion. Docket Entry No. 110. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

The plaintiff, H D Danbury, LLC, in a three-count complaint filed with the court on May 19, 2023, alleges the following facts.  The plaintiff appeals a decision from the action of the defendant, the city of Danbury, through the Danbury Board of Assessment Appeals (hereinafter “the Board”), concerning a tax assessment of the real property located at 53 Federal Road, Danbury, Connecticut.

On July 12, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, supported by a memorandum of law, on the ground of a lack of statutory standing pursuant to General Statutes 12-l l 7a. Docket Entry Nos. 101 and 102. Following the plaintiff s objection to the motion, the plaintiff moved to modify the statutory requirements to file an appraisal within 120 days of the filing of the appeal. Docket Entry No. 103; Docket Entry No. 104. On August 28, 2023, the court (Shaban, J.) found good cause for the extension of the September 16, 2023, deadline for the filing of the appraisal and granted the plaintiff a sixty-day extension to November 15, 2023, to do so. Docket Entry No. 104.01. The defendant then filed another motion to dismiss on December 15, 2023, following the expiration of the extension period, arguing the same grounds as the first motion. Docket Entry No. 108. The plaintiff has objected to the defendant’s motion.

Given that the plaintiff was granted an extension to file its appraisal, and having failed to file the appraisal with the court by the extended deadline, the court exercises its discretion to dismiss the action pursuant to 12-ll 7a (a) (2).

The original decision includes six additional cases; March 12, 2024.  7 Germantown Road, LLC v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-604628 2-S; BDN Property, LLC et al v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-6046285-S; Best Enterprises, LLC v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-6046290-S; Big Sky Properties, LLC v. Danbury, CV-23-6046287; Stetson Development Corporation v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-6046284-S; Route 6 Plaza, LLC v. Danbury, DBD-CV-23-6046281-S.

New Exchange Place LLC, Et Al v. City of Waterbury (CV 18 6040197S) March 1, 2024

Subsidized Housing Assessment Appeal

The Property is an 11-story 150-unit multi-family rental property with five commercial rental units on the ground floor. The Property consists of 0.43 acres and a building located in downtown Waterbury. The Property is subject to and benefitted by a long-term Section 8 contract with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) which subsidizes the rents being paid. The tenants of the Property are low- income elderly or disabled people. The rents to be charged are approved by HUD.

The Section 8 contract with HUD is a 20-year contract which expires on December 31, 2033, and may be renewed thereafter. The contract can be transferred from one owner of the Property to a succeeding owner with the approval of HUD. In fact, the plaintiff received assignment of the contract when it purchased the Property on February 1, 2017. A contract with HUD has been in place in connection with this Property since 1983.

The William W. Backus Hospital v. Town of Stonington

Town appeals ruling that Backus Hospital is exempt from taxes at an outpatient rehab facility

Date Argued: 2/14/2024

Supreme Court Oral Argument:  https://ct-n.com/ctnplayer.asp?odID=22612

Original Appeal

The William W Backus Hospital v. Town of Stonington (CV 21 6067052 S) October 7, 2022

Decision has been appealed by the Town of Stonington October 24, 2022

Tax Exempt Status of Personal Property in an Outpatient Rehabilitation Facility

This matter is a property tax appeal by The William W. Backus Hospital (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Stonington (defendant) of certain personal property owned by the plaintiff and located at 100 Perkins Farm Drive, Suite 201, in Mystic, Connecticut. The plaintiff is a general hospital and is licensed as such by the Connecticut Department of Health and provides outpatient medical services which consist of medical rehabilitation services including physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, and specialized therapies to address neurological conditions, movement disorders, musculoskeletal conditions and sports medicine (collectively, “Rehabilitative Services”).

The parties have each filed motions for summary judgment which the court has ruled on through this memorandum of decision.

Conclusion: The court grants the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denies the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court enters judgment for the plaintiff on all counts. The Personal Property may not be taxed on the grand lists for 2020 and 2021.

Stonington has 20 days to determine if they will appeal.

Fuel Cell Energy, Inc. v. Town of Groton

Fuel Cell – Do they constitute “Class One Renewables” for exemption 12-81 (57)

Supreme Court Oral Argument: https://ct-n.com/ctnplayer.asp?odID=22580

Original  Appeal

Fuelcell Energy Inc. v. Town of Groton (CV 17 6038440 S) October 18, 2022

Personal Property Appeal.  Four Fuel Cell Modules – Exemption application not timely filed

December 22, 2021 Memorandum of Decision (counts three through eight)

The property at issue is certain personal property (ID No. 299473) comprising four fuel cell modules and related equipment designed to produce 5.6 megawatts of electrical power located at the Pfizer Inc (Pfizer) campus at 445 Eastern Point Road in Groton (Property).

The defendant taxed the Property as of October 1, 2016, as construction in progress and assigned a value of $8,192,800 on the 2016 grand Notice of the foregoing valuation and taxation was issued on January 31, 2017. On February 6, 2017, the defendant issued a Personal Property Change Notice adding an additional $2,048,200 to the valuation of the Property on the 2016 grand list, representing a 25% penalty for the plaintiff s failure to file a personal property declaration for the Property.

In its December 22, 2021 decision on summary judgment, this court (Klau J) determined that the Property, as of the 2017 though 2019 grand lists, was a fuel cell exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statute 12-81 (57).  The plaintiff did not file a written application for exemption from taxation with the defendant on or before the first day of November 2016, but instead first filed its application for exemption on February 14, 2017.

In view of the foregoing, the court finds that, as of October 1, 2016, the Property was exempt from taxation by the defendant pursuant to 12-81 (50). Accordingly, the assessment on the 2016 grand list by the defendant, both the basic assessment and the penalty was improper.

Michael Camilini v. Town of Thomaston (CV 22 5031657 S) January 25, 2024

Single Family Home – Over-assessed

On October 1, 2021, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Mr. Camilini.  The subject property consists of approximately .4 acres of slightly sloping land in a rural, residential area of Thomaston.  The house located on the subject property is a two story, colonial style home built in 1968.

Thomaston set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $223,000 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2021. Mr. Camilini did not present an appraisal of the subject property at trial. Nevertheless, Mr. Camilini did present a comparative market analysis done by Ms. Mirabilio, who is a local real estate agent (and also Mr. Camilini’s grandmother) with decades of experience in the Thomaston residential real estate market. The defendant’s appraiser, Ms. Wicks, appraised the FMV of the subject property at $225,000 using the sales comparison approach.

Shelbourne CT, LLC v. City of Hartford (CV 22 6073442 S) January 24, 2024

Assessment Appeal – Downtown High Rise Office Building

The subject property is located at 20 Church Street in Hartford and is colloquially known as the “Stilts Building” because the entirety of its upper floors sit on concrete stilts. On October 1, 2021, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Shelbourne CT, LLC.  The subject property is a 23-story, class A commercial office building constructed in 1981.  The subject property is well maintained and generally up to date for a Class A commercial office building. The subject property has 418,807 square feet of net rentable area.

Konstantin Anikeev v. Town of Brookfield (CV 22 5031651 S) January 24, 2024

Residential Property – Over-assessed

The plaintiff, Konstantin Anikeev, appeals the real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the town of Brookfield, on the real property and improvements located at 16 Obtuse Rocks Road in Brookfield, Connecticut.  Mr. Anikeev proceeds pro se and pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a.

This matter was tried to the court on December 5, 2023.  The court heard from Mr. Anikeev, testifying on this own behalf, and Christopher Kerin, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the town of Brookfield.

McHenry Solar LLC v. Town of Hampton (CV 22 6078896 S) January 2, 2024

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reargue/Reconsider January 10, 2024

The plaintiff alleges that the town assessor failed to apply the tax exemption to the gross assessment and valuation of the personal property and instead listed the personal property as taxable.

Whether the generation of electricity constitutes manufacturing for the purposes of an exemption from personal property taxes is an issue of statutory interpretation. The plaintiff argues that the facts are undisputed, and the only issue is whether the plaintiff’s solar electric equipment qualifies for the exemption from personal property taxation under 12-81 (76) as a matter of law.

SG Pequot 200, LLC v. Town of Fairfield (AC 45863) January 10, 2024

Timely Filing to the Board of Assessment Appeals

The plaintiff, SG Pequot 200, LLC, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Fairfield (town), by the trial court in this municipal tax appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s municipal tax appeal on the basis that the plaintiff’s petition to the town’s board of assessment appeals (board) was untimely under General Statutes 12-111 (a) (1) and 12-112.

The plaintiff mailed its petition to appeal the valuation to the board on Friday, February 18, 2022, via Federal Express (FedEx) standard overnight shipping. The town’s municipal offices were closed Saturday, February 19, 2022, through Monday, February 21, 2022, Washington’s Birthday. On February 22, 2022, the board received the plaintiff’s petition, and on February 23, 2022, the board notified the plaintiff that its petition would not be heard because it was received after the statutory deadline of February 20.

Greenwich American, Inc. v. Town of Greenwich (CV 16 6050945 S & 19 6050944 S) December 15, 2023

Real Property Valuation Appeal

1 American Way, Greenwich.  The two appeals are for the same property, one is from October 1, 2015 and the other is from October 1, 2018. The matters were consolidated and transferred to the Judicial District of Stamford on March 18, 2021.

The property was built in 1970 and designed by Gordon Bunshaft, an internationally renowned architect, to serve as a single-tenant corporate headquarters for the American Can Company.  The property was reportedly the first corporate campus ever constructed in Fairfield County.  Property is a Class A office property consisting of three main structures: an office building, an executive building, and an on-site mansion.  Like many other large office properties in Greenwich, the property was eventually converted into smaller rentable units for multi-tenant office use.

Loch View, LLC v. Town of Windham (CV 16 6149827 S) December 11, 2023

Tax Fixing Agreement and Overassessment of Commercial Property

This case arises out of the redevelopment of Windham Mills in Willimantic, Connecticut. The plaintiff and current owner of the property, Loch View, LLC, claims that the defendant, Town of Windham, breached a seven-year tax fixing agreement formed in accordance with General Statutes 12-65b by cancelling the agreement and retroactively reassessing and taxing the property after the agreement had expired.

The plaintiff further challenges the amount of the retroactive assessments and the October, 2015 assessment pursuant to General Statutes 12-119, and challenges the assessments from October, 2015 to October, 2022 pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a.

Supreme Court Decision

Alico, LLC, Et Al v. Town of Somers Et Al. (SC 20748) December 12, 2023

Supreme Court Oral Testimony  Date Argued: September 11, 2023

Alico LLC, Et Al v. Town of Somers (CV 19 6055404 S) May 6, 2022

Motor Vehicle Registered out of State

This matter is an appeal of personal property taxes assessed by the Town of Somers (defendant), starting on its October 1, 2017 grand list, against Alico LLC (plaintiff), concerning two motor vehicles, namely a 2017 Chevrolet Silverado and a 2017 Cadillac Escalade.

The plaintiff is a Massachusetts limited liability company having an office and a place of business in Ludlow, Massachusetts. The plaintiff is a landscape construction company which performs work in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York.

The Motor Vehicles are driven daily and are garaged overnight at a Somers residence.  The plaintiff listed the Motor Vehicles on its 2019 personal property declaration in Somers with a notation that it paid taxes on the Motor Vehicles in Massachusetts.
 

Alico LLC, Et Al v. Town of Somers (CV 19 6055404 S) May 6, 2022

Motor Vehicle Registered out of State

This matter is an appeal of personal property taxes assessed by the Town of Somers (defendant), starting on its October 1, 2017 grand list, against Alico LLC (plaintiff), concerning two motor vehicles, namely a 2017 Chevrolet Silverado and a 2017 Cadillac Escalade.

The plaintiff is a Massachusetts limited liability company having an office and a place of business in Ludlow, Massachusetts. The plaintiff is a landscape construction company which performs work in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York.

The Motor Vehicles are driven daily and are garaged overnight at a Somers residence.  The plaintiff listed the Motor Vehicles on its 2019 personal property declaration in Somers with a notation that it paid taxes on the Motor Vehicles in Massachusetts.

Waterbury East LLC v. City of Waterbury (CV 18 6039528 S) November 30, 2023

Commercial Property Overassessment

The Property consists of 8.659 acres with four buildings located thereon. The four buildings have an aggregate gross building area of about 143,196 square feet and about. 141,646 square feet of net rentable area. The Property has easy on and off access to Interstate 84 and is located near a well-established commercial area. The Property was purchased by the plaintiff in 2005 for $3 million. At the time of purchase the Property comprised two buildings, however after the purchase of the Property, the plaintiff constructed two additional buildings on the Property.

As of October 1, 2017 (Valuation Date), the defendant valued the Property at $4,278,164.  The plaintiff’s expert produced a report and testified that, using the income valuation approach, he valued the Property, as of the Valuation Date, at $3,075,000.

The defendant’s expert produced a report and testified that, using the income valuation approach, he valued the Property as of the Valuation Date, at $3,600,000 for tax years 2017 and 2018, and $3,900,000 for tax years 2019 through 2021.

Nadia Drake v. Town of Fairfield (CV 21 6067324 S) November 29, 2023

Waterfront Residential Property – Over-assessed

The subject property is located at 2262 Fairfield Beach Road in Fairfield.  On October 1, 2020, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Ms. Drake.  The subject property consists of approximately .1 acres and sits at nearly the very end of Fairfield Beach Road, which itself sits on a narrow peninsula bordered by Pine Creek in the rear and Long Island Sound at the front.  At the point where the subject property is located, the peninsula is only approximately fifty yards wide. The subject property directly abuts Pine Creek at the rear of the property.  The subject property includes a small wooden dock 1 on Pine Creek and, given the subject property’s location near the end of the peninsula, provides ready and easy access to Long Island Sound.  The front of the subject property directly abuts Long Island Sound and includes. a small, private, sandy beach.

America Petroleum Realty v. Danbury (CV 23 6046185 S) November 21, 2023

Timely Submission of Appraisal

The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the plaintiff’s appeal from a ruling of the Board of Assessment Appeals of the City of Danbury. In its motion, the defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to comply with General Statutes 12-117a relative to appeals from rulings involving commercial property that is valued at over $1,000,000.

The statute, which was amended effective July 1, 2022, calls for the plaintiff to file an appraisal of the property with the court within 120 days of the filing of the appeal. General Statutes 12-117a (a)(2). That statute also allows for an extension of the deadline for good cause. The plaintiff has filed an objection (#103) and the defendant a reply (#105). Oral argument was held on November 20, 2023.

Alico LLC, Et Al v. Town of Somers (CV 19 6055404 S) May 6, 2022

Supreme Court Oral Testimony  Date Argued: September 11, 2023

Motor Vehicle Registered out of State

This matter is an appeal of personal property taxes assessed by the Town of Somers (defendant), starting on its October 1, 2017 grand list, against Alico LLC (plaintiff), concerning two motor vehicles, namely a 2017 Chevrolet Silverado and a 2017 Cadillac Escalade.

The plaintiff is a Massachusetts limited liability company having an office and a place of business in Ludlow, Massachusetts. The plaintiff is a landscape construction company which performs work in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York.

The Motor Vehicles are driven daily and are garaged overnight at a Somers residence.  The plaintiff listed the Motor Vehicles on its 2019 personal property declaration in Somers with a notation that it paid taxes on the Motor Vehicles in Massachusetts.

Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. City of Hartford (CV 17 6040042 S) November 2, 2023

Park Squire Associates, LLC v. City of Hartford (CV 17 6040043 S) November 2, 2023

Tax Abatement Agreement not honored

In the two above consolidated tax appeals, the plaintiffs, Park Seymour Associates, LLC (Seymour) and Park Squire Associates, LLC (Squire), appeal the imposition of real property taxes by the defendants, the City of Hartford and the Hartford Board of Assessment Appeals (together, Hartford, or the City of Hartford).   Seymour and Squire claim that they had tax abatement agreements with Hartford and that Hartford failed to honor those agreements.

ShortLineProperties v. Stamford (CV 23 6060950 S) October 12, 2023

Submission of Appraisal Requirement

Because the assessed value of the property was one million dollars or more, the applicant was required to file its own appraisal of the property that was the subject of the application. See General Statutes 12-117a (a) (2). The applicant, in a Motion for Order (Docket Entry No. 103), now requests that this court grant an order finding that an appraisal, dated as of December 30, 2020 satisfies the applicant’s obligations under 12-117a (a) (2).

The City filed an objection to this motion on July 14, 2023 (Docket No. 106) and again on July 20, 2023 (Docket No. 109), which also refers to other filings by the plaintiff.

Ann Macilvin v. Town of Fairfield, Office of the Tax Collector (CV 18 6047263 S) October 3, 2023

Certificate of Correction – Time Limit

The material facts of this matter are not in dispute.  Ms. Macilvin is the owner of real property located at 3388 Black Rock Turnpike in Fairfield (the subject property).  Ms. Macilvin has been the owner of the subject property since 1997.  The parties agree that the actual size of the subject property is 1.06 acres.  Nevertheless, since Ms. Macilvin’s ownership of the subject property, Fairfield has taxed the subject property as if it were 1.60 acres.

In August of 2017, Ms. Macilvin discovered Fairfield’s mistake and brought that mistake to the attention of the Fairfield assessor.  The assessor immediately made the relevant changes to the Subject Property’s field card and Fairfield issued tax credits to Ms. Macilvin for the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 tax years.

This case was brought by the Plaintiff to recover the overpayment of taxes from 1997 through 2013.

R. Bruce Palmer & Bradford C. Palmer v. Town of Salisbury (CV 22 5031550 S) September 25, 2023

Waterfront Residential Property – Over-assessed

On October 1, 2020, the real property and improvements at the subject property were  owned by the Palmers. The subject property consists of 1.49 acres that directly abuts Lakeville Lake (Lake Wononscopomuc).  The subject property is a long, thin rectangular parcel approximately 100 feet wide and 675 feet long.  The parcel is flat, abuts State Highway 112 at one end and the lake at the other.  There are two buildings on the subject property.  The first building is an approximately 2,102 square foot colonial style house constructed in approximately 1970 (hereinafter, the main house).  The main house has 4 bedrooms, 3 baths, and 8 rooms total. The outside areas have good views of the lake.

The second building on the property is a 1,000 square foot cottage style house located directly adjacent to the lake (hereinafter, the cottage).  The cottage was constructed in approximately 1987 and has 1 bedroom, 1-1/2 bathrooms, a small, walk-out finished basement, and a total of 4 rooms.  There is a small deck adjacent to the lake and the cottage has good views of the lake.

Salisbury set the fair market value (FMV) of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $1,505,700 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2020.

The plaintiffs’ appraiser appraised the FMV of the subject property at $1,145,000. The defendant’s appraiser appraised the FMV of the subject property at $1,750,000.

Baker Middletown, LLC v. City of Middletown (CV 22 6073647 S) September 22, 2023

Income and Expense Penalty

The plaintiff appeals the imposition of a tax penalty levied by the defendant pursuant to the terms of General Statute (12-63c). Section 12-63c’s authorization is discretionary, not mandatory.  In other words, an assessor is not required to seek income and expense information.  Nevertheless, if an assessor does choose to exercise their authority under 12-63c, and a property owner fails to submit the required income and expense data, 12-63c(d)(l) authorizes the assessor to impose a penalty by increasing the assessed value of the property by 10%.

In defense, Baker argues that 12-63c(a)’s requirement that income and expense data must be submitted “on a form provided by the assessor” means that the income and expense form must be actually received by the property owner.  Here, Baker claims it never received the income and expense form from Middletown, and, therefore, was unaware of any obligation to respond.

The court holds that 12-63c(a)’s requirement that income and expense data be submitted “on a form provided by the assessor” means that the property owner must actually receive that form.

 IJAN 2 CT v. City of Waterbury (CV 18 6040339 S) September 21, 2013

 Commercial Property Overassessment (2 Properties)

The property at issue comprises improved real property located at 158 Manor Avenue and 105 Meriden Road, both in Waterbury (Property).

After a reduction by the Board of Assessment Appeals, the defendant valued the 105 Meriden Road Property, as of the Valuation Date and on each grand list challenged; at $746,335. The plaintiff’s expert valued the 105 Meriden Road Property at $756,000 for the same periods. The defendant’s expert valued the 105 Meriden Road Property at $1,025,000 for the same periods. Accordingly, the plaintiff is not aggrieved with respect to the 105 Meriden Road Property.

The plaintiff is aggrieved and the valuation of 158 Manor Avenue on each of the challenged grand lists must be reduced to $1,288,000. The plaintiff has established that the challenged valuation for 158 Manor Avenue was excessive but has not established that the valuation was manifestly excessive. The plaintiff has also failed to establish that the challenged valuation of 158 Manor Avenue could only have been arrived at by disregarding applicable statutes. Instead, the difference in valuation arose merely from good faith differences of opinion.

Waterbury Reidville Drive, LLC v. City of Waterbury (CV 18 640883 S) September 18, 2023

Commercial Shopping Center

Plaintiff claims overvaluation of the shopping center. Competing income approach values both have their pluses and minuses.  However, the plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate that the property has been over-assessed and is not aggrieved as to the tax year 2017.

The court also finds that the assessor’ s value for 2018 should not be disturbed. The assessor value of $23,515,064 is lower than Vimini ‘s value, and the court has found that Vimini ‘s approach is the approach that best determines market value in this case.

The plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate that the property has been over-assessed and is not aggrieved as to the tax year 2018.

87 Grandview LLC v. City of Waterbury (CV 18 60039321 S) September 18, 2023

Medical, Surgical Center Overassessment

The property comprises a 2.565 acres site with a building which contains 26,834 square feet of first floor rentable space and 5,375 square feet of lover level space.  In addition to to office, reception and exam room space, the building also contained a surgical center. The Property is located in close proximity to Waterbury Hospital. In view of the property’s surgical center, its proximity to Waterbury Hospital is advantageous, particularly in case of emergency.

The court further found that the income valuation approach as executed by the Defendant’s appraiser was the most reliable and accurate valuation. The court found the valuations performed by the Plaintiff’s appraisers to be unreliable.

The appeal is dismissed for lack of aggrievement.

Greenwich Retail LLC v. Town of Greenwich (CV 21 6052214 S) August 1, 2023

Income and Expense Penalty

In this case, the assessor imposed a statutory 10% penalty for the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the statute (12-63c).  The application of the law to this case is complicated by a number of factors, including the fact that the year in question was 2020, such that the COVID pandemic impacted on a number of levels.  The June 1, 2020 deadline was extended to August 15.  The operation of the Assessor’s office and the operation of the designated representative of the property owner were affected in terms of staffing and what otherwise might be normal operations.

The plaintiff is challenging the imposition of the statutory 10% penalty, claiming that the statutory requirements for imposition of the penalty have not been satisfied. The plaintiff contends that the requirement of 45 days in which to comply – triggered by the assessor providing a suitable form – has not been satisfied. Further, to the extent that there was a follow-up mailing by the Assessor in August, reminding affected property owners of the need to meet the August 15 deadline, the plaintiff contends that it did not receive that notice until more than a week after the August 15 deadline, notwithstanding the assessor’s contention (and evidentiary submission) that there had been approximately two weeks between the date of mailing and the August 15.

A key issue – if not the critical determinative issue – centers on the address to which the Assessor sent notices and other communications.

Arthur D. Schaller, v. Town of Chester (CV 21 6066443 S) July 27, 2023

Real Property Tax Appeal – Residential Estate located on the Connecticut River

The subject property is a single-family contemporary home with 8,977 square feet built in 2000, an accessory home of 1,872 square feet, all located on 22 acres with 945 feet of riverfront with excellent views of the Connecticut River and Gillette Castle. The main house has 12 rooms, 4 full bathrooms, 2 half baths, an indoor pool and a customized woodworking shop.

The assessor for the town of Chester set the fair market value of the subject property as of the assessment date, October 1, 2018, at $2,924,026. Mr. Schaller’s appraiser found the fair market value of the subject property as of the assessment date to be $1,750,000. Chester’s appraiser found the fair market value of the subject property as of the assessment date to be $3,200,000. Both Appraisers concluded that the highest and best use of the subject property was as a single-family home and that the best way to estimate the fair market value of the subject property was by using the sales comparison method.

The court initially observes the difficulty in determining the “fairest approximation” of value in this matter.  The subject property was constructed to Mr. Schaller’s specific and somewhat idiosyncratic tastes.  Reflecting this reality, none of the comparable properties used by the appraisers included indoor pool areas, large wood working (or other special purpose) areas, large acreage plots, or second homes on the property.  Most of the comparable properties used by each appraiser were not of the more contemporary architectural style chosen by Mr. Schaller.  To adjust for these differences, each of the comparable properties used by the appraisers required significant adjustments to reach a perceived comparable value.  Nevertheless, after reviewing all the testimony, exhibits, and evidence admitted at trial, including the appraisals of both parties, the court adjusted the fair market value to $2,414,150

The Caring Community of Connecticut, Inc v. Town of Colchester (CV 16 6037378 S) July 6, 2023

Residential Group Home Exemption

Caring Community withdrew their appeal (April 8, 2024).

The Caring Community’s work is in large part funded through service contract with the Connecticut Department of Developmental Services (DDS) and the Connecticut Department of Social Services (DSS). Because of the severity of its clients’ disabilities, the Caring Community concedes that its clients are intended to remain in their residences permanently.  Nevertheless, the Caring Community argues that the legislature’s reference to “housing” in 12-81 (7) (B) is intended to apply only to government subsidized, low to moderate income housing where subsidized housing is the only service being provided.

For the Grand List years at issue in this case, the court interprets 12-81 (7) as providing a charitable purpose exemption only to charitable organizations providing temporary housing for persons with mental health and intellectual disabilities.  Because the Caring Community concedes that the housing it provides to its clients is intended to be permanent, the court holds that the Caring Community’s real property is not exempt from taxation under 12-81 (7) for the Grand List years at issue in this case.

Fair Oaks Commons LLC v. City of Waterbury (CV 18 6040495 S) June 27, 2023

Real Property Valuation – Retail Plaza

The Property comprises a retail plaza on 4.26 acres with frontage on Wolcott Street in Waterbury and with approximately 46,780 square feet of leasable area. The area on Wolcott Street nearby to the Property comprises primarily retail establishments.

The plaintiff s expert produced a report and testified that, using the sales comparison valuation approach, he valued the Property, as of the Valuation Date, at $912,800.

The defendant’s expert produced a report and testified that, using the income and sales comparison valuation approaches, he valued the Property as of the Valuation Date, at $2,100,000.

The highest and best use of the Property is as a retail plaza, its current use. The plaintiff purchased the Property in July of 2008 for $4.8 million. The plaintiff sold the Property in December 2021 for $1.7 million. The Property has suffered from poor management under the plaintiff, with the plaintiff (i) allowing the buildings on the Property to fall into disrepair, (ii) failing to reasonably invest in or maintain the Property, and (iii) allowing the Property to suffer from substantial vacancy which was far in excess of the annual retail vacancy in the neighborhood.

Momentum Equestrian Center LTD v. City of Torrington (CV 21 6063960 S) May 25, 2023

Tax Exempt Status of Real Property

The plaintiff, Momentum Equestrian Center, LTD (MEC), appeals the decision of the defendants, the City of Torrington and the Torrington Board of Assessment Appeals, revoking MEC’s status as a charitable organization under General Statutes 12-81(7).  For the reasons set forth, the court concludes that MEC is a charitable organization under General Statutes 12-81(7) and therefore sustains MEC’s appeal.

Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. v. Town of Rocky Hill (AC 45303) May 23, 2023

Personal Property Valuation

This appeal arises from a municipal tax appeal filed by the plaintiff, Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc., pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a,1 against the defendant, the town of Rocky Hill (town), challenging its assessments of personal property located at 1899 Silas Deane Highway (store) for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. The town appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff’s appeal and ordering the reduction of the town’s tax assessments levied against the plaintiff’s personal property. The town claims that the court (1) abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the valuations of the plaintiff’s expert appraiser and (2) made clearly erroneous findings that the plaintiff was aggrieved and as to the true and actual value of its personal property.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Re-Trial Decision

Kohl’s Department Stores v. Town of Rocky Hill (CV 16 6029185 S) February 3, 2022

This case, involving the valuation of personal property for property tax purposes, is decided by this court due to a remand from a prior decision in the Appellate Court, Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. v. Town of Rocky Hill, 195 Conn. App. 831, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 917 (2020).  In the prior decision, the Appellate Court held that the town was permitted to base its defense on General Statutes 12-63 (b) (3) B (6), even though the town had not adopted this statutory provision by ordinance.

The plaintiff taxpayer (Kohl’s) has taken an appeal from the defendant Rocky Hill assessor’s valuation for the tax years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017.

CC1 Owner LLC v. City of New Britain (CV 21 6065869) May 16, 2023

Downtown Special Services District Tax Appeal

Plaintiff is appealing the levy of additional taxes by the New Britain Downtown Special Services District (DSSD).  The claim is that the City entered into a tax modification agreement with the prior owner and therefore the DSSD is in violation of that agreement by levying additional taxes.

The court finds in favor of the City.  The court concludes that the tax modification agreement could not, as a matter of law, abate any taxes levied by the DSSD, and regardless, was not intended to do so by the parties.

93-1 Business Trust v. City of Waterbury (CV 20 6054491) March 8, 2023

Valuation of Retail Building (Family Dollar Store)

This matter is a property tax appeal by 93-1 Business Trust (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the City of Waterbury (defendant) of certain real property located at 1805 North Main Street in Waterbury. The court held a trial on March 1, 2023.

The Property is, and was at relevant times, leased by Family Dollar Stores of Connecticut LLC through a lease that was signed in August 2019, commenced in October 2019, has a ten-year lease term and has four five-year lease term extension options (Current Lease). Accordingly, the term of the Current Lease will range from ten years to thirty years depending upon the tenant’s.

Kingdom 1st v. City of Waterbury (CV 19 6048320) March 1, 2023

Tax Exempt Status of Real Property

This matter is a tax appeal concerning the valuation and taxation by Waterbury of real property located at 189 Wood Street in Waterbury. The plaintiff has asserted that the property is exempt from taxation, but the defendant denied the plaintiff s exemption application, and the Waterbury Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) upheld that denial.

The complaint comprises a single count asserting a claim pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a. Each of the parties has filed a motion for summary judgment on the single count.

The Property is being used exclusively to provide services to impoverished and disabled veterans of the United States armed forces. The program deployed by the plaintiff at the Property is called Each One Reach One. The Property is not used for any purpose other than for the program.

James R. Brennan v. Town of Seymour BAA (CV 21 6042688) January 26, 2023

Declassification of Farm Land

The plaintiff, James R. Brennan, brought this administrative appeal challenging the assessment of his residential property and the declassification of his farm property.  The plaintiff appealed these decisions to the defendant, the Town of Seymour Board of Assessment Appeals, which upheld the assessor’s decision.  The plaintiff has abandoned count one of this appeal.  The parties also agreed that the only decision for the court to make is whether there was a change of use of the 7.26 acres of the plaintiff s property located at 124 Bungay Road in Seymour, Connecticut (Seymour property).

Property designated as farm land is assessed based on its current use. General Statutes 12-63(a). “The fact that a tax assessor makes no actual change in the classification for many years after the occurrence of one of the triggering events in 12-504h is irrelevant.”

In this present case, “it would be in direct conflict with the statutory scheme to retain a farm land classification on land that no longer qualifies as such and then assess it based on its non-farm current use.”

Paul P Huffard IV & Kimberly Huffard v. Town of Darien (CV 19 6041652 S) December 14, 2022

Waterfront Residential Property with a Conservation Easement

The property, consisting of approximately 4.8 acres, is bounded on its east by the Long Island sound and on its west by Long Neck Point Road. ASL Partners had been able to subdivide the parcel into four building lots. On December 17, 2015, ASL Partners conveyed the subject property to the plaintiffs by means of a warranty deed. The purchase price for the entire parcel was $11,416,667.

On December 21, 2015, the plaintiffs deeded a conservation easement over the general southerly portion of the property to The Land Trust of Darien, Inc., a Connecticut nonprofit corporation (hereinafter, the “land trust”). The area affected by the conservation easement consisted of approximately 1.964 acres. This left the plaintiffs with the northerly 2.7982 acres, unencumbered by the conservation easement. On the same date, December 21, 2015, the plaintiffs filed and recorded a Declaration of Restrictions which affected the northerly portion which had been retained by the plaintiffs. The declaration provided that the property must be used and occupied for one single-family residence and accessory structures, only, and that it could not be subdivided or re-subdivided. The plaintiffs then constructed a residence on the property (having approximately 10,800 ft.) between approximately 2016-2018.

L&L Realty LLC v. Town of Avon  (CV 19 6054131 S) December 2, 2022

Real Property Valuation – Light Manufacturing Building

This matter is a real property tax appeal by L&L Realty LLC (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Avon (defendant) of certain real property located at 80 Darling Drive in Avon. The court held a trial on November 30, 2022.

The Property comprises a 161,710 square feet one-story light manufacturing building and a paved parking area as improvements. The foregoing improvements are in average to above average condition. The building comprises offices, shop area, warehouse and shipping/receiving. The improvements were generally initially constructed in 1975 with an addition constructed in 1981.

1160 Elm Street Rocky Hill LLC v. Town of Rocky Hill (CV 19 6052136 S) November 3, 2022

Real Property Valuation – Memory Care/Assisted Living Facility

The property at issue consists of land and improvements located at 1160 Elm Street Extension in Rocky Hill (Map ID:3214; Parcel ID: 12-146) (Property). The Property is operated as a memory care assisted living facility with 54 living units and 60 beds known as The Atrium at Rocky Hill. The facility has suffered declining occupancy rates with the 2016 occupancy rate at 85%, the 2017 occupancy rate at 77% and the 2018 occupancy rate at 65%.

As of October 1, 2018 (Valuation Date), and on each of the 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 grand lists, the defendant valued the Property at $8,879,400.

The plaintiff s expert, Courtney B. Lees, produced a report and testified that, using the sales comparison, income, and cost valuation approaches, she valued the Property, as of the Valuation Date, at $5,100,000. The defendant’s expert, Krystyna Gut, produced a report and testified that, using the sales comparison and income valuation approaches, the proper valuation of the Property as of the Valuation Date was $10,462,677.

Capasso, Concettina v. Town of Glastonbury (CV 20 6061040 S) October 28, 2022

Refusal to Allow Inspection of the Property

This matter is a real property tax appeal concerning property located at 305 Country Club Road in Glastonbury (Property). The property is a residence. The improvements on the Property are newly constructed.

The plaintiff has refused, and continues to refuse, to allow the defendant’s expert to inspect the Property. The court notes, however, that the plaintiff has allowed its own expert to inspect the Property, both interior and exterior. The defendant has filed a motion seeking entry of a judgment of non-suit. The plaintiff has opposed the motion. The court held a hearing on October 28, 2022.

GNR Realty, LLC v, City of Waterbury (CV 18 6040199 S) October 24, 2022

Overvaluation – Commercial “Mall View Plaza”

The city appraised the subject property at $2,900,972 for the revaluation date of October 1, 2017. Rented tenant spaces were used for purposes including a cinema, a Chinese buffet, a church, a cable shop, a barber shop, a family center, and a medical facility.

The plaintiff claims that the true and actual value of the subject property as of October 1, 2017, was the market value of $1,200,000 based on the retrospective appraisal report and testimony. The city at trial altered its market value and adopted a market value for the subject property as of October 1, 2017, as $2,275,000 based on the testimony.

The court finds, based on the credible testimony, that the highest and best use of the property as of October 1, 2017, was low-end commercial retail uses.  The plaintiff has satisfied its burden of establishing overvaluation under 12-117a. The plaintiff has not satisfied the heavier burden of establishing something more egregious than overvaluation under 12-119. The court finds that the true and actual proper fair market value for the subject property on October 1, 2017, is $1,800,000.

COF Real Estate Investments LLC v. Town of Windsor (CV 19 6052733 S), October 19, 2022

Overvaluation – Office Building Real Property

This matter is a real property tax appeal by COF Real Estate Investments, LLC, Series C (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Windsor (defendant) of real property and improvements thereon located at 3 Waterside Crossing in the Town of Windsor.  The Property is located in an office building complex known as Griffin Center or Griffin Park North which consists of the Waterside Crossing office buildings and the Griffin Road North office buildings.

The building was occupied as of October 1, 2018 by CIGNA with 26 months remaining on the lease.  Notification had not yet been given whether they were planning on exercising a five-year lease option.  Subsequently they did not renew and the building became vacant in 2020.

The plaintiff s expert, Arnold Grant, produced a report and testified that, using the income and sales comparison valuation approaches, he valued the Property as of the valuation date at $4,700,000 ($8,250,000 – $3,550,000 for needed tenant improvements in order to re-lease).  The defendant’s expert, William Kane, produced a report and testified that, using the income and sales comparison valuation approaches, he valued the Property as of the Valuation Date at $8,850,000.

The majority of the testimony centered on what would have been known by a potential investor as of October 2018 and what effect it would have on the value.  The court also considered that in its final decision.  Judgment enters for the plaintiff on counts one, three, five and seven. The full valuation of the Property on the 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 grand lists shall be $5.9 million.

Supreme Court Decision

Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Town of Hamden (SC 20571) October 18, 2022

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the word ‘‘submit’’ in 12-63c (a) unambiguously requires that the income and expense information be received by the assessor by June 1. See, e.g., Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Alfaro, 328 Conn. 134, 142, 176 A.3d 1146 (2018) (‘‘[A]mbiguity exists only if the statutory language at issue is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation. . . . In other words, statutory language does not become ambiguous merely because the parties contend for different meanings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). In the present case, therefore, the plaintiff did not ‘‘submit’’ its income and expense information when it placed that information in the hands of the United States Postal Service on May 31, 2016. The process of submission was not complete until the assessor received the forms on June 2, 2016, one day after the statutory deadline imposed by 12- 63c (a). Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to submit the required income and expense information under 12- 63c (d), and the 10 percent penalty imposed on the plaintiff pursuant to 12-63c (d) was valid. The Appellate Court, therefore, properly affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

Supreme Court – Concurrence

Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Town of Hamden (SC 20571) October 18, 2022

Appellate Court Decision

Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Town of Hamden (AC 42770) February 2, 2021

Income & Expense Penalty Appeal

Appeal from the decision of the defendant’s Board of Assessment Appeals denying the plaintiff’s appeal of a penalty imposed by the defendant’s assessor and added to tax assessments on certain of the plaintiff’s real properties, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, S. Richards, J., granted the defendant’s motions for summary judgment and to strike, and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

The plaintiff, Seramonte Associates, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the town of Hamden, as to count one of the plaintiff’s complaint and granting the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s constitutional claims in count two. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, with respect to count one, that the court erred in holding that the word ‘‘submit’’ as used in General Statutes 12-63c requires that certain tax forms have to be received by the defendant by June 1, and, with respect to count two, that the court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to strike, because the penalty imposed for the plaintiff’s late submission of the tax forms amounts to a fine that violates the excessive fines clauses of the federal and the state constitutions. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Original Appeal

Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Town of Hamden  (NNH-CV 16-6065237 S) February 5, 2019

Fuelcell Energy Inc. v. Town of Groton (CV 17 6038440 S) October 18, 2022

Personal Property Appeal.  Four Fuel Cell Modules – Exemption application not timely filed

December 22, 2021 Memorandum of Decision (counts three through eight)

The property at issue is certain personal property (ID No. 299473) comprising four fuel cell modules and related equipment designed to produce 5.6 megawatts of electrical power located at the Pfizer Inc (Pfizer) campus at 445 Eastern Point Road in Groton (Property).

The defendant taxed the Property as of October 1, 2016, as construction in progress and assigned a value of $8,192,800 on the 2016 grand Notice of the foregoing valuation and taxation was issued on January 31, 2017. On February 6, 2017, the defendant issued a Personal Property Change Notice adding an additional $2,048,200 to the valuation of the Property on the 2016 grand list, representing a 25% penalty for the plaintiff s failure to file a personal property declaration for the Property.

In its December 22, 2021 decision on summary judgment, this court (Klau J) determined that the Property, as of the 2017 though 2019 grand lists, was a fuel cell exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statute 12-81 (57).  The plaintiff did not file a written application for exemption from taxation with the defendant on or before the first day of November 2016, but instead first filed its application for exemption on February 14, 2017.

In view of the foregoing, the court finds that, as of October 1, 2016, the Property was exempt from taxation by the defendant pursuant to 12-81 (50). Accordingly, the assessment on the 2016 grand list by the defendant, both the basic assessment and the penalty was improper.

New Britain Water Department Et Al v. Town of Southington (CV 21 6065056 S) October 11, 2022

Valuation of Land used as Water Supply

This matter is a real Property tax appeal by the New Britain Water Department and the City of New Britain Board of Water Commissioners (collectively, plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Southington (defendant) of certain real Property owned by the New Britain Water Department in the Town of Southington. The court held a trial on September 7, 2022.

Every portion of the Property is held and used for the purpose of creating and furnishing a supply of water for the plaintiff s use and for use by the citizens of New Britain, and accordingly the Property must be valued for taxation purposes as if it were improved farmland pursuant to General Statutes 12-76. Improved farmland is land that has been altered from its natural state in order to enhance its use for farming. Such alterations may include clearing the land, grading the land, providing for irrigation, or similar improvements.

The citizens of Southington do not have the right to use, and do not use, the water supply provided through the use of the Property on the same terms as are applied to residents of New Britain, and accordingly the Property is not exempt from taxation.

Capital For Change, Inc v. Town of Wallingford (ASC 44404) October 11, 2022

Appellate Court Decision

The plaintiff, Capital for Change, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Town of Wallingford (board), which upheld the denial of the plaintiff’s application for a charitable organization real property tax exemption. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff’s property is not exempt pursuant to General Statutes 12-81 (7) because its mission to support affordable housing for low- and moderate-income persons is not a charitable purpose and, therefore, it is not organized exclusively, and its property is not used exclusively, for carrying out charitable purposes.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court on the ground that, regardless of whether the plaintiff’s mission to support affordable housing is a charitable purpose, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff’s property is not used exclusively for such a purpose, as required to qualify for the exemption.

Original Appeal

Capital For Change, Inc v. Town of Wallingford (CV 18-6080550) November 2, 2020

Denial of a Tax Exemption

The tax appeal now before the court presents the issue whether the subject property, owned by the appellant, Capital For Change, Inc. (“C4C”), is exempt from taxation pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-81(7). For reasons discussed in the decision, the subject property is not exempt.

Most of the pertinent facts have been stipulated by the parties. The subject property (“Property”) is located at 10 Alexander Drive in Wallingford. C4C operates its business at the Property together with the business of its subsidiary, CT Energy Efficiency Financing Co. (“CEEFCO”). Both C4C and CEEFCO are exempt from Federal taxation pursuant to 501( c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

The William W Backus Hospital v. Town of Stonington (CV 21 6067052 S) October 7, 2022

Decision has been appealed by the Town of Stonington October 24, 2022

Tax Exempt Status of Personal Property in an Outpatient Rehabilitation Facility

This matter is a property tax appeal by The William W. Backus Hospital (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Stonington (defendant) of certain personal property owned by the plaintiff and located at 100 Perkins Farm Drive, Suite 201, in Mystic, Connecticut. The plaintiff is a general hospital and is licensed as such by the Connecticut Department of Health and provides outpatient medical services which consist of medical rehabilitation services including physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, and specialized therapies to address neurological conditions, movement disorders, musculoskeletal conditions and sports medicine (collectively, “Rehabilitative Services”).

The parties have each filed motions for summary judgment which the court has ruled on through this memorandum of decision.

Conclusion: The court grants the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denies the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court enters judgment for the plaintiff on all counts. The Personal Property may not be taxed on the grand lists for 2020 and 2021.

Stonington has 20 days to determine if they will appeal.

Saint Mary Home, Incorporated v. Town of West Hartford (CV 18 6045800) October 4, 2022

Tax Exempt Status of Short Term Rehabilitation Section of Nursing Home

The Property is owned by a corporation organized exclusively for charitable purposes. As of October 1, 2017, the Rehab Unit treated patients who were already residents of the Saint Mary Home, as well as patients who were transferred to the Rehab Unit after hospital stays and required the types of rehabilitative services provided at the Rehab Unit.

All portions of the Property were granted the Exemption before and after the addition of the Rehab Unit (added 1986) until the 2017 Grand List when the 2017 Quadrennial Renewal Application was denied as relates to the Rehab.

By letter dated February 8, 2018, the assessor informed the plaintiff he was denying the plaintiff’s “request for tax exempt status for the 30,000 square foot section of the building currently used for short term rehabilitation purposes” (the “Rehab Unit”).  The plaintiff timely appealed this assessment to the defendant’s Board of Assessment Appeals (“BAA”).  The BAA denied the plaintiff’s appeal.

Conclusion

The court finds that the plaintiff uses the Property, including the Rehab Unit, exclusively for charitable purposes. The court further finds that the plaintiff has met its burden of proof on counts one and two of the complaint, and that, as of October 1, 2017, the entirety of the Property is fully exempt from taxation pursuant to 12-81 (7) and that the defendant’s attempted taxation was improper and inconsistent with applicable statutes and law.

John J Gunther, Et Al. v. City of West Haven, Et Al. (CV 21 6115404 S) September 29, 2022

Denial of Local Elderly Tax Relief

The plaintiffs, John J. Gunther1 and Joanne Gunther, seek recovery from the defendants regarding the denial of their application for a senior citizen tax credit. On October 1, 2021, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint, along with an accompanying memorandum of law in support, on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to meet the prerequisite statutory notice requirements pursuant to 7-465. The plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss on October 22, 2021. A hearing was held on the motion on May 24, 2022. On August 2, 2022, the court ordered the parties to brief the impact of Executive Order 7G on the issue of timeliness raised by the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Both parties submitted briefs on September 1, 2022.

Link to all the motions and court orders

SG Pequot 200 LLC v. Town of Fairfield (CV 22 6072518 S) September 14, 2022

Timely filing of appeal to Board of Assessment Appeals & Income & Expense Penalty

The following facts are relevant to a decision in this matter and are uncontested. The plaintiff shipped its appeal of the valuation and taxation of the Property on the October 1, 2021 grand list to the Fairfield Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) on February 18, 2021, which was a Friday, by Federal Express. The town hall, the clerk’s office, and the BAA for Fairfield were closed on February 19-21, 2021, because of the weekend and the President’s Day holiday on the following Monday. The plaintiff s appeal was received by the BAA on February 22, 2021.

The defendant has not assessed any penalty for the plaintiff s failure to timely file an income and expense report.  This count was withdrawn by the Plaintiff.

On February 23, 2022, the BAA sent a notice to the plaintiff informing the plaintiff that the BAA would not hear the plaintiff s appeal because the appeal was received past the statutory deadline.

323 Railroad Corp. v. Town of Greenwich (CV 16 6036231 S) September 1, 2022

Real Property Appeal. Failure to disclose expert or provide appraisal.

This matter, along with three consolidated matters, is a real property tax appeal. This matter has been pending with this court since 2016. In early December 2021, the parties submitted a joint scheduling order which the court promptly implemented. The scheduling order required the plaintiff to disclose, as provided for in Practice Book Section 13-4, any experts that it intended to call at trial and to provide any expert report or appraisal by March 1, 2022.  The plaintiff failed to disclose any expert and did not provide any expert report or appraisal by the required date.

Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust v. Town of Rocky Hill (CV 19 6052172 S) August 22, 2022

Overvaluation – Commercial “Big Box” Real Property

This matter is a real property tax appeal by Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Rocky Hill (the defendant) of real property and improvements thereon located at 80 Town Line Road as of October 1, 2018. The court held a trial on August 15 and 16, 2022.

As of October 1, 2018 (Valuation Date), the defendant valued the Property at $14,409,400 for the 2018 through 2020 grand lists and assessed taxes based upon seventy percent of the foregoing valuation and the applicable mil rate. The defendant valued the Property at $15,806,200 for the 2021 grand list and assessed taxes based upon seventy percent of the foregoing valuation and the applicable mil rate.

The plaintiff s expert, Gregory Curtis, produced a report and testified that he used the sales comparison and income valuation approaches, and he valued the Property, as of the Date, at $6,210,00 for the 2018 through 2021 grand lists.

The court did not credit or accept the sales comparison analysis of either expert. The court found that the income valuation approach was the appropriate and most accurate method of valuing this Property.

Wind Colebrook South, LLC v. Town of Colebrook (SC 20594) August 3, 2022

Wind Colebrook South, LLC v. Town of Colebrook – Concurrence

Wind Turbine – Real or Personal Property – Supreme Court Decision

The principal issue in this appeal is whether wind turbines used for the generation of electricity, and their associated equipment, are properly classified for purposes of taxation as real property pursuant to General Statutes 12-64 (a) or, instead, as personal property pursuant to General Statutes 12-41 (c) The plaintiff, Wind Colebrook South, LLC, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered primarily in favor of the defendant, the town of Colebrook, in this municipal property tax appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119.

Original Appeal

Wind Colebrook South, LLC v. Town of Colebrook (CV 16  6019649 S) March 16, 2020

Real Property or Personal Property and Valuation Thereof

The plaintiff has filed a municipal property tax appeal in which the primary items of property under appeal are two wind turbines and certain associated equipment located on the plaintiff’s land on Flagg Hill Road in Colebrook, Connecticut (the “property”) which transmit electricity generated by the wind turbines to the electrical power grid. Construction of the wind turbines and associated equipment was completed in 2015, and were first subject to municipal property taxation on the grand list of October 1, 2015. For that grand list year, the town’s assessor classified the two wind turbines and associated equipment and the land to which they were affixed as real estate subject to taxation under General Statutes 12-64. The plaintiff filed an appeal of the assessor’s classification and assessment with the town’s Board of Assessment Appeals.

More specifically, the plaintiff appeals the assessment and taxation of the real property at 29 Flagg Hill Road, including the wind turbines, and the assessment and taxation of its personal property. It does not appeal the assessment and taxation of the adjoining real property at 17 Flagg Hill Road but does appeal the assessment of some of the personal property located there.

Conclusion

The plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence its allegations as to counts one, two, three, four, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve. Judgment shall enter in favor of the defendant as to those counts.

The plaintiff has proven its allegations as to count five relative to the illegality of the imposition of the penalty relative to the October 1, 2016 personal property declaration. Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff as to that count. The defendant is ordered to refund to the plaintiff, the amount of the penalty paid by the plaintiff with four (4) percent interest from the date it was paid.

Deborah Ziegler Hilibrand v. Town of Greenwich (CV 16 6036186 S) July 21, 2022

Overvaluation – Residential Property

This matter is a real property tax appeal by Deborah Ziegler Hilibrand (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Greenwich (defendant) of real property and improvements thereof located at 100 Conyers Farm Drive in the Town of Greenwich as of October 1, 2015. The court held a trial on July 19, 2022.

The Property comprises approximately 5 acres with an 11,612 square foot (gross living area above grade) home, a pool, tennis court and patios. The total square footage of the home is in excess of 15,000 square feet including finished below grade space. The Property also has a three-car garage. The condition of the improvements is good with no deferred maintenance.

As of October 1, 2015 (Valuation Date), the defendant valued the Property at $13,419,400 and assessed taxes based upon seventy percent of the foregoing valuation and the applicable mil rate.

The plaintiff appealed the foregoing valuation and assessment to the Greenwich Board of Assessment Appeals and the board reduced the valuation to $12,419,400 and correspondingly reduced the assessment to seventy percent of the reduced value.

The plaintiff remains of the belief that the Board’s reduced valuation and assessment are still excessive, disproportionate and unlawful in that the plaintiff believes that the reduced valuation exceeds the actual value of the Property, and has accordingly brought this appeal.

As of the Valuation Date, the court finds that the true market value of the Property was $12,550,000.

John J. Fuller v. Town of Old Saybrook, Et Al (CV 19 6054200 S) June 21, 2022

Overvaluation – Residential Waterfront Property

This matter is a real property tax appeal brought by John J. Fuller (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation of real property located at 42 Watrous Point Road in Old Saybrook by the Town of Old Saybrook and the Old Saybrook Board of Assessment Appeals (collectively, defendants). The plaintiff has brought a single count complaint asserting a claim pursuant to General Statute 12-ll 7a. The court held a trial on May 27, 2022.

The Property comprises 4.97 acres on the Connecticut River near Long Island Sound in Old Saybrook as well as a 7,866 square foot residence which has been well maintained and in good condition. The Property also has an in-ground pool, a detached garage, a pool house, and a dock on the Connecticut River with a boat lift.

The plaintiff s expert, Robert Champagne, determined that the full fair market value of the Property as of the Assessment Date was $4,030,000.

The defendant’s expert, Michael Fazio, determined that the full fair market value of the Property as of the Assessment Date was $5 million.

Judgment enters for the plaintiff on the single count of the complaint. The full fair market valuation of the Property as of October 1, 2018 was $5 million. Taxes should be assessed on the Property based upon seventy percent of the foregoing full market valuation and the applicable mill rate.  The court will consider an award of costs if the plaintiff submits an appropriate and reasonable request. The court declines to award interest.

Chestnut Point Realty, LLC, ET AL v. Town of East Windsor (CV 19 6112549 S) June 1, 2022

Overpayment Refund Request

In this action, the plaintiffs assert that the defendant town should be compelled to refund alleged overpayments of real estate taxes and pay their attorneys’ fees under the doctrine of municipal estoppel. The plaintiffs claim that the town misled them into believing that they could appeal the town’s Board of Assessment Appeals’ (BAA) decision by filing, rather than serving, their tax appeals within two months from the date notices of the BAA’s decisions were mailed.

In the present action, the Town filed its answer to the complaint on May 28, 2021, and asserted statute of limitation, res judicata and collateral estoppel as special defenses. The plaintiffs’ reply denied the special defenses. On July  13, 2021, the Town filed its motion for summary judgment  and supporting memorandum  of law (motion for summary judgment), arguing that (1) the plaintiffs’  municipal estoppel claims are barred by the three-year tort statute of limitations in General Statutes 52-5774  because the alleged wrongful conduct occurred on May 1, 2013, when the Appeal Instructions were issued, and the plaintiffs did not commence this action until April 29, 2019; (2) the plaintiffs could and should have raised their municipal estoppel claims in the Tax Litigation, and are now barred from doing so under the principles ofres judicata  and/or collateral estoppel; and (3) the plaintiffs’  action is an impermissible collateral attack.

For the foregoing reasons (in the decision), the Town’s motion for summary judgment based on the collateral attack on the Supreme Court’s prior judgments is granted. The court need not address the Town’s alternative grounds for summary judgment (statute of limitations, res judicata, and collateral estoppel).

Original Appeal

On March 20, 2013, KB Realty and CP Realty filed tax appeals with the BAA, alleging that the KB Property and the CP Property had been overassessed. On May 1, 2013, the Town, acting through the BAA and the assessor, denied the appeals and issued written notices (Appeal Instructions) advising KB Realty and CP Realty that “[a]ppeals from the decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals are to be filed with the Superior Court within two (2) months of the Board’s action.” (Revised Compl., Exs. 1 & 3.)

On June 28, 2013, KB Realty and CP Realty filed tax appeals with the Superior Court (Tax Litigation) alleging that the properties had been overvalued. (See Kettle Brook Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, Docket no. HHB-CV-13-6021279-S; Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, Docket no. HHB-CV-13-6021280-S.)  The procedural history of these companion cases, and the arguments presented on appeal, are identical. The plaintiffs sought reimbursement from the Town for excess taxes they paid on the properties. The complaints were accompanied by a citation and recognizance and bore a July 23, 2013, return date. On July 10, 2013, a marshal served the complaints, citations and recognizances on the Town. On July 17, 2013, the marshal filed the returns of service with the court. On August 14, 2013, the Town filed motions to dismiss the appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not serve the appeal papers on the Town within the two- month period mandated by General Statutes 12-117a.1 After a hearing, the court granted the Town’s motions and dismissed the appeals.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial courts’ decisions, finding that the appeals were untimely under 12-117a because the plaintiffs did not serve the Town within two months of the date that the board mailed notice of its decision denying the tax appeals.

The plaintiffs further appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court. This court takes judicial notice of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 324 Conn. 528, 153 A.3d 636 (2017), in which the court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decisions and concluded that the tax appeals were untimely. 

Alico LLC, Et Al v. Town of Somers (CV 19 6055404 S) May 6, 2022

Motor Vehicle Registered out of State

This matter is an appeal of personal property taxes assessed by the Town of Somers (defendant), starting on its October 1, 2017 grand list, against Alico LLC (plaintiff), concerning two motor vehicles, namely a 2017 Chevrolet Silverado and a 2017 Cadillac Escalade.

The plaintiff is a Massachusetts limited liability company having an office and a place of business in Ludlow, Massachusetts. The plaintiff is a landscape construction company which performs work in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York.

The Motor Vehicles are driven daily and are garaged overnight at a Somers residence.  The plaintiff listed the Motor Vehicles on its 2019 personal property declaration in Somers with a notation that it paid taxes on the Motor Vehicles in Massachusetts.

Loch View, LLC v. Town of Windham (AC 44169) April 14, 2022

Appeal of a Prior Decision

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s denial of its motion to open the judgment dismissing its 2019 action against the defendant town regarding a municipal tax dispute, claiming that the court failed to exercise its discretion in ruling on that motion or, in the alternative, that it abused its discretion. The court had dismissed the 2019 action pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine, on the basis that the plaintiff had filed a previous action in 2016 against the defendant which had not been resolved and the two actions were virtually alike, both actions having been brought to adjudicate the same underlying rights and factual claims. Thereafter, the trial court in the 2016 action denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend its complaint to add a count alleging the constitutional violations th.at it had asserted in the 2019 action, and the court in the 2019 action denied the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment.

Held, that the trial court exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to open, as it considered and rejected  the change in circumstances identified by the plaintiff in its motion,  and the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the court’s denial of the plaintiff’s request to amend its complaint in the 2016 action did not require that the judgment of dismissal in the 2019 action be opened; moreover, the plaintiff could still fully and fairly litigate its constitutional claims in the 2016 action, as the plaintiff raised an identical constitutional argument as a special defense to the defendant’s counterclaim in the 2016 action and the fact that the plaintiff was forced to make its constitutional claim defensively instead of affirmatively did not affect the plaintiff’s ability to litigate those arguments; furthermore, the court properly considered the interests of judicial economy and efficiency and the need to avoid duplicative litigation and conflicting results in denying the plaintiffs motion to open.

Kaplan Walker, Robert Lisa v. Town of Clinton ( CV 21 6066444 S) April 8, 2022

Interior Inspection Refusal for Tax Appeal

This matter is a real property tax appeal which asserts claims of over-taxation pursuant to CGS 12-117a and CGS 12-119. In such a tax appeal, the proper valuation of the property is the primary issue to be decided. The plaintiffs have had the property at issue appraised. The defendant town seeks an order from the court compelling the plaintiff to allow the town’s appraiser to inspect the property. The plaintiff has opposed the town’s motion and has refused to allow an inspection of the property.

United States Postal Service & 29 Valley LLP v. Town of Greenwich (CV 17 6039384) April 8, 2022
 

Trial Brief for Bifurcated Trial regarding Land Value April 6, 2022

Overvaluation Portion of the Appeal

This court has previously determined that the Buildings and Improvements are exempt from taxation pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes 12-81(1) and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because they are owned by the USPS. See Memorandum of Decision dated August 18, 2021 by Aurigemma, J. at pages 11-12.

Judgment enters for the Plaintiffs on counts one, two and four. Judgment enters for the defendants on count three. The proper full market valuation of the property as of October 1, 2015, and for all periods challenged in this matter, shall be $7,400,000.  Taxes should have been assessed using seventy percent of the foregoing full market value and the applicable mil rate. The Buildings and Improvements are exempt from taxation. The court awards the Plaintiffs interest at the rate of three percent per year on any overpaid taxes from the date of such overpayment to the date of this decision.

United States Postal Service & 29 Valley LLP v. Town of Greenwich (CV 17-6039384) August 18, 2021

Exemption of a US Post Office

For many years the post office building in Greenwich, Connecticut had enjoyed tax exempt status as property belonging to the United States. In 2015 a new assessor began employment with the Town of Greenwich and determined that the post office building should no longer enjoy the federal exemption. In this case the plaintiffs appeal from the assessment under Connecticut General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119, alleging that this post office building is exempt from local taxation and seeking reimbursement for overpayment of taxes.

“Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the buildings and improvements on the Subject Property belong to the USPS within the meaning of Connecticut General Statutes 12-81(1) and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and are, therefore, exempt from taxation. Estoppel Preventing Change in Exemption.”

Digital 60 & 80 Merritt LLC v. Town of Trumbull (AC 44296) April 1, 2022

Town of Trumbull’s  Appeal of the Lower Court Decision

The defendant town of Trumbull and its Board of Assessment Appeals appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff’s appeals from the decisions of the board, which upheld the town’s tax assessments levied against the plaintiff’s real property.

After reviewing the record, including the thorough and well-reasoned memorandum of decision, we conclude that the court’s determination of the fair market value of the property was not clearly erroneous. The judgments are affirmed.
 

Digital 60 & 80 Merritt LLC v. Town of Trumbull (CV 14 025041 S) & (CV 15029300 S) August 4, 2020

Overvaluation – Original Appeal

These consolidated cases are tax appeals brought by the plaintiff, Digital 60 & 80 Merritt, LLC, pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a, contesting the valuation of its property at 60 Merritt Boulevard in the town of Trumbull (town) on the town’s Grand Lists for October 1, 2013, and October 1, 2014, and the refusal of the town’s Board of Assessment Appeals to reduce the corresponding tax assessments. The appeals were tried before the court for twenty-three days between October 2018 and March 2019. The court heard testimony from the town’s assessor, two experts with opinions on valuation, and two representatives of the plaintiff with knowledge about the plaintiff, the facility in question, and its operations. The parties introduced many exhibits into evidence, the plaintiff s labeled with capital letters and the defendant’s with numbers, including written appraisal opinions from each one’s expert. On December 19, 2018, the court and counsel also conducted a site visit and view of the property.

After the close of evidence, the parties submitted proposed findings of facts and briefs, appeared for argument in December 2019, and submitted post-argument briefs in February 2020. The matter is now ready for decision. The town appraiser appraised the property as having a fair market value of $145,446,000 as of October 1, 2013, and October 1, 2014. As discussed below, the court finds that the plaintiff has proven that the property was overvalued for tax assessment purposes and is therefore aggrieved. The court further finds that the fair market value of the fee simple interest in 60 Merritt Boulevard, reflecting the physical condition of that property as of October 1, 2013 and October 1, 2014, and based on market conditions as of October 1, 2011, was $109,000,000.

Peerless Realty, Inc v. City of Stamford Et Al. (AC 43448) March 25, 2022

Assessment Change and Tax Refund Greater than Three Years

The plaintiff property owner sought reimbursement from the defendants, the city and its tax assessor, for certain real property taxes paid to the city. In 2017, the plaintiff discovered that the city’s tax assessment records listed its property as being comprised of 1.15 acres, rather than the 0.89 acres that the plaintiff’s appraiser had determined in 1995 or the 0.88 acres that it had been surveyed at in 2008. The plaintiff contacted the tax assessor, who confirmed that the discrepancy was the result of an error and indicated that it likely had occurred when the city converted its records to an electronic system in 1993. The tax assessor corrected the error, credited the plaintiff for the excess amount it had paid in 2016, the then current tax year, informed the plaintiff that, pursuant to the applicable statutes (12-60 and 12-129), the city could only refund the plaintiff for excess payments made during the prior three years, and sent the plaintiff an application for reimbursement for the excess amounts paid for the 2014 and 2015 tax years.

Instead of completing the application, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendants demanding a refund of all excess taxes paid since 1993. The defendants’ response reiterated that any claim for a refund going back more than three years was time barred by the applicable statutes.

Danbury Mall LLC v. City of Danbury (CV 18 6046738 S) March 24, 2022

MS Portfolio LLC v. City of Danbury (CV 18 6046739 S) Consolidated decision, included in above link

Real Property Appeal – Valuation

These consolidated litigations are real property tax appeals brought pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119. The two appeals challenge the valuations and property tax assessments of the City of Danbury (Danbury) concerning three related parcels of real estate. The consolidated matters were tried to the court over several days in December 2021 and January 2022. The “Danbury Mall Property” is comprised of three parcels; the Mall Proper, the Sears Property & the Former Filene Property.

The decision is split with some counts for the plaintiff and others for the defendant.

Bassilakis, Harry v. Town of Bloomfield (CV 20-6060278 S) March 21, 2022

Motion For Judgment

Fair Market Value of $67,180 for the Property broken down with the P.A. 490 exemption in place for farmland of 12.33 acres with a fair market value of $12,330; plus outbuildings with a fair market value of $22,900 and for the non­ exempt land $31,950. The Property will have an assessed value of $47,026.

The assessed value and fair market value shall remain at the reduced values and with the P.A. 490 farmland exemption and shall not change except for the value or as may otherwise be permitted by law or the cessation of farming activities as they were existing on 10/112020.

Bassilakis, Harry v. Town of Bloomfield (CV 20-6060278 S) November 17, 2020

Physical Inspection of Farmland – Original Appeal

In this tax appeal the plaintiff challenges the Town of Bloomfield’s (“Town”) revocation of a longstanding farmland exemption for the subject property. As part of the discovery process, the Town seeks a court order authorizing it to inspect the subject property. The plaintiff objects. For the following reasons, the court overrules the plaintiff s objection.

Colvest/Colchester, LLC v. Town of Colchester (CV 20 6062877 S) March 14, 2022

Real Property Appeal – Valuation

This matter is a real property tax assessment appeal by Colvest/Colchester, LLC (plaintiff) concerning the tax assessment by the Town of Colchester (Colchester) for certain real property owned by the plaintiff located at 71 Linwood Avenue in Colchester. The plaintiff’s complaint challenges the tax assessment on the subject real property, pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119, on the 2019 and 2020 Colchester grand lists. The court held a trial on March 10, 2022.

Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc. v. City of Danbury (CV 18 6046735 S) March 2, 2022

Department Store, Mall Anchor – Valuation Appeal

This matter is a property tax appeal challenging the October 1, 2017 tax assessment of property, owned by Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc. (plaintiff), located at 7 Backus Avenue in Danbury by the City of Danbury (defendant). The effective complaint is an amended complaint dated September 29, 2021, asserting eight counts challenging the defendant’s assessment of the foregoing property pursuant to General Statutes 12-1l7a and 12-119 on the grand lists for October 1, 2017 through October 1, 2020. The court held a trial on December 1 -2, 2021.

The Property comprises a three-level owner occupied department store building attached to a regional shopping mall within the A class category with a gross building area of 240,413 square feet and 14.33 acres of land.

As of October 1, 2017 (Assessment Date), the defendant assessed the full fair market value of the Property as $17,206,800 with $10,953,600 attributed to the land and $6,253,200 attributed to the improvements thereon.

The defendant’s expert, Mark Kenney, determined that the full fair market value of the Property as of the Assessment Date was $19 million.

The plaintiff s expert, Donald Bouchard, determined that the full fair market value of the Property as of the Assessment Date was $11,500,000.

Redding Life Card, LLC v. Town of Redding (CV 13 6021904 S) February 4, 2022

Life Care Facility – Assessment Appeal

This matter is a real estate tax appeal concerning a property known as Meadow Ridge located at 100 Redding Road in Redding. Redding Life Care LLC (plaintiff) has filed a complaint challenging the valuation of the foregoing property set by the town of Redding (defendant) as of October 1, 2012, and on the defendant’s grand lists for 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119. The court held a trial on December 6- 9, 2021.

As of October 1, 2012 (Valuation Date), the defendant determined that the fair full market value of the Property was $112,500,000, and assessed taxes based upon 70% of the foregoing. The foregoing valuation was utilized by the defendant in all tax periods at issue in this matter.

The plaintiff s expert, David Lennhoff, determined that the value of the Property as of the Valuation Date was $70 million. Mr. Lennhoff employed and reconciled the cost, income and sales comparison valuation approaches.

The plaintiff s expert, Raymond Dennehy, determined that the value of the Property as of the Valuation Date was $78.9 million. Mr. Dennehy used the income valuation approach.

The defendant’s expert, Michael Baldwin, determined that the value of the Property as of the Valuation Date was $142.3 million. Mr. Baldwin employed and reconciled a modified income approach and the cost approach to attain his valuation.

The court then took a weighted average of the cost and income valuations to arrive at a final valuation for the Property as of the Valuation Date of $92,367,043, which the court rounded to $92 million.

Kohl’s Department Stores v. Town of Rocky Hill (CV 16 6029185 S) February 3, 2022

Re-Trial Decision

This case, involving the valuation of personal property for property tax purposes, is decided by this court due to a remand from a prior decision in the Appellate Court, Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. v. Town of Rocky Hill, 195 Conn. App. 831, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 917 (2020).  In the prior decision, the Appellate Court held that the town was permitted to base its defense on General Statutes 12-63 (b) (3) B (6), even though the town had not adopted this statutory provision by ordinance.

The plaintiff taxpayer (Kohl’s) has taken an appeal from the defendant Rocky Hill assessor’s valuation for the tax years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017.

Kohl’s Department Stores v. Town of Rocky Hill (AC 42021)

Appellate Court remands new trial.

The plaintiff, K Co., appealed to the Superior Court from an assessment by the Board of Assessment Appeals for the defendant town in connection with certain of K Co.’s personal property declarations. The trial court sustained K Co.’s appeal, finding that K Co. was aggrieved by the tax assessment.

The court stated that pursuant to statute (12-63 (b) (2)), the depreciation schedule set forth in 12-63 (b) (6) can be used by an assessor only if the municipality has, by ordinance, adopted the provisions of that section, and that the defendant had not adopted any such ordinance. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the court’s refusal to consider its assessor’s use of the statutory depreciation schedule in 12-63 (b) (6) was incorrect and that this legal determination likely influenced the court’s finding of aggrievement and its ultimate determination of valuation.

Held:

1. The use of the statutory depreciation schedule set forth in 12-63 (b) (6) by the defendant’s assessor was legally correct; the legislature intended that the depreciation schedule set forth in 12-63 (b) (6) was to be used by municipal assessors for purposes of standardization and uniformity, and, given the intent of the assessor in this matter to use the statutory depreciation schedule in order to achieve town wide consistency and uniformity in the valuation of business personal property, this court could not conclude that the assessor was legally barred from utilizing the statutory schedule.

2. The trial court’s misinterpretation of 12-63 (b) (2) was harmful and influenced the outcome of the case; the court’s too narrow interpretation of 12-63 (b) (2), foreclosed its consideration of the defendant’s evidence bearing on value solely because that evidence was based on the statutory depreciation schedule set forth in 12-63 (b) (6); moreover, the defendant was not required to offer an expert appraiser to counter K Co.’s opinion of value because 12-63 (b) (2) permitted the assessor to rely solely on the depreciation schedule contained in 12-63 (b) (6), and, accordingly, the case was remanded for a new trial

Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc vs. Town of Rocky Hill (CV 15-6029185 S), August 7, 2018

Original Appeal – Personal Property Valuation

The plaintiff brings this personal property tax appeal challenging the town of Rocky Hill assessor’s valuation.  The entire appeal revolves around the depreciation tables versus an actual market study by a consultant for the taxpayer.

Decision in favor of the plaintiff utilizing the values determined by the consultant.

Putnam Trust Company & Bank of NY Mellon v. Town of Greenwich (CV 16-6034459 S) January 3, 2022

Greenwich Commercial Building Valuations

This matter is a property tax assessment appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a concerning two properties located in the Town of Greenwich (Greenwich). The plaintiffs have brought a two count complaint dated June 10, 2016 challenging the tax assessment of each of the two properties as of October 1, 2015, with a single count directed to each of the two properties at issue. Both counts assert that Greenwich’s October 1, 2015 valuation exceeded the true and actual market value and was instead grossly excessive, disproportionate and unlawful. A trial to the court was held on November 22, 2021.

Fuelcell Energy, Inc v. Town of Groton (CV 17-6038440 S) December 22, 2021

Fuel Cell Exemption

The plaintiff owns two fuel cells that provide electrical power on the Pfizer campus in the City of Groton, an unconsolidated borough of the defendant Town of Groton (Town), which is the taxing authority for the City. For Grand List years October 1, 2016 through October 1, 2019, the Town assessed the fuel cells for personal property tax purposes. The plaintiff contends that the assessments are unlawful because fuel cells are categorically exempt under 12-81 (57). The Town responds that the fuel cells are a cogeneration system because they include a component known as a heat system recovery generator (HSRG). The Town maintains that the assessment was lawful because the Town did not enact an ordinance exempting cogeneration systems.

Thus, the principal question this appeal presents is whether a fuel cell with an HSRG is subject to 12-81 (57) or 12-81 (63).

For the following reasons, the court concludes that a fuel cell with an HSRG is categorically exempt under 12-81 (57). Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on Counts Three through Eight of its appeal complaint, which allege the plaintiff s exemption and overvaluation claims for Grand List years October 1, 2017 through October 1, 2019. Because of factual disputes about the status of construction of the fuel cells as of October 1, 2016, the court denies both parties’ motions for summary judgment on Counts One and Two.

Hartford Management Solutions, LLC v. Town of Bloomfield (CV 19-6052716) December 20, 2021

Personal Property Audit

This tax appeal challenges the defendant’s assessment of personal property taxes and its imposition of a 25% penalty for the plaintiff’s failure to file an itemized personal property declaration in 2016 and its failure to file any declaration in 2017. The defendant moves for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint.

For the following reasons the court concludes that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s illegal assessment claim under General Statutes 12-119 1 (Count One) and the plaintiff’s fourteenth amendment equal protection claim (Count Four). Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the plaintiff’s overvaluation claim under General Statutes 12-117a 2 (Count Two) and its claim under General Statutes 12-53 (Count Three).

The court assumes, without deciding, that the plaintiff’s failure to file a properly itemized declaration in 2016 and any declaration at all in 2017 warrants the imposition of a penalty under 12-53. However, by law the amount of the penalty must be based on the assessed value of the personal property. Because there is a genuine dispute over the value of the plaintiff’s personal property, the amount of the penalty is also indeterminate at this juncture.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Town’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Partial summary judgment shall enter in favor of the Town on Counts One and Four. Summary judgment is denied as to Counts Two and Three.

Park Place Improvement Association, Inc. v. Town of Glastonbury (CV 19-6053294) December 9, 2021

Open Space Land in a Subdivision – Exempt Status

This matter is a tax appeal contesting the assessment, as of the October 1, 2018 Grand List, of a property located on Park Place at Map: D11, Block: 5240, Lot: W0144 in the Town of Glastonbury. The plaintiff initially appealed the assessment to the Board of Assessment Appeals but was denied relief by the board in a notice dated April 1, 2019. The plaintiff brings a four-count amended complaint, dated November 3, 2021, in this court asserting claims under General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119, respectively, concerning assessments on October 1, 2018, 2019 and 2020. In particular, the plaintiff asserts that the property is exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statutes 12-81 (7). The court held a trial on November 4, 2021.

Dattilo Family Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westbrook (CV 17-6037358) November 22, 2021

Multi-Family Home Assessment Appeal

The Property is a multi-family, residential, year-round structure, consisting of 3 units located on 16,988 square feet of land in an area referred to as “Money Point” surrounded by million-dollar single family houses. The plaintiff purchased the Property in December, 2015 for $485,000. The plaintiff’s representative, Claudio Marasco, testified that he had previously represented to the Board of Tax Review that the fair market value of the Property was $600,000. He further testified that the Property was purchased as a rental property and he has previously rented three separate units in the Property. He also testified that he understood from the Town that the legal use of the Property is limited to two units.

The plaintiff filed a timely appeal to the Westbrook Board of Tax Review. On March 15, 2017 the Board of Tax Review denied the appeal, finding that the valuation of the Property “has already been lowered.” At the Board hearing the plaintiff argued that the fair market value of the Property was $600,000.

The plaintiff then timely appealed to this court. The First Count of the complaint alleges a violation of Connecticut General Statutes 12-117a and the Second Count alleges a violation of Connecticut General Statutes 12-119. The trial occurred on August 10, 2021 and September 7, 2021. The parties submitted simultaneous briefs on October 15, 2021.

There is also case law that the trial court is charged with the duty of making an independent evaluation of the property involved. E&F Realty v. Commission of Transportation, 173 Conn 247, 253, 377 A. 2d 302(1977). The only reliable evidence presented as to valuation came from Mr. Ryan. With respect to the First Count of the complaint, the court will reduce the Assessor’s value in accordance with Mr. Ryan’s appraisal and find that the Property had a fair market value of $900,000 and a 70% assessed value of $630,000 on October 1, 2016.

There was no evidence of misfeasance or malfeasance by the Assessor or Board or that the valuation was manifestly excessive within the meaning of Connecticut General Statutes 12-119. Judgment enters in favor of the defendant Town of Westbrook on the Second Count.

H L O Land Ownership Associates Ltd Ptnshp v. City of Hartford (CV 17-6038945 S) October 25, 2021

Surface Parking Lot Valuation

The property consists of 2.08 acres containing 275 to 286 parking spaces. It is located in the City’s Central Business District, just across from Bushnell Park. The property was once the site of a Hilton hotel, which was demolished in the early 1990s. The property has been used exclusively as a parking lot since then.

Based on the evidence, the claims of the parties, and after weighing the opinions of the experts, the court finds that the fair market value of the subject project, as of October 1, 2016 and subsequent years until the next town wide revaluation, was $3,900,000.

Bristol Sports Center DST v. City of Bristol (CV 18-6044354) October 13, 2021

ESPN Facility Assessment Appeal

This matter is a tax appeal contesting the assessment, as of the October 1, 2017 Grand List, of a property located at 383 Middle Street in Bristol. The plaintiff initially appealed the assessment to the Board of Assessment Appeals but was denied relief by the board in a notice dated March 12, 2018. The Plaintiff brings a two-count complaint dated April 26, 2018 in this court asserting claims under General Statutes 12-l 17a and 12-119 respectively. The court held a trial on October 6-7, 2021.

The main building, originally constructed in 1961, serves as an office building and comprises 330,400 square feet of building area. A warehouse building constructed in 1974 comprises 71,712 square feet of building area and is connected to the main building. There are also a 6,000 square foot garage and a 2,587 square foot building that houses a bank branch facility.  ESPN has occupied the Property, at least in part, since 2005.

The appropriate comparable sales valuation method, as analyzed by the defendant’s expert, yielded a higher valuation, however the court found that the income valuation method as analyzed by the defendant’s expert produced the most accurate valuation of the Property. The cost approach is not an appropriate valuation method in this case.

The court finds that the plaintiff has failed to prove that it is aggrieved. The court found that the proper valuation of the Property as of October 1, 2017 was $37,320,000, which exceeds the applicable assessed value of $36,064,500. In reaching its valuation, the court specifically credited, and found most persuasive, the defendant’s expert income valuation of the Property.

The court also found significant that the current owner of the property, a sophisticated real estate investment trust entity, paid $42,175,000 for the Property in December 2013, and that the market for the Property had not materially changed between the plaintiff s purchase and the Valuation Date. The court therefore finds that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant’s October 1, 2017 valuation of the Property at $36,064,500 was excessive.

Accordingly, the plaintiff is not aggrieved, and has failed to prove either of its claims. The court therefore will respectfully enter judgment for the defendant on both counts.

Mooreland Hill School Inc. v. Town of Berlin (CV 20-6059981 S) October 5, 2021

Tax Exemption on Closed Educational Facility

The school ceased to operate as an educational institution on or about August 31, 2019.  The Plaintiff maintains that the facility is being “maintained for an educational use” and they are hoping to sell or lease it to a third party for future use as a school.

Under 12-81 (7) the court finds that the facility must be actively used as an educational institution in order to have the exemption granted.

Rainbow Housing Corporation Et Al v. Town of Cromwell (SC 20506) September 1, 2021

Exemption Eligibility under 12-81 (7) 

Appeal from the decision of the defendant’s Board of Assessment Appeals upholding the denial of the plaintiffs’ claim for a certain real property tax exemption, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex and transferred to the judicial district of New Britain, where the court, Hon. Arnold W. Aronson, judge trial referee, who, exercising the powers of the Superior Court, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Rainbow Housing Corporation Et Al v. Town of Cromwell – Concurrence, Robinson, C.J.

Based on the limited factual record in this case, I conclude that Valor Home provides temporary housing to its clients within the meaning of the plain language of 12-81 (7) (B). I, therefore, agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the court affirming the trial court’s judgment

Original Appeal

Rainbow Housing Corp & Gilead Community Services Inc. v. Town of Cromwell  (CV 18-6045100), June 7, 2019

The plaintiffs, Rainbow Housing Corporation and Gilead Community Services, Inc. bring this action challenging the decision of the assessor of the town of Cromwell denying their application for a real property tax exemption related to their property known as 461 Main Street in Cromwell.  The property is a group home used to furnish rehabilitative services to inhabitants with mental disabilities, which services are funded in part by the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services and private donations.

Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs granting their motion for summary judgment. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied. No costs are awarded to any party.

Mozzicato Family, LLC I v. Town of Wethersfield (CV 19-6051630 S) August 18, 2021

Valuation Appeal from 2018 Revaluation

The plaintiff, Mozzicato Family, LLC I (Mozzicato) brings this real estate tax appeal challenging the assessor’s fair market valuation of the subject property located at 709-725 Silas Deane Highway in the town of Wethersfield (town) for the revaluation year of October 1, 2018 and subsequent years until the next town wide revaluation.

United States Postal Service & 29 Valley LLP v. Town of Greenwich (CV 17-6039384) August 18, 2021

Exemption of a US Post Office

For many years the post office building in Greenwich, Connecticut had enjoyed tax exempt status as property belonging to the United States. In 2015 a new assessor began employment with the Town of Greenwich and determined that the post office building should no longer enjoy the federal exemption. In this case the plaintiffs appeal from the assessment under Connecticut General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119, alleging that this post office building is exempt from local taxation and seeking reimbursement for overpayment of taxes.

“Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the buildings and improvements on the Subject Property belong to the USPS within the meaning of Connecticut General Statutes 12-81(1) and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and are, therefore, exempt from taxation. Estoppel Preventing Change in Exemption.”

Digital 60 & 80 Merritt LLC v. Town of Trumbull (CV 14-6025041 S & CV 15-6029300 S)

Post Judgment Interest

The plaintiff in the above consolidated tax appeals has moved for an award of post judgment interest pursuant to General Statutes 37-3a. Having also considered the defendant’s objection and the plaintiff’s reply thereto, the motion is denied, for two reasons.  The pending motion presents several issues this court has already considered and the other reason for denying the motion is that the court agrees with the defendant that it lacks authority.

Kenneth A. Black v. Town of West Hartford (AC 43918) July 13, 2021

NADA “Clean Retail Value” versus “Average Retail Price”

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from an assessment by the Board of Assessment Appeals for the defendant town of West Hartford in connection with certain of the plaintiff’s personal property. In his appeal, the plaintiff also named as a defendant the state Office of Policy and Management, claiming that it violated a certain statute (12-71d) in recommending the schedule of motor vehicle values the town used to assess his vehicle. The Office of Policy and Management moved to dismiss the action as against it and the trial court granted the motion on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Held that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the alternative ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the action against the Office of Policy and Management because he was not classically aggrieved; the personal and legal interest claimed by the plaintiff, namely, the way in which vehicles are assessed for tax purposes, is common to all taxpayers, and not specific and personal to the plaintiff, and apart from the Office of Policy and Management’s recommendation that municipalities use a certain guide’s schedule to assess vehicles, the plaintiff did not allege that the Office of Policy and Management had any involvement in the assessment of the plaintiff’s vehicle or any other vehicle, the plaintiff recognizing that it was the responsibility of each municipality to perform that function.

AH Min Holding LLC v. City of Hartford (CV 19-6106366 S) July 6, 2021

Termination of Tax Abatement Agreement

In this matter concerning termination of a tax abatement agreement, evidence was presented to the court at a remote bench trial on April 14, 2021. Thereafter, pursuant to a briefing schedule, the parties submitted post-trial briefs on May 7, 2021. After consideration of the evidence and the arguments presented in the parties’ post-trial briefs, the court issues this memorandum of decision.

On May 25, 2018, the City’s Committee on Abatement of Taxes and Assessments issued a letter (termination letter) to Ah Min indicating that the Agreement would be terminated if Ah Min failed to cure alleged Hartford Municipal Code violations within 90 days.

29 Parker Lane v. Town of Madison BAA (CV 19-60926285 S) July 2, 2021

Waterfront Home on Long Island Sound

The issue before the court is whether the plaintiff’s real property, (a waterfront home on the Long Island Sound), has been overvalued by the Assessor of the Town of Madison, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes 12-111. The court finds the value of the property is One Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand and No/100 ($1,650,000.00) Dollars, for the reasons set forth within.

Stanley Falkenstein v. Town of Manchester (CV 20-6060268 S) June 15, 2021

Defective Concrete Foundation Appeal

In this property tax appeal pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a the plaintiff challenges the defendant’s October 1, 2019 assessment of his property. The plaintiff contends that the defendant overvalued the property because its assessor failed to account for its defective concrete foundation.

It is undisputed that the plaintiff has already received property tax relief for that very condition for Grand List years October 1, 2020 through October 1, 2024 pursuant to General Statutes 29-265d.  Stipulation of Facts (dated Feb. 2, 2021) (#107.00) (“Stip.”), iii!7-10.

Moreover, the only reason the plaintiff did not obtain such relief for 2019 is because he missed the defendant’s December 31 deadline for filing his 29-265d application. Nevertheless, the plaintiff contends that he is entitled to use 12-117a to pursue a reduction in the assessed value of his property for the 2019 Grand List year based on the same defective foundation claim. The defendant responds that the plaintiff is limited to the relief he will receive under 29-265d.

Following a pretrial in which the precise nature of the parties’ dispute became apparent, the court invited the parties to submit cross-motions for summary judgment based upon a stipulation of facts. See Order (dated Dec. i4, 2020) (#103.00). The parties filed their respective motions and the court heard oral argument on April 26, 2021. The court now concludes that the plaintiff s claim under 12-117a fails as a matter of law.

LSE Canis Minor LLC v. Town of New Hartford (CV 19-6022324 S) May 28, 2021

LSE Canis Minor LLC v. Town of Barkhamsted (CV 19-6022592 S)

Personal Property Exemption Question – Solar Facility

The present motions concern the plaintiff’s appeals and claims for relief against the towns of New Hartford (Docket No. CV-19-6022324-S) (New Hartford appeal) (#116) and Barkhamsted (Docket No. CV-19-6022592-S) (Barkhamsted appeal) (#114), which were brought pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119.

The question before the court is whether the plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment as to counts three and four of its amended complaint against New Hartford (#117), and counts one and two of its amended complaint against Barkhamsted (#115), should be granted on the basis that the personal property that is the subject of the appeal is exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statutes 12-81 (57) (D).

The defendants New Hartford and Barkhamsted have filed their own motions for summary judgment (#121 and #119, respectively), as to the same counts on the basis that the personal property is subject to taxation and is not exempt under that statute. The court notes that the present inquiry regarding 12-81 (57) (D) appears to be a matter of first impression in Connecticut.

Wilton Campus 1691 v. Wilton (Appellate) AC 40697, August 14, 2019

Superior Court Decision May 26, 2021. (Upheld Appellate Court)

Income and Expense Penalty Appeal.

The plaintiff property owners filed six appeals from the decisions of the Board of Assessment Appeals of the defendant town of Wilton denying their appeals from the town’s tax assessments of the plaintiffs’ properties. Pursuant to statute (12-63c [d]), the plaintiffs were required to provide the assessor with annual income and expense reports regarding their properties by June 1, 2014. The defendant received those reports past the deadline but failed to add any late filing penalties, pursuant to 12-63c (d), before taking the oath in signing the grand list on January 1, 2015. Instead, as had been his practice, the assessor imposed late filing penalties on the plaintiffs retroactively, pursuant to the statute (12-60) that governs corrections to the grand list due to clerical omission or mistake, and issued certificates of change for the subject properties in April, 2015.

Decision...because the assessor was without the statutory authority to impose the late filing penalties after he signed the grand list, the late filing penalties are null and void. Because we agree and conclude that the assessor may not collect a tax on an assessment that is untimely adjusted by the imposition of late filing penalties (i.e., after the assessor signed the 2014 grand list), it can hardly be said that the statutorily unauthorized delay of the imposition of the late filing penalties was a mere procedural irregularity, which, if uncorrected, would result in no harm to the plaintiffs. The judgments are reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgments for the plaintiffs.

Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding (CV 13-6021904 S) April 7, 2021

Superior Court Order May 21, 2021

Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude Expert (#227.00)

This tax appeal has been pending since 2013. There are many reasons for the delay, none of which are particularly relevant to this ruling except that they prompted the court, Cardani, J., to issue a clear and unequivocal scheduling order on July 23, 2020. That order required the parties to exchange appraisals on or before October 30, 2020. The order further stated, “further extensions of the scheduling order are unlikely to be granted given the age of this matter.”

The defendant Town of Redding (“Town”) did not disclose its expert appraisal until late December 2020-nearly two months after the deadline. The plaintiff now moves for an order precluding the testimony and report of the Town’s expert. The Town objects and argues that the untimely disclosure did not prejudice the plaintiff and that preclusion would be inequitable under the facts and circumstances of the case.

Airgas USA LLC v. Town of Windsor (CV 20-6059844 S) March 19, 2021

Manufacturing Equipment Exemption

In this tax appeal Airgas USA, LLC (“Airgas”), challenges the Town of Windsor’s (“Town”) denial of a claimed personal property tax exemption. Airgas supplies atmospheric gases, such a hydrogen and nitrogen, for use in various manufacturing processes. The gases are stored in large tanks which Airgas owns and leases to manufacturing companies, including Aero Gear, Inc. (“Aero Gear”), located in Windsor. Airgas claims that the storage tanks leased to Aero Gear, and many other companies across the state, are exempt from personal property tax under General Statutes 12-81 (76). That statute exempts “machinery” and “equipment” installed in a manufacturing facility, if the “predominant use of [the machinery and equipment] . . . is for manufacturing.” “Equipment” means “any device separate from machinery but essential to a manufacturing  . . . process.” Airgas argues that the storage tanks are “equipment” and, therefore, are tax-exempt personal property.

Because the relevant material facts are not disputed, the court invited the parties to file cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties did so and the court heard oral argument on March 12, 2021. For the following reasons, the court concludes as a matter of law that the storage tanks are “equipment” and thus exempt from personal property tax.

Steven R. Astrove, et al v. Town of Norfolk (CV 19 6022555 S) March 10, 2021

This is a real estate tax appeal taken pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a from the assessment of property on the Norfolk Grand List of October 1, 2018.  The plaintiffs, Steven R. Astrove and Christina L Astrove, own property (“the property”) which was appraised by the Norfolk Tax Assessor at a 100% value of $356,700, and at a 70% assessed value of $249,690. The plaintiffs filed a timely appeal of their assessment to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Town of Norfolk which reduced the 100% value to $317,060 and the 70% assessed value to $221,940. This appeal followed. The trial took place on January 27, 2021.

The property is an undeveloped residentially-zoned building lot containing 2.05 acres in the Town of Norfolk. It has about 200 feet of road frontage along the east side of Tower Hill Road and about 200 feet of water frontage along the westerly shore of Doolittle Lake (“the lake”).

Brunswick School, Inc v. Town of Greenwich (CV 18-6037555 S) February 9, 2021

Taxable to Exempt – Taxes due

This case arises out of a disagreement between the parties concerning the appropriate interpretation of Connecticut General Statutes 12-81b which authorizes municipalities to set an earlier property tax exemption date, by ordinance, than the property tax exemption date that would otherwise be applicable under C.G.S. 12-89. The plaintiff argues that 12-81b authorizes a municipality to enact an ordinance which would provide that any tax or prorated amount of tax payable after the property becomes tax exempt would be eliminated by the exemption and that in fact Greenwich has adopted such an ordinance.

The defendant argues that 12-81b authorizes a municipality to exempt a property from municipal taxation as of the date of its acquisition with regard to the assessment year but that taxes due and payable after the exemption but based upon the assessment prior to the exemption are not affected. The defendant also argues that the Town of Greenwich did not adopt any ordinance to the contrary.

The plaintiff’s position would allow the municipality not only to accelerate the exemption to the date of acquisition but would allow the municipality to abate taxes that had become liens on the property more than a year before the acquisition. Interlude held that this was not the intent of the legislature and that determination controls the outcome of this case.

Accordingly, the plaintiff s motion for summary judgment must be and is denied.

Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Town of Hamden (AC 42770) February 2, 2021

Income & Expense Penalty Appeal

Appeal from the decision of the defendant’s Board of Assessment Appeals denying the plaintiff’s appeal of a penalty imposed by the defendant’s assessor and added to tax assessments on certain of the plaintiff’s real properties, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, S. Richards, J., granted the defendant’s motions for summary judgment and to strike, and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

The plaintiff, Seramonte Associates, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the town of Hamden, as to count one of the plaintiff’s complaint and granting the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s constitutional claims in count two. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, with respect to count one, that the court erred in holding that the word ‘‘submit’’ as used in General Statutes 12-63c requires that certain tax forms have to be received by the defendant by June 1, and, with respect to count two, that the court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to strike, because the penalty imposed for the plaintiff’s late submission of the tax forms amounts to a fine that violates the excessive fines clauses of the federal and the state constitutions. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Original Appeal

Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Town of Hamden  (NNH-CV 16-6065237 S) February 5, 2019

YPS Family v. City of Hartford (CV 17 6037545 S) January 28, 2021

Court Stipulation Violated (Contempt charged)

The plaintiff moves the court to find the City of Hartford (“City”) in contempt for allegedly violating a court-approved stipulation of value in a property tax appeal. The stipulation established an agreed-upon fair market and assessed value of the subject property-an apartment building and parking lot-and included the following key provision: “The parties hereto further stipulate and agree that said fair market valuation for the October 1, 2016 Grand List shall not change until the next city-wide revaluation except in the event that improvements are made to the Subject Property, it is demolished or partially or totally destroyed or as may be otherwise permitted by ” (Emphasis added):

Several months after the stipulation, the plaintiff changed the ownership structure of the apartment building to a condominium.  Actual ownership did not change, however, change in ownership structure allegedly resulted in a change in the income and the property, both of which may affect the property’s value, the City reassessed value higher than the stipulated value.

The court stresses that it does not decide whether, absent the parties’ stipulation, a change in ownership structure of real property would be grounds for an interim revaluation under 12-55 (b). The court resolves the motion before it solely as a matter of contract interpretation. “A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties.” Falcigno v. Falcigno, 199 Conn. App. 663, 691, 238 A.3d 60 (2020).

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff s motion for contempt is denied.  However, the court determines that the City’s interim revaluation of the subject property based on the change in ownership structure is not permitted under the terms of the stipulation.

Connecticut Supreme Court Hearing, December 11, 2020
 

Rainbow Housing Corporation et. al v. Town of Cromwell (video of hearing)

Original Memorandum of Decision

Rainbow Housing Corp & Gilead Community Services Inc. v. Town of Cromwell  CV 186045100, June 7, 2019
 

CT Community Nonprofit Alliance, Inc v. Town of Rocky Hill (CV 18-6048266) December 8, 2020

Memorandum of Decision : RE: Count Two; Motion To Strike (#102)

The plaintiff s two-count complaint challenges the defendant’s denial of an application for a property tax exemption, which resulted in a property tax assessment significantly higher than it otherwise would have been. Count One asserts a claim for wrongful assessment under General Statutes 12-119. Count Two requests a declaratory judgment, per General Statutes 52-29, that the plaintiff is organized for charitable purposes and that the subject property should be exempt from real property taxation.

The court grants the motion to strike Count Two, albeit for somewhat different reasons than the defendant asserts.
 

Peerless Realty, Inc. v. City of Stamford (CV 18-6034688) December 7, 2020

Tax Refunds greater than 3 Years – State Statute 12-60

Plaintiff, Peerless Realty Inc., has filed a two-count complaint against the City of Stamford and the Stamford Tax Assessor alleging, in count one, that the defendants have collected excess taxes resulting in financial damages to the plaintiff and seeks restitution, and in count two, that the defendants have been unjustly enriched.

The defendants assert that there exist no triable issues of fact with respect to these claims.
 

Bassilakis, Harry v. Town of Bloomfield (CV 20-6060278 S) November 17, 2020

Physical Inspection of Farmland

In this tax appeal the plaintiff challenges the Town of Bloomfield’s (“Town”) revocation of a longstanding farmland exemption for the subject property. As part of the discovery process, the Town seeks a court order authorizing it to inspect the subject property. The plaintiff objects. For the following reasons, the court overrules the plaintiff s objection.
 

Capital For Change, Inc v. Town of Wallingford (CV 18-6080550) November 2, 2020

Denial of a Tax Exemption

The tax appeal now before the court presents the issue whether the subject property, owned by the appellant, Capital For Change, Inc. (“C4C”), is exempt from taxation pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-81(7). For reasons discussed in the decision, the subject property is not exempt.

Most of the pertinent facts have been stipulated by the parties. The subject property (“Property”) is located at 10 Alexander Drive in Wallingford. C4C operates its business at the Property together with the business of its subsidiary, CT Energy Efficiency Financing Co. (“CEEFCO”). Both C4C and CEEFCO are exempt from Federal taxation pursuant to 501( c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
 

Doris Zelinsky et al v. Town of Branford (CV 20-6013530) October 13, 2020

Equal Protection Violation

Present before the court is the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiff’s Third Count of the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleges the violation of the Equal Protection clauses of the U. S. and the Connecticut Constitutions. The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s Count Three is legally insufficient, it does not allege the requisite element of disparate treatment, hence is defective as a matter of law to support a claim of the said violation of Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. and the Connecticut Constitutions. The plaintiffs oppose the subject motion. The Motion to Strike Count Three of the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby granted for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum of Decision.
 

GHJCC Swim & Racquet Club LLC v. Town of Bloomfield (CV 186044898 S) September 16, 2020

Denial of a Tax Exemption

The plaintiff, GHJCC SWIM & RACQUET CLUB LLC (Club), in its amended complaint filed on November 30, 2018, alleges the following facts.  The plaintiff is an organization described in 26 U.S.C. 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code.  The plaintiff claims to be a nonprofit entity, and, pursuant to General Statutes 12-81 (7), its quadrennial application for a property exemption should have been accepted by the assessor as of October 1, 2017.

This action is an appeal by the plaintiff from the assessor’s denial of its application for a tax exemption for property located at 4 Duncaster Road in Bloomfield. The plaintiff claims that the Club’s sole corporate member is the Joyce D. and Andrew J. Mandell Greater Hartford Jewish Community Center, Inc. (Community Center).
 

Digital 60 & 80 Merritt LLC v. Town of Trumbull (CV 14025041 S) & (CV 15029300 S) August 4, 2020

Overvaluation

These consolidated cases are tax appeals brought by the plaintiff, Digital 60 & 80 Merritt, LLC, pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a, contesting the valuation of its property at 60 Merritt Boulevard in the town of Trumbull (town) on the town’s Grand Lists for October 1, 2013, and October 1, 2014, and the refusal of the town’s Board of Assessment Appeals to reduce the corresponding tax assessments. The appeals were tried before the court for twenty-three days between October 2018 and March 2019. The court heard testimony from the town’s assessor, two experts with opinions on valuation, and two representatives of the plaintiff with knowledge about the plaintiff, the facility in question, and its operations. The parties introduced many exhibits into evidence, the plaintiff s labeled with capital letters and the defendants with numbers, including written appraisal opinions from each one’s expert. On December 19, 2018, the court and counsel also conducted a site visit and view of the property.

After the close of evidence, the parties submitted proposed findings of facts and briefs, appeared for argument in December 2019, and submitted post-argument briefs in February 2020. The matter is now ready for decision. The town appraiser appraised the property as having a fair market value of $145,446,000 as of October 1, 2013, and October 1, 2014. As discussed below, the court finds that the plaintiff has proven that the property was overvalued for tax assessment purposes and is therefore aggrieved. The court further finds that the fair market value of the fee simple interest in 60 Merritt Boulevard, reflecting the physical condition of that property as of October 1, 2013 and October 1, 2014, and based on market conditions as of October 1, 2011, was $109,000,000.
 

David Godbout v. Tony Attanasio Et Al.  (AC 42683) July 14, 2020

FOIA Violation

The plaintiff is a resident of East Lyme (town).  In 2012, he filed a complaint with the FOIC against the board and the town alleging that they had violated the state’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), General Statutes 1-200 et seq., ‘‘by not permitting [the plaintiff] or others with assessment appeals to view, listen, observe and attend the hearings of other persons appealing their motor vehicle tax assessments.’’ Godbout v. Board of Assessment Appeals, Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 2012–504 (August 28, 2013). The FOIC, after a hearing, concluded that the board had violated General Statutes 1-225 (a) FOIA’s open meeting provision—as alleged by the plaintiff, and the FOIC ordered the town and board to comply strictly with 1-225 in the future in conducting hearings and meetings concerning tax assessment appeals.

The plaintiff sought to recover monetary relief pursuant to statute (12-170) for the alleged misconduct of the defendants, members of the town board of assessment appeals related to his motor vehicle tax assessment appeal. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s action on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and had failed to allege that the defendants had engaged in some unlawful act or the omission of a necessary act, allegations that were required to support an action pursuant to 12-170. The court granted the motion to dismiss on both grounds, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument on appeal, and consistent with the ruling of the trial court, we conclude that the complaint fails to allege any act or omission by an individual defendant, that, if established as true, could satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating an unlawful act or omission necessary to prevail under 12-170. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that the complaint was insufficiently pleaded, and, because the plaintiff never raised his inability to replead as an issue before the trial court, the court’s granting of the motion to dismiss was not reversible
error. The form of the judgment is improper; the judgment dismissing the complaint is reversed, and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the defendants.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.
 

BRE Knight SH CT Owner, LLC vs. Town of Glastonbury (CV 196044652 S) June 10, 2020

Overvaluation

The subject property was built in the year 2000, specifically as a memory care facility. Of particular importance here is that BRE purchased the subject property as a memory care facility. This purchase appears to be an arms-length transaction that occurred on April 4, 2017, close to the revaluation date of October 1, 2017. The recorded price was $16,295,291. This purchase was part of a sixty-three facility, multi-state transaction and included tangible and intangible assets.

On October 1, 2017, the assessor for the town of Glastonbury conducted a revaluation of the subject property increasing its fair market value from $6,347,714 to $13,156,600. The plaintiff’s appraiser, Courtney B. Lees, was of the opinion that the fair market value of the subject property, as of October 1, 2017, was $9,500,000. The town’s appraiser, James K. Tellatin, was of the opinion that the fair market value of the subject property, as of October 1, 2017, was
$12,540,000.

Both appraisers considered the highest and best use of the subject premises, as of October 1, 2017, to be land improved with a memory care facility.

Considering all of the factors provided to the court, dealing with the real estate (land and improvements) as part of the memory care facility distinct from the furniture fixtures and equipment, and the business value attached to a well run operation of the subject facility, the value of the subject real estate is found to be $10,500,000.

Accordingly, judgement may enter in favor of the plaintiff without costs to either party.
 

Duracell US Operations Inc. vs. Town of Bethel (CV 186045322 S) May 6, 2020

Overvaluation

Duracell U.S. Operations, Inc. (Duracell) appeals the. real estate tax assessment issued by the Town of Bethel (Bethel)on real estate located at 14 Research Drive in Bethel (Subject Property) on the grand lists for October 1, 2017, 2018, and 2019. The litigation is brought in three counts. Count One alleges excessive valuation and is brought pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a. The second count alleges disproportionate tax burden and is brought pursuant to 12-117a. The third count alleges wrongful assessment and is brought pursuant to 12-119. The matter was tried to the court over three days on March 10-12, 2020.

Two experts produced reports and testified: Bruce Hunter and Peter Vimini. Both experts took extreme positions that the court did not find accurate or believable. The testimony and reports of both experts were partially believable and partially unbelievable.

The court finds that Duracell is aggrieved. Based upon the evidence presented, the court found that, as of the Valuation Date, the true value of the Subject Property was $50 million, and therefore the appropriate assessment is $35 million. The foregoing valuation and assessment as found by the court should have applied in each of 2017, 2018, and 2019. In contrast, as of the Valuation Date, Bethel determined that the market value for the Subject Property was $60,858,300 and assessed a value of $42,600,810. Bethel continued the foregoing valuation and assessment for 2018 and 2019.

The court therefore finds that the tax assessor’s action in valuing and assessing the Subject Property for the grand lists in 2017, 2018 and 2019 was erroneous and overvalued the Subject Property. Duracell has met its burden of establishing that the assessor’s valuation and assessment were excessive. As such, Duracell is aggrieved.
 

Wind Colebrook South, LLC v. Town of Colebrook (CV166019649 S) March 16, 2020

Real Property or Personal Property and Valuation Thereof

The plaintiff has filed a municipal property tax appeal in which the primary items of property under appeal are two wind turbines and certain associated equipment located on the plaintiff’s land on Flagg Hill Road in Colebrook, Connecticut (the “property”) which transmit electricity generated by the wind turbines to the electrical power grid. Construction of the wind turbines and associated equipment was completed in 2015, and were first subject to municipal property taxation on the grand list of October 1, 2015. For that grand list year, the town’s assessor classified the two wind turbines and associated equipment and the land to which they were affixed as real estate subject to taxation under General Statutes 12-64. The plaintiff filed an appeal of the assessor’s classification and assessment with the town’s Board of Assessment Appeals.

More specifically, the plaintiff appeals the assessment and taxation of the real property at 29 Flagg Hill Road, including the wind turbines, and the assessment and taxation of its personal property. It does not appeal the assessment and taxation of the adjoining real property at 17 Flagg Hill Road but does appeal the assessment of some of the personal property located there.

CONCLUSION

The plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence its allegations as to counts one, two, three, four, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve. Judgment shall enter in favor of the defendant as to those counts.

The plaintiff has proven its allegations as to count five relative to the illegality of the imposition of the penalty relative to the October 1, 2016 personal property declaration. Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff as to that count. The defendant is ordered to refund to the plaintiff, the amount of the penalty paid by the plaintiff with four (4) percent interest from the date it was paid.
 

GAIA Colchester LLC v. Town of Colchester (CV176037379 S) March 6, 2020

Overvaluation

The plaintiff, GAIA Colchester, LLC (“GAIA”) brings this tax appeal challenging the assessor’s valuation of $5,814,300.00 for the 2016 Grand List placed upon its real estate known as Colchester Courtyards, a multifamily property containing 92 dwelling units and located a 12 Balaban Road, Colchester, Connecticut (the “Property”). GAIA acquired the Property on August 4, 2010 for $5,400,000.

It is a basic principle of law governing tax appeals that it is the burden of the taxpayer to show that he or she has been aggrieved by the action of the assessor over-assessing the property. Ireland v. Wethersfield, 242 Conn. 550, 556, 698 A.2 d 888 (1997). It is also recognized by our case law that where the trial court finds that the taxpayer’s appraiser is unpersuasive, judgment may be entered in favor of the municipality on this basis alone. Id, at 557-58. See also Nutmeg Housing Development Corporation v. Town of Colchester, 324 Conn. l, 151 A.3 d 358(2016).

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that taxpayer’s appraiser unpersuasive and the taxpayer has not established aggrievement and enters judgment in favor of the defendant.

Kohl’s Department Stores v. Town of Rocky Hill (AC 42021) February 18, 2020

Appellate Court remands new trial.

The plaintiff, K Co., appealed to the Superior Court from an assessment by the Board of Assessment Appeals for the defendant town in connection with certain of K Co.’s personal property declarations. The trial court sustained K Co.’s appeal, finding that K Co. was aggrieved by the tax assessment.

The court stated that pursuant to statute (12-63 (b) (2)), the depreciation schedule set forth in 12-63 (b) (6) can be used by an assessor only if the municipality has, by ordinance, adopted the provisions of that section, and that the defendant had not adopted any such ordinance. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the court’s refusal to consider its assessor’s use of the statutory depreciation schedule in 12-63 (b) (6) was incorrect and that this legal determination likely influenced the court’s finding of aggrievement and its ultimate determination of valuation.

Held:

1. The use of the statutory depreciation schedule set forth in 12-63 (b) (6) by the defendant’s assessor was legally correct; the legislature intended that the depreciation schedule set forth in 12-63 (b) (6) was to be used by municipal assessors for purposes of standardization and uniformity, and, given the intent of the assessor in this matter to use the statutory depreciation schedule in order to achieve town wide consistency and uniformity in the valuation of business personal property, this court could not conclude that the assessor was legally barred from utilizing the statutory schedule.

2. The trial court’s misinterpretation of 12-63 (b) (2) was harmful and influenced the outcome of the case; the court’s too narrow interpretation of 12-63 (b) (2), foreclosed its consideration of the defendant’s evidence bearing on value solely because that evidence was based on the statutory depreciation schedule set forth in 12-63 (b) (6); moreover, the defendant was not required to offer an expert appraiser to counter K Co.’s opinion of value because 12-63 (b) (2) permitted the assessor to rely solely on the depreciation schedule contained in 12-63 (b) (6), and, accordingly, the case was remanded for a new trial
 

CIL Community Resources, Inc v. City of Hartford Et Al CV 17-6040041 S, November 7, 2019

Denial of a Tax Exemption

The plaintiff, CIL Community Resources, Inc. (CIL-CR), brings this action contesting the action of the assessor for the city of Hartford, Connecticut (city) denying a tax exemption to the plaintiff for its property, located at 75 Charter Oak Avenue in Hartford, for the city’s Grand List of October 1, 2016.

On October 15, 2013, the plaintiff had submitted a Tax-Exempt Organization Application for the subject property, which the city initially accepted as exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statutes 12-81 (7)1 as property being used for charitable purposes. The plaintiff later filed a 2017 renewal application for its charitable exemption previously granted in 2013.

The assessor, however, assessed the subject property on the Grand List of October l, 2016, at $5,481,100 because the assessor had concluded that the plaintiff had leased a portion of the subject property to other nonprofit charitable organizations, and therefore, the property did not qualify for an exemption.

Because the court finds that, in the present case, the sole purpose of CIL-CR is to lease commercial office space to charitable. organizations-and non-charitable organizations, this leasing does not serve an exclusive charitable purpose and, therefore, the city has sustained its burden to show that, as a matter of law, it is entitled to a judgment.

Accordingly, judgment may enter in favor of the defendants city of Hartford and Board of Assessment Appeals, without costs to either party.

Connecticut Radio Fellowship Incorporated v. City of Middletown CV 186044961 S, November 6, 2019

Denial of a Tax Exemption

The plaintiff owns and operates “an FCC licensed radio station, WIHS, which is a non-profit, non-commercial, listener supported religious, educational and public service radio station, located at 104.9MHz on the FM band.” Pl.’s Am. Compl. 2, Background, 2, No.  105. The main transmitter of the radio station is located on Round Hill Road. The radio station that operates the transmitter is located on South Main Street.

The plaintiff filed a Quadrennial Report (M-3) with the town’s assessor prior to October 1, 2017, claiming that six parcels of land were exempt from a property tax because of the plaintiffs religious and educational programs provided by its radio station as a public service. The plaintiff contends that the vacant parcels are incidental to the operation of the radio station.

Of the six parcels of land listed in the Quadrennial Report, the assessor had granted an exemption as to two of the parcels and denied the exemption as to the remaining four parcels.

In summary, the Judge essentially split the difference and said that the 11 acre parcel adjacent to their tax-exempt lot on Round Hill Road, and their 5.46 acre lot adjacent to their South Main Parcel are exempt from tax, while the other parcels C & D (totaling 6.4 acres) do not qualify for an exemption and are taxable.

The Judge found that since there was activity on the two parcels that emanated from the education purpose of the radio station, it qualifies as an exclusive use for an educational purpose.

Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding  CV 136021904 S, September 25, 2019

Motion for a Protective Order of a Non-Party Real Estate Expert

In this real estate tax appeal, the defendant, the town of Redding (town), seeks to depose a non-party real estate expert, David K Salinas (Salinas), who had previously rendered an opinion of value for the purpose of the plaintiff obtaining financing unrelated to a revaluation of the subject property. Salinas now moves for a protective order prohibiting the town from taking his deposition.

The formulation of the rule of law by the Appellate Court was made at the time that the Appellate Court did not recognize that it lacked subject jurisdiction to entertain Salinas’ appeal because the order of the pretrial judge was not a final order from which an appeal could be taken. The issue before this court can be resolved by following the recommended guideline of the Supreme Court at Redding Life, 331 Conn. 743-44: “Once Salinas attends the deposition, objects on the record to specific questions, and a trial court decides which, if any, questions he must answer, the courts will be better positioned to determine not only whether an unretained expert privilege exists, but if such a privilege even applies in this case.  As the record now stands, Salinas is requesting this court to decide this issue in a vacuum.”

Whether an unretained expert privilege exists will be decided by our courts following the procedure outlined above.

Accordingly, Salinas’ motion for a protective order is denied.

Wilton Campus 1691 v. Wilton (Appellate) AC 40697, August 14, 2019

Income and Expense Penalty Appeal.

The plaintiff property owners filed six appeals from the decisions of the Board of Assessment Appeals of the defendant town of Wilton denying their appeals from the town’s tax assessments of the plaintiffs’ properties. Pursuant to statute (12-63c [d]), the plaintiffs were required to provide the assessor with annual income and expense reports regarding their properties by June 1, 2014. The defendant received those reports past the deadline but failed to add any late filing penalties, pursuant to 12-63c (d), before taking the oath in signing the grand list on January 1, 2015. Instead, as had been his practice, the assessor imposed late filing penalties on the plaintiffs retroactively, pursuant to the statute (12-60) that governs corrections to the grand list due to clerical omission or mistake, and issued certificates of change for the subject properties in April, 2015.

Decision...because the assessor was without the statutory authority to impose the late filing penalties after he signed the grand list, the late filing penalties are null and void. Because we agree and conclude that the assessor may not collect a tax on an assessment that is untimely adjusted by the imposition of late filing penalties (i.e., after the assessor signed the 2014 grand list), it can hardly be said that the statutorily unauthorized delay of the imposition of the late filing penalties was a mere procedural irregularity, which, if uncorrected, would result in no harm to the plaintiffs. The judgments are reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgments for the plaintiffs.

873 WB LLC v. City of Hartford  CV 176037885, June 27, 2019

The plaintiff, 873 WB LLC, brings this tax appeal challenging the assessment of its property located at 873 West Boulevard in the City of Hartford on the grand list of October 1, 2016. The city’s assessor determined that the fair market value of the subject property was $11,205,500.

The subject property is a large apartment building located in the west end of Hartford near the West Hartford town line. The plaintiff purchased the subject building on December 3, 2015 for $11,550,000.  The subject building, constructed in 1971, consists of an apartment building containing 165 units with a mixture of 8 studio apartments, 120 one-bedroom apartments and 37 two- bedroom apartments.

The plaintiff claims that it overpaid for the subject property by approximately $3,000,000. The plaintiff presented at trial the testimony of its property manager, Paul Fornaby. He testified that the high price paid for the subject was “based on overly optimistic financial numbers proffered by the listing broker, as well as the plaintiff’s general unfamiliarity with the Hartford real estate market.” (Plaintiff’s 5/6/19 brief, p. 8.)

..“Recognizing that it is not the city’s burden to defend the action of the assessor in determining the assessment value of the subject” the court finds that the fair market value of the subject, as of October 1, 2016, is $10,250,000.

Rainbow Housing Corp & Gilead Community Services Inc. v. Town of Cromwell  CV 186045100, June 7, 2019

The plaintiffs, Rainbow Housing Corporation and Gilead Community Services, Inc. bring this action challenging the decision of the assessor of the town of Cromwell denying their application for a real property tax exemption related to their property known as 461 Main Street in Cromwell.  The property is a group home used to furnish rehabilitative services to inhabitants with mental disabilities, which services are funded in part by the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services and private donations.

Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs granting their motion for summary judgment. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied. No costs are awarded to any party.

Tuohy v. Town of Groton  SC – 20019, May 28, 2019

Supreme Court upholds the trial court decision.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendants and upholding the legality of assessments of Plaintiffs’ properties following a revaluation – which was a mass appraisal – conducted by the Town of Groton as a direct equalization measure in order to ensure that Plaintiffs’ neighborhood was not undertaxed relative to others in the municipality, holding that the trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs’ assessments were not manifestly excessive.

Plaintiffs argued that Defendants violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-62 and numerous regulations promulgated by the state Office of Policy and Management when they applied a flat, undifferentiated adjustment factor that increased the assessed value of all properties in Groton Long Point by a certain percentage without individualized consideration of the unique characteristics of each property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendants validly incorporated ratio studies and direct equalization via adjustment factors to neighborhood strata into the revaluation in order to ensure that Groton Long Point bore its fair share of the Town’s municipal tax burden relative to the Town’s other neighborhoods.

Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc vs. Town of Rocky Hill CV 15-6029185S, August 7, 2018

The plaintiff brings this personal property tax appeal challenging the town of Rocky Hill assessor’s valuation.  The entire appeal revolves around the depreciation tables versus an actual market study by a consultant for the taxpayer.

Decision in favor of the plaintiff utilizing the values determined by the consultant.

Walgreen Eastern Company, Inc v. Town of West Hartford  SC – 19750, July 24, 2018

Supreme Court upholds the trial court decision.

On March 14, 2017, Murtha Cullina LLP filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities (CCM) in an appeal pending before the Connecticut Supreme Court, Walgreen Eastern Company, Inc. v. Town of West Hartford.  Click here to read the entire amicus brief.

The case involves a commercial property located in West Hartford that is leased to a Walgreens drug store. The Town and Walgreens disagreed about the property’s actual fair market value by almost two million dollars. The trial court accepted the Town’s valuation which was premised upon a conclusion that the property’s highest and best use was as a retail drug store based in part on the existing contract rent under the Walgreens lease. The appeal raises challenges to the statutory requirement that municipal assessor’s consider contract rent in valuing rental properties and the specificity of highest and best use that may properly be applied in determining actual fair market value. The Supreme Court’s decision in this appeal could have broad implications for municipal tax assessments throughout the state.

According to the amicus brief filed by Murtha Cullina Attorneys Kari L. Olson and Proloy K. Das, “CCM advocates for approval of the use by municipal assessors of contract rents as a tool in arriving at the fair market value of income-producing properties, especially where, as here, the contract rents fairly reflect the highest and best use and intrinsic market value of the property.”

Walgreen Eastern Company, Inc v. Town of West Hartford.  CV 12-6015514S, December 29, 2015. 

This case is a real estate tax appeal concerning commercial rental property leased by Walgreen Eastern Company, Inc.  The subject property is a 1.45 acre improved parcel with a Walgreen Pharmacy.  For purposes of the October 1, 2011 property revaluation, the town appraised the property at $5,020,000.  The plaintiff appealed to the board of assessment appeals, which declined to reduce the assessment.  The plaintiff’s appraisers valued the property at $3,000,000.  The town’s appraiser valued the property at $4,900,000.  The testimony and the final decision revolved around the concepts of fee simple, leased fee and market versus contract rent. It also found that a market for the sales of pharmacies does exist and that sales of property leased to Walgreens are the most comparable.”  The court finds that the plaintiff has proven aggrievement but accepts the town’s appraisal and finds the value of the property as of October 1, 2011 is $4,900,000.

Charles D. Gianetti v. Adam Dunsby Et. Al.  (Board of Selectmen) Appellate Decision, June 26, 2018 (AC 40419)
 

Charles D. Gianetti v. Town of Easton,  CV 15-5030791S, April 20, 2017

The matter before the court is the plaintiff’s claim that he is eligible for tax relief by the Town of Easton under the terms of the “2009 Tax Relief for the Elderly Ordinance” of said Town.

The parties have raised several issues, including whether there is the remedy of appeal available to the plaintiff; whether the statute of limitations bars this claim; whether there is a valid claim of res adjudicate controlling the resolution of plaintiffs claim and finally whether the plaintiff’s claim can be successful on its merits.

The court has examined the evidence submitted in this case and arguments raised by the Briefs of the parties.  It is the courts determination that the plaintiff s claim fails on its merits.

Michael C. & Corinne E. Harrington v. Town of West Hartford CV 17-6038032S, April 20, 2018

The plaintiffs, Michael C. Harrington and Corinne E. Harrington (the Harringtons), are self-represented and bring this real estate tax appeal contesting the valuation placed upon their home at 16 Walbridge Road in the town of West Hartford (town) for the revaluation year of October 1, 2016. On the revaluation year of October 1, 2016, the town’s assessor determined that the fair market value of the subject property was $546,900 (assessed at $382,830).

The Harringtons’ main argument is that their home is very similar to that of 19 Walbridge Road, a house located across the street from the subject. This is the only comparable that was used by the taxpayer.  19 Walbridge Road was valued by the assessor, as of October 1, 2016, at $510,000, which equates to an assessment value of $357,000.

The decision was in favor of the Town. The plaintiff is not an appraiser, did not hire an appraiser and did not prove that they were aggrieved by the assessor’s opinion of value.

R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Town of Avon CV 14-6025599, April 20, 2018

Industrial printing facility disputes its market value from the 2013 revaluation.  This value was changed by the Court based on the differences in the opposing appraisers’ adjustments.  Very detailed description of the adjustments presented to the judge and his decision.

B. Devine v. City of Middletown CV 14-5015997S, March 8, 2018

Single Family residential assessment appeal from the 2013 revaluation where the property owner refused a physical inspection by the Assessor and the City’s appraiser.  The appraiser hired by the plaintiff was allowed access.

The plaintiff emphatically denied the defendant’s appraiser permission to inspect the subject property for the purpose of determining the subject’s fair market value.  However, the plaintiff claims the subject property was in such poor condition that the value of the property had decreased.

Decision: a small adjustment was granted, however, none of the issues relating to condition were allowed since entry was refused.

100 Berlin Holdings v. Town of Cromwell  CV 16-6033452S, January 12, 2018

Personal Property ownership and the filing of the declaration by the prior owner are central to this appeal.  The prior owner (Shaner) filed the declaration and paid the subsequent tax without disclosing that the property was sold before the October 1, 2015 grand list. The new owner (100 Berlin Holdings) appealed the assessment saying they were never sent a declaration.

In summary, it was the failure of Shaner to inform the assessor of the change in ownership that led Shaner to file the declaration, which itself, caused the assessor to rely on this filing as to the hotel’s ownership.  In addition to the assessor being misled by Shaner, the personal property taxes were paid without objection. Since the personal property tax for the 10/1/2015 Grand List was paid voluntarily without fault on the part of the assessor, 100 Berlin cannot be considered an aggrieved party. Accordingly, the town’s motion to dismiss is granted.

Brenda I. Tirado v. City of Torrington.  AC 39273, January 9, 2018

The plaintiff sought damages for the allegedly improper addition of her motor vehicle to the 2004 grand list of the defendant city, Torrington, resulting in a tax assessment on the vehicle. In 2010, the city of Waterbury issued a certificate of change for its 2004 grand list, removing the plaintiff’s vehicle therefrom, after receiving information from the plaintiff that she resided in Torrington at that time. In adding the plaintiff’s vehicle to its 2004 grand list in 2010, the defendant also issued a certificate of change. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the defendant issued its certificate of change after the three-year statute of limitations (12-57) had run. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her available administrative remedies before she filed her action pursuant to the statute (12-117a) governing appeals to the Superior Court from municipal boards of assessment appeals, and that she had failed to file her action within one year of the assessment if she had proceeded under the statute (12-119) governing applications for relief when property has been wrongfully assessed.

David H. Faile, Jr. v. Town of Stratford; Paul A. Lange v. Town of Stratford; N759ZD, LLC v. Town of Stratford. AC 38912, October 17, 2017

In this joint tax appeal, the plaintiffs, David H. Faile, Jr., Paul A. Lange, and N759ZD, LLC (LLC), appeal from the judgments of nonsuit, rendered by the trial court, in favor of the defendant, the town of Stratford (town). They also appeal from the court’s denial of their motions to open the nonsuits. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court’s findings that they violated its orders were clearly erroneous, and that, even if we assume, arguendo, that they did violate the orders, the court abused its discretion in rending judgments of nonsuit. We agree with the plaintiffs. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

Wilton Campus 1691, LLC v. Town of Wilton. CV 15-6030508S, July 12, 2017

Tax assessor’s duty to impose assessment penalties before the list is finalized is mandatory rather than discretionary, and an improper deferral until after finalization will delay penalty assessments until the following grand list.

Groton Long Point v. Town of Groton. CV 12-6050023S, July 5, 2017

This case is a class action residential real property tax application for relief pursuant to General Statutes 12-119.¹  The plaintiff class comprises: all owners of taxable residential real property with buildings thereon in the Groton Long Point assessment area of the Town of Groton (“town” or “Groton”) between October 1, 2011 and July 1, 2013, excluding those owners who individually appealed their real property tax assessments to the Superior Court and whose appeals have reached a final judgment.  (#201.00.)  A trial to the court took place on October 21, 28, and 30, 2016. For the reasons stated in the memorandum, the court finds for the defendant.

MSK Properties LLC v. City of Hartford. CV 15-6029158S, July 3, 2017

Part 1 – Sole member of a single-member LLC has standing to prosecute a real estate tax assessment appeal on behalf of the LLC.

Part 2 – Party who purchases rental property has standing to appeal an outstanding penalty imposed for the seller’s late filing with the assessor of an annual statement of rental income and expense.

Part 3 – Ten percent penalty for the late filing of a statement of income and expenses relating to rental property may be imposed even for a filing made only one day late.

Part 4 – Imposition of a tax penalty for a late filing cannot be challenged on a theory of unjust enrichment, regardless of how brief the delay may have been.

Charles D. Gianetti v. Adam Dunsby Et. Al. (Board of Selectmen) Appellate Decision, June 26, 2018

Charles D. Gianetti v. Town of Easton CV 15-5030791S, April 20, 2017

The matter before the court is the plaintiff’s claim that he is eligible for tax relief by the Town of Easton under the terms of the “2009 Tax Relief for the Elderly Ordinance” of said Town.

The parties have raised several issues, including whether there is the remedy of appeal available to the plaintiff; whether the statute of limitations bars this claim; whether there is a valid claim of res adjudicate controlling the resolution of plaintiffs claim and finally whether the plaintiff’s claim can be successful on its merits.

The court has examined the evidence submitted in this case and arguments raised by the Briefs of the parties.  It is the courts determination that the plaintiff s claim fails on its merits.

Kobyluck Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Town of Montville.  CV 15-6024120S, November 15, 2016.

Part 1 – Tax Assessor May Not Deny an Exemption Based Solely on a Taxpayer’s Failure to Provide All Information Requested on the Assessor’s Standard Exemption Claim Form. Rather, the assessor must make a decision on an exemption claim based on “the best information available.” This opinion holds that an assessor and a Board of Assessment Appeals improperly denied an exemption claim under the “manufacturing machinery and equipment” exemption, CGS 12-81 (72), based solely on the taxpayer’s failure to provide all of the valuation information requested on the assessor’s standard manufacturing exemption form.

Part 2 – Manufacturing Equipment Stored in One Town and Temporarily Moved and Used at Job Sites in Other Towns Is Not Entitled in the Town of Storage to the “Manufacturing Machinery and Storage” Exemption from the Personal Property Tax.

Coventry Imperial Development v. Town of Coventry.  CV 16-6029662S, April 1, 2016.  

Plaintiff Imperial Development, LLC appeals from the decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals of the defendant Town of Coventry (town) approving the removal of the plaintiff’s property from its classification as forest land.  The owner applied for sub-division, which was approved, the project was bonded, and roads were built.  The Town took the property out of PA 490 once the roads were built and the court ruled that the property should remain in PA 490. PA 490 as we know is to preserve farms, forest and open space (this property was a forest).  Once a developer posts a bond and builds roads, the development has started. The Assessor only took out the lots in the particular phase as it was built, he left the balance of the lot in PA 490. There were about 15 lots involved. The court decided that the property should remain classified as forest land. The judge relied heavily on the Griswold Airport v. Madison case

Walgreen Eastern Company, Inc v. Town of West Hartford.  CV 12 6015514S, December 29, 2015.  This case is a real estate tax appeal concerning commercial rental property leased by Walgreen Eastern Company, Inc.  The subject property is a 1.45 acre improved parcel with a Walgreen Pharmacy.  For purposes of the October 1, 2011 property revaluation, the town appraised the property at $5,020,000.  The plaintiff appealed to the board of assessment appeals, which declined to reduce the assessment.  The plaintiff’s appraisers valued the property at $3,000,000.  The town’s appraiser valued the property at $4,900,000.  The testimony and the final decision revolved around the concepts of fee simple, leased fee and market versus contract rent. It also found that a market for the sales of pharmacies does exist and that sales of property leased to Walgreens are the most comparable.”  The court finds that the plaintiff has proven aggrievement but accepts the town’s appraisal and finds the value of the property as of October 1, 2011 is $4,900,000.
 

Supreme Court of Connecticut – SC 19750 

On March 14, 2017, Murtha Cullina LLP filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities (CCM) in an appeal pending before the Connecticut Supreme Court, Walgreen Eastern Company, Inc v. Town of West Hartford.  Click here to read the entire amicus brief.

The case involves a commercial property located in West Hartford that is leased to a Walgreens drug store. The Town and Walgreens disagreed about the property’s actual fair market value by almost two million dollars. The trial court accepted the Town’s valuation which was premised upon a conclusion that the property’s highest and best use was as a retail drug store based in part on the existing contract rent under the Walgreens lease. The appeal raises challenges to the statutory requirement that municipal assessor’s consider contract rent in valuing rental properties and the specificity of highest and best use that may properly be applied in determining actual fair market value. The Supreme Court’s decision in this appeal could have broad implications for municipal tax assessments throughout the state.

According to the amicus brief filed by Murtha Cullina Attorneys Kari L. Olson and Proloy K. Das, “CCM advocates for approval of the use by municipal assessors of contract rents as a tool in arriving at the fair market value of income-producing properties, especially where, as here, the contract rents fairly reflect the highest and best use and intrinsic market value of the property.”

Reznik v. City of Milford. CV 126028137, December 11, 2015. This is a real estate tax appeal in which the plaintiffs, Alan M. Reznik and Elizabeth Kaye Reznik (Rezniks) challenge the valuation of their properly at 19 Beach Avenue in the city of Milford as determined by the assessor for the city of Milford on the grand list of October 1, 2012 related back to the last revaluation year of October 1, 2011. On June 11, 2012, the Rezniks purchased 19 Beach Avenue for 1,825,000. On August 7, 2012, the Rezniks wrote a letter to the city of Milford notifying the city that the purchase price included $100,000 worth of furniture that was purchased from the sellers. (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5). The Rezniks informed the city in this letter that the purchase price for the furniture should not be included in the assessment of the house. The assessor denied their request. The Rezniks have not produced any documentation, other than their letter of August 7, 2012, to support their claim that the purchase price for the subject property included the sale of the furniture for $100,000. The assessor had previously determined that the fair market value of 19 Beach Avenue, as of October 1, 2011 was $1,362,900.  Subsequently, for the grand list of October 1, 2012, a non-revaluation year, the assessor increased the assessment of the subject property to reflect a fair market valuation of $1,654,140. The assessor’s change in valuation of the subject property for the list of October 1, 2012 came about because of the practice of the Milford assessor, in his “watch tower” role, to comply with the provisions of General Statutes 12-55, which requires an assessor, prior to subscribing to the yearly grand list, to “equalize the assessment of property in the town, if necessary . . . .”

As to the second count of the plaintiffs’ complaint, based on 12-119, judgment may enter in favor of the defendant.  As to the first count based on 12-117a, judgment may enter in favor of the plaintiffs finding the fair market value of the subject property as of October 1, 2011 to be 1,560,000 without costs to either party.

Sweet Potatoes, LLC dba v. The Town of Seymour et al. CV146016022S March 27, 2015

The defendants, town of Seymour, its board of assessment appeals and tax assessor, move to dismiss the plaintiff’s action claiming that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. More particularly, the defendants contend that the plaintiff failed to file “a written appeal in proper form” in accordance with General Statutes 12–111(a). The facts necessary to the determination of the motion are undisputed. The plaintiff operates a barbeque restaurant at 225 West Street in Seymour, Connecticut. The plaintiff received a “Personal Property Assessment Notice” concerning the restaurant for the assessment year of 2012 by notice issued by the tax assessor’s office on February 7, 2013. The notice set forth the then current assessed value of the plaintiff’s personal property as $1,050, and noted the prior assessed value as $1,170. Pursuant to 12–111(a), any appeal of the 2012 assessment to the board of assessment appeals required that the appeal be filed in writing and no later than February 20, 2013. The plaintiff did not appeal the 2012 personal property assessment under that statutory section.
 

The defendants do not claim that the appeal was not timely filed. Admittedly, it was filed within the statutory time frame. Therefore, the court holds that the plaintiff’s appeal form substantially complied with the requirements of 12–111(a) despite not including the plaintiff’s estimate of the property value or date of signature.

The defendants are not prejudiced by this finding because 12–111(a) further provides for an appeal hearing before the board, held shortly after the filing of the appeal, in which involves the issue of the value of the assessed property. Because the appeal was timely filed, the lack of a date of the plaintiff’s signature also does not result in any prejudice to the defendants. Under the factual circumstances of this case, a hearing is warranted where the plaintiff’s personal property assessment in 2013 represented a substantial increase from its assessment in the 2012 tax year, and the plaintiff timely pursued its appeal remedy. In view of the foregoing, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

Afscme, Council 4, Local 818-052 v Town of Marlborough (SC 18865) August 20, 2013.

The primary issue in this certified appeal is whether an arbitration panel properly ordered the plaintiff, the town of Marlborough (town), to reinstate a former town assessor, Emily Chaponis, to her position because the termination of her employment, which had followed the expiration of her term of office, violated the applicable collective bargaining agreement (agreement). The town appeals, following our grant of certification,1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s denial of the town’s application to vacate the arbitration award (award) in which the arbitrators found that the town had violated the agreement when it terminated the employment of the town assessor without just cause. Marlborough v.AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052, 130 Conn. App. 556, 557–58, 23 A.3d 798 (2011).

On appeal, the town argues that General Statutes 9-187 (a)2 clearly applies to the position of town assessor and that the arbitrators’ decision to the contrary was in manifest disregard of the law and was unenforceable. We conclude that, the award ordering Chaponis’ reinstatement after the statutory expiration of her term of office contravened the plain and unambiguous mandates of the statutory scheme governing the term of office for municipal officers and that the award is, therefore, unenforceable. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Afscme, Council 4, Local 1303-325 v Town of Westbrook (SC 18969) August 20, 2013.

The determinative question in this appeal is whether the trial court properly limited the scope of its review when it denied an application, filed by the plaintiff, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1303-325 (union), to vacate an arbitration award (award), which concluded that a grievance challenging the decision of the defendant, the town of Westbrook (town), not to reappoint its assessor, Ivan Kuvalanka, to a successive term of office was not arbitrable. Specifically, the union claims on appeal that the trial court improperly limited its scope of review and incorrectly concluded that the town’s decision to terminate Kuvalanka’s employment upon the expiration of his term of office was not governed by the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement (agreement). We disagree and conclude that the trial court properly limited the scope of its review when considering the union’s application to vacate the award and properly determined that the union did not establish grounds to vacate the award. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kasica vs Town of Columbia Supreme Court, (SC 18968) June 25, 2013. 

The primary issue in this tax appeal is whether a municipal assessor has the authority, under General Statutes 12-55 (b), to conduct an interim assessment of a property and increase its valuation based on partially completed construction. The defendant, the town of Columbia (town), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Gene Kasica, in his appeal from the decision of the town’s Board of Assessment Appeals (board) upholding the town assessor’s interim valuations of the plaintiff’s property under 12-55. On appeal, the town claims that the trial court improperly applied General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) 12-53a, to the facts of the present case and incorrectly concluded that, because 12-53a only applies to ‘‘completed new construction,’’ the assessor did not have statutory authority to assign value to the partially completed construction on the grand lists for the years in question.   We agree with the town and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Superior Court Decision, October 6, 2011

Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission; Town of North Stonington v. FOI Commision; Judicial Branch v. FOI Commission; AFSCME Council 4 v. FOI Commission. 

The sole issue in these appeals is whether General Statutes 1-217,1 which prohibits public agencies from disclosing, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act); General Statutes 1-200 et seq.; the home addresses of various federal, state and local government officials and employees, is applicable to grand lists of motor vehicles and their component data provided to town assessors by the department of motor vehicles (department) pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) 14-163.3

Decision: We conclude that 1-217 applies to motor vehicle grand lists and their component data provided to the town assessors pursuant to 14-163. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding  Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 084019333; (February 23, 2011. Aronson, J.T.R.) Valuation of a Continuing Care Retirement Facility (CCRC).  The key issue was the valuation approach used by the taxpayer’s appraiser.  Going concern valuation vs. the Income Approach.

Marketing Drive LLC v. Norwalk, CV 084014423S. The matter before the court is an application of Marketing Drive, LLC (the “Applicant”) brought pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a, constituted an appeal from the doings of the Board of Assessment Appeals of the City of Norwalk (“Board”). The Applicant claims that the Assessor of the City of Norwalk (“Assessor”), on the assessment dates for 2007 and 2008, overvalued the personal property of the Applicant located at 800 Connecticut Avenue in Norwalk by not assessing it at 70% of its true and actual value as of the two assessment dates for those years. After appealing the assessment for 2007 to the Board (Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-111) with no relief, the Applicant appealed to this court (Conn. Gen. Stat. 117a). Similarly, the Applicant appealed to the Board for the 2008 assessment and after similar results, amended this appeal to the court to include the 2008 assessment (Conn. Gen. Stat. 117a). The Applicant prays that the personal property assessment for those years be reduced accordingly

Town of Windham v. St. Joseph’s Living Center Supreme Court, (SC 17916) March 24,2009.  The 3-2 decision affirmed the ability to tax the nursing home, but exempted the chapel portion. This appeal was on the 2003-2008 Grand Lists, if lost, would have required refunds totaling over $800,000, including 10% interest. It was a real “David v. Goliath” case.  This case may provide a “blueprint” of sorts for facilities such as these to be exempt in the future. The Supreme Court has almost redefined “charitable”.

Griswold Airport, Inc. v Madison, Supreme Court, (SC 17938) 12/23/2008. The primary issue before the court is whether a municipal tax assessor’s termination of an open space classification for property on the basis of its proposed use, as opposed to its current use, was proper. The outcome of this appeal turns on the proper interpretation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) 12-504h, a provision that gives municipal tax assessors discretionary authority to remove open space classifications previously placed on real property within their municipalities when the use of that property has changed.

Snake Meadow Club, Inc. v. Killingly, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CV 07 4006068S (July 24, 2008, Aronson, J.T.R.) (assessor under no statutory authority to recognize agreement between plaintiff and AT&T to consider cell tower erected on plaintiff’s property as personalty rather than realty).

Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 074014469;Trinity Hill Realty, Inc. v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 074014470 (April 2, 2008, Aronson, J.T.R.) (nursing home classified as commercial, not residential or apartment property).

Breezy Knoll Association, Inc. v. Town of Morris (SC 17815) – May 13, 2008

HealthSouth Corp. v. Waterbury, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 054011048; HealthSouth Corp. v. Madison, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 054010916; HealthSouth Corp. v. Fairfield, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 054010807; HealthSouth Corp. v. Willimantic, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CV 054002794; HealthSouth Corp. v. Norwalk, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 054006234 (March 13, 2008, Aronson, J.T.R.).

Aspetuck Land Trust, Inc. v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 064016847 (March 3, 2008, Cohn, J.) (whether undeveloped island property held for charitable purpose was entitled to tax exemption).

Connecticut Post Limited Partnership v. Milford, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV 074008134. The issue in this motion is whether an appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals was timely received by the Board. The plaintiff claims that its putting in the mail by the date set for filing appeals complied with the requirement that the application be filed by a certain date.

Burlington Coat Realty v. East Windsor, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 064011423S (January 3, 2008, Aronson, JTR) (valuation of owner/occupied big box retail property)

Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. East Haddam, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket Nos. CV 040104527S; CV 064005318S; CV 064005319S (December 20, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (valuation of commercial utility airport partly classified as open space).

J.C. Penney v. Manchester, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 064010562S (November 13, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (issue involved the timely filing of a personal property declaration for a large commercial distribution center).

Dominion Nuclear v. Waterford, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 03 0566126 (November 8, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (valuation of a nuclear power plant).

Sullivan v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 04 4000507 (August 2, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (valuation of eighty-year-old single-family house converted into three apartments).

Sullivan v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 07 4013444 (August 2, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (personal property consisting of stoves and refrigerators located in leased apartments are not exempt from taxation as household furniture pursuant to General Statutes 12-81 (31)).

PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 05 4009473; Bridgeport Towers, LLC v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 05 4009474 (July 27, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (interpretation of the penalty provision in General Statutes 12-63c dealing with taxpayers’ failure to provide the assessor with rental income and expense information).

Krevis v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 06 4014350 (July 17, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (declaratory judgment denied and judgment entered in favor of the defendant; one-year statute of limitations in General Statutes 12-119 applicable to the facts in this case; plaintiff failed to overcome the statutory presumption that his motor vehicles are sited for tax purposes at his residence in Bridgeport).

Sakon v. Glastonbury, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, Docket Nos. CV 054003783 & 054006620 (April 27, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (highest and best use of three, contiguous parcels of undeveloped land, owned or controlled by the same taxpayer, located in a planned travel zone, were for commercial use, not for a park).

Moutinho v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 04 0412557 (April 11, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (valuation of 1.86 acre parcel of land located in a light industrial zone improved with two buildings consisting of an office/warehouse and garage).

Griswold Airport v. Madison, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 05 4011562 (March 30, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (assessor was without authority to terminate open space classification of airport and then revalue property for condominium use).

Rizzuto v. DRS, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 06 4008351 (February 28, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (Burden of Proof involving change of domicile is by clear and convincing evidence).

St. Joseph Living Center v. Windham, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CV 04 0072963 (February 23, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (church-affiliated nursing home facility not exempt from property taxes because it was not used exclusively for charitable purpose).

Sheridan v. Killingly, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CV 03 007 0359 (January 12, 2007, Aronson, JTR) (on remand, valuation of 202-acre site with 31 acres divided into 274 lots; issue of the valuation of leasehold interests in the lots).

Middletown Oxford L.P. v. Middletown, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV 04 0104632 (December 11, 2006, Aronson, JTR) (valuation of property containing thirteen, three-story walk-up, garden-style apartment buildings with 336 units).

Hotshoe Enterprises, LLC v. Hartford, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, Docket No. CV 05 4007951 (November 30, 2006, Aronson, JTR) (condominium hangar units located on a state-owned airport and leased to private individuals exempt from municipal property taxes pursuant to 12-64 (c)).

Dominion Nuclear v. Waterford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 03 0566126 (April 7, 2006, Aronson, JTR) (transferability of exemption).

Executive Square v. Wethersfield, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 04 4000074 (January 4, 2006, Aronson, JTR) (valuation of 12-story housing complex for low- and moderate-income elderly residents where the issue was whether, under the income approach, contract rent or market rent should be used in determining net income).

Dominion Nuclear v. Waterford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 03 0566126 (May 27, 2005, Aronson, JTR) (Statutory exemption cannot be transferred unless specifically provided for in the statute; the role of the assessor in relationship to the grant of statutory exemption).