Court Decisions 2024
LIXI Hospitality Norwalk, LLC v. City of Norwalk (CV 23 6061693 S) December 17, 2024 Real Property Appeal – Motion to Dismiss The defendant City has moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s action due to the plaintiff’s alleged noncompliance with Gen Stat 12-117a (b). More specifically, the City claims that the plaintiff failed to file a property appraisal with the court required by Gen Stat 12-117a (a) (2). The City argues that as a result thereof, the plaintiff has no standing, and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. |
Feralcare Inc. v. Town of Stratford (CV 22 6073377 S) December 20, 2024 Tax Exempt Status of Real Property The plaintiff, Feralcare, Inc. (Feralcare), and the defendant, the Town of Stratford (Stratford), cross move for summary judgment on Feralcare’s municipal real property and personal property tax appeal alleging that Feralcare’s real and personal property located at 616 and 626 Surf Avenue in Stratford, Connecticut (the subject property) is exempt from taxation under General Statutes 12-81(7) because Feralcare qualifies as a charitable organization in that it runs a spay and neutering clinic for cats at the subject property. .it is well settled that merely accepting a fee for a charitable service does not undermine the charitable character of that service. “This court never has held that accepting payment or charging a fee, without more, alters the character of a charitable or otherwise tax-exempt organization”. The court grants the motion for summary judgment in favor of Feralcare and against Stratford. |
Wakefern Food Corp v. Town of Orange (CV 20 6060016 S) December 18, 2024 Retail Grocery Store Assessment Appeal The subject property is a 6.4 acre, flat, rectangular site upon which is situated a roughly 73,000 square foot, stand-alone grocery store. Wakefern purchased the subject property on September 8, 2016 for $10,800,000. The on-site grocery store was formerly a Stop & Shop grocery store, but Wakefield refurbished and rebranded the store to be a Shoprite grocery store. Wakefern made substantial investments in the subject property to convert the store to a Shoprite grocery store. Both sides submitted appraisals of the subject property. Both appraisers testified that the income approach to value was the best way to determine the FMV of the subject property and the court credits that testimony. Although both appraisers are well qualified to offer their opinions of value, the court concludes that the Plaintiff’s appraisal was sloppily done and largely relies on untested, unverified and unexplained information. As a result, the court does not give the appraisal any weight. As the trier of fact, the court may reject expert testimony in whole or in part if it concludes it is reasonable to do so. Here, for the reasons set forth above, the court makes that conclusion. The court does not attach any weight to the Plaintiff’s appraisal and finds that Wakefern has not presented any other credible evidence that the subject property was over assessed. |
Colchester Estate Ventures v. Town of Colchester (CV 22 6074575 S) December 18, 2024 Apartment Complex Assessment Appeal The plaintiff, Colchester Estate Ventures LLC (CEV), appeals the real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the Town of Colchester, on the real property and improvements located at 12 Balaban Road in Colchester, Connecticut. This matter was tried to the court on November 26, 2024. The court heard testimony from Stuart Zelmanovitz, one of the owners of the subject property, Ronald Diorio, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the plaintiffs, and John Chaponis, the Assessor for the Town of Colchester. Colchester assessed the subject property at a fair market value (FMV) of $12,396,400 as of the date of assessment, October 1, 2021. Mr. Diorio found the FMV of the subject property to be $10,800,000, as of the date of assessment. Colchester did not submit a formal appraisal at trial. Instead, Mr. Chaponis testified based on his experience as Colchester’s long-time assessor. Here, the court finds that CEV has not met its initial burden of demonstrating that the subject property was over assessed, and, therefore, that CEV was aggrieved. Having rejected Mr. Diorio’s appraisal and also finding that there is no other creditable evidence presented at trial that the subject property was over assessed by Colchester, there is no creditable evidence upon which the court can conclude that CEV was aggrieved. |
Concettina Capasso v. Town of Glastonbury (CV 23 6080021 S) December 17, 2024 Single Family Home Assessment Appeal The plaintiff, Concettina Capasso, appeals the real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the Town of Glastonbury, on the real property and improvements located at 305 Country Club Road in Glastonbury, Connecticut. The court heard testimony from Joseph Capasso, the husband of the subject property’s owner, Mark Gottesdiener, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the plaintiff, and Laura Callahan, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the Town of Glastonbury. Both Mr. Gottesdiener and Ms. Callahan are well qualified to offer their opinions of value. After reviewing the various comparable sales/properties proffered by the two appraisers, the court concludes there are three properties that are best to compare the subject. Each appraiser made a series of subjective adjustments to the sale prices of the comparable properties to reach a FMV price comparable to the subject property. After reviewing each of the appraisals submitted into evidence and reviewing the characteristics of the comparable properties as compared to the subject property, the court concludes that the comparable properties are in the aggregate, broadly comparable to the subject property. Therefore, the court uses the actual sale prices of the comparable properties as the best estimate of FMV for the subject property and therefore averages the sale prices to determine the FMV. |
DMG Partners-Rye LLC v. Town of Orange (CV 20 6060015 S) December 18, 2024 Orange Improvements Partnership v Town of Orange (CV 6060017 S) December 18, 2024 Retail Plaza Assessment Appeal The plaintiffs in the above captioned cases, DGM Partners-Rye LLC and Orange Improvements Partnership, (together simply DGM), appeal the real property municipal tax assessments levied by the defendant, the Town of Orange, on the real property and improvements located at 80 Boston Post Road in Orange, Connecticut (the subject property). The plaintiffs appeal in two separate cases because the land and improvements at the subject property were assessed separately by Orange. Both sides submitted appraisals of the subject property. DGM’s appraiser, Mr. Quaresima, found that the FMV of the subject property (both land and improvements) was $17,055,000, as of the date of assessment. Orange’s appraiser, Mr. Franke, appraised the FMV of the subject property at $21,300,000, as of the date of assessment. Both Mr. Quaresima and Mr. Franke testified that the income approach to value was the best way to determine the fair market value of the subject property and the court credits that testimony. Although both Mr. Quaresima and Mr. Franke are well qualified to offer their opinions of value, the court concludes, for the reasons set forth below, that Mr. Franke’s appraisal is more credible and more thoroughly supported. Therefore, in reaching a FMV of the subject property, the court relies on Mr. Franke’s analysis. |
Sun New Cambridge Apartments 1 LP Et Al v. City of Bristol (CV 22 6072394 S) December 17, 2024 Income & Expense Penalty Appeal Cambridge owns the real property and improvements located at 1175 Farmington Avenue in Bristol, Connecticut (the subject property). On January 29, 2020, Mr. DeNoto signed the Grand List for the City of Bristol for the 2019 Grand List year (the 2019 Grand List). When Mr. DeNoto signed the 2019 Grand List, it did not include any penalty assessment against the then owner of the subject property. On or about June 8, 2020, see Ex. 5, Bristol imposed a lien on the subject property pursuant to the penalty provision of General Statutes 12-63c because the subject property owner did not timely file and income and expense report for the 2019 Grand List year pursuant to General Statutes 12-63c. On September 20, 2021, Cambridge acquired the subject property. Cambridge has paid, under protest, the penalty assessed by Bristol and reflected in the June 8, 2020 lien on the subject property. We conclude that the deadline for imposing penalties under 12-63c (d) must be the deadline articulated in 12-55 (b)—i.e., the penalties must be imposed before the assessor signs the grand list for the applicable assessment year. |
Martha’s Ridge LLC v. Town of Greenwich (CV 23 6061289 S) December 17, 2024 Filing Timely Appraisal The defendant, Town, has moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s action due to the plaintiff’s alleged noncompliance with Gen. Stat. 12-117-a (b). More specifically, the Town claims that the plaintiff failed to file a property appraisal with the court. The plaintiff claims that any delay in filing the appraisal had been occasioned, at least in part, by the circumstances that the Town had been delinquent in filing its appearance. Plaintiff’s counsel finally did file an appraisal on or about October 1, 2024. |
Fiore, Richard Et Al v Town of Stonington (CV 22 5032670 S) December 9, 2024 Personal Property Appeal Pursuant to General Statutes 12-71, the Town of Stonington assessed personal property tax for the 2019 Grand List year on the equipment and furnishings owned by Two Penguins LLC. Mr. Fiore is the sole member of Two Penguins LLC. Mr. Fiore formed Two Penguins LLC in approximately 2017 for the purpose of opening and operating a convenience store. Mr. Fiore argues that because his envisioned convenience store never actually opened, it was never a “store” as that term is used in 12-41 and thus Mr. Fiore does not owe any taxes under 12-71. Read together to form one uniform and harmonious body of law, the court holds that 12-71’s express authorization for Stonington to tax goods and chattels includes the equipment and furnishings at issue in this case, and that the express authorization in 12-71 is not limited by the merely illustrative list of the personal property that ought to be listed on the personal property declaration as set forth in 12-41. Thus, the court finds in favor of the defendant, the Town of Stonington. This appeal is dismissed. |
Bedford Hall Investors NCM, LLC v. City of Stamford (CV 18 6048491 S) October 24, 2024 Overvaluation – Apartment Building The subject property is located at 545 Bedford Street in Stamford. On October 1, 2017, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Bedford Hall. The subject property is .55 acres in size upon which is situated a modern, multi- family apartment building consisting of 82 one and two bedroom units. Seven units are below market value rentals, the remainder of the units are market value rentals. The apartment building is a Class A residential apartment building and has the amenities typical of that class of apartment buildings. On the date of valuation, the apartment building was well rented with a vacancy rate of approximately 3%. Both sides submitted appraisals of the subject property. Stamford set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $22,753,000 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2017. The taxpayer’s appraiser found the FMV of the subject property to be $19,800,000 ($19,760,000 via the comparable sales approach/$19,830,000 via the income approach) as of the date of assessment. Stamford’s appraiser appraised the FMV of the subject property at $24,500,000 ($24,518,000 via the comparable sales approach/$24,143,000 via the income approach) as of the date of the assessment. It is undisputed that the subject property was purchased by Bedford Hall on September 29, 2017, for $24,500,000. This sale price was supported by a Cushman & Wakefield appraisal dated August 23, 2017 valuing the subject property at $24,500,000. The taxpayer’s appraiser did not account for the sale in his analysis. The inescapable conclusion the court reaches is that he did not use the September 29, 2017 sale of the subject property because it did not support the plaintiff s preferred positionFor all the reasons laid out in the full decision, this appeal is dismissed. Judgment may enter in favor of the defendant. |
The Lauren Investment Corp v. City of Waterbury (CV 20 6054164 S) July 5, 2024 Overvaluation – Restaurant Building This matter is a property tax appeal by the Lauren Investment Corporation (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the City of Waterbury (defendant) of certain real property located at 544 Reidville Drive in Waterbury. The court held a trial on June 25, 2024 and July 3, 2024. As of October 1, 2017 (Valuation Date), the defendant valued the Property at $2,031,480 and assessed taxes based upon seventy percent of the foregoing valuation and the applicable mil rate. The plaintiff s expert produced a report and testified that, using the income and sales comparison valuation approaches, he valued the Property, as of the Valuation Date, at $1,475,000. The defendant’s expert produced a report and testified that, using the income and sales valuation approaches, he valued the Property as of the Valuation Date, at $2,000 000. As of the Valuation Date the Property was subject to an amended lease with Friendly’s restaurant which amended lease was then most recently dated November 26, 2014 and had a term ending on March 31, 2036 (Friendly’s Lease). The highest and best use of the Property is as a restaurant. As of the Valuation Date Friendly’s had leased the Property since about 1980. The restaurant subsequently closed in 2019 and Friendly’s Lease was terminated in the bankruptcy proceedings. The building that was present on the Valuation Date was torn down in 2021 and new building was erected and leased to Starbucks. |
Brass Mill Center Mall, Et Al v. City of Waterbury (CV 18 6040421 S) August 15, 2024 Overvaluation of a Regional Mall This matter is a property tax appeal by Brass Mill Center Mall LLC and Brass Mill Center Realty Holding LLC (collectively, plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the City of Waterbury and Board of Assessment Appeals of the City of Waterbury (collectively, defendant) of certain real property located at 495 Union Street in Waterbury. The court held a trial on August 7-8, 2024. The Property is a portion of a retail shopping mall comprising all of its mall in-line stores, JC Penney, Burlington Coat Factory, Shoppers World and a movie theatre and containing 539,522 square feet of gross leasable area and 31 acres of land. As of October 1, 2017 (Valuation Date) and for each fax year at issue in this litigation, the defendant valued the Property at $97,880,528 and assessed taxes based upon seventy percent of the foregoing valuation and the applicable mil rate. The Properly has a trade area with a radius of approximately 9.5 miles and faces substantial competition from other malls which are outside of the trade area but nearby. As of the Valuation Date, there were signs that financial risks for the mall anchors (Sears, JC Penney and Macy’s) were rising. PWC, on page 24 of plaintiff s exhibit 15, states that 2017 was then poised to be the worst year on record for store closures and that the number of 2017 store closings was triple of that for 2016. In view of the court’s factual findings, the court finds that the Property was overvalued by the defendant and the plaintiff is aggrieved. The proper valuation of the Property for all challenged tax periods is $86 million. |
Fuel Cell – Do they constitute “Class One Renewables” for exemption 12-81 (57) Supreme Court Decision July 24, 2024 The plaintiff appealed from the exemption denial and retroactive assessment to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a and 12-119. From 2017 to 2019, the plaintiff continued to file additional applications for tax exemptions under 12-81 (57). The defendant denied each subsequent exemption application and added 25 percent penalties for failure to declare the property. Decision: We uphold the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff was not required to declare the property because it was exempt from taxation under 12-81 (57) and, by extension, that the penalties levied by the defendant under 12-81 (50) were not permitted. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred Supreme Court Oral Argument: https://ct-n.com/ctnplayer.asp?odID=22580 Original Appeal Fuelcell Energy Inc. v. Town of Groton (CV 17 6038440 S) October 18, 2022 Personal Property Appeal. Four Fuel Cell Modules – Exemption application not timely filed December 22, 2021 Memorandum of Decision (counts three through eight) The property at issue is certain personal property (ID No. 299473) comprising four fuel cell modules and related equipment designed to produce 5.6 megawatts of electrical power located at the Pfizer Inc (Pfizer) campus at 445 Eastern Point Road in Groton (Property). The defendant taxed the Property as of October 1, 2016, as construction in progress and assigned a value of $8,192,800 on the 2016 grand Notice of the foregoing valuation and taxation was issued on January 31, 2017. On February 6, 2017, the defendant issued a Personal Property Change Notice adding an additional $2,048,200 to the valuation of the Property on the 2016 grand list, representing a 25% penalty for the plaintiff s failure to file a personal property declaration for the Property. In its December 22, 2021 decision on summary judgment, this court (Klau J) determined that the Property, as of the 2017 though 2019 grand lists, was a fuel cell exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statute 12-81 (57). The plaintiff did not file a written application for exemption from taxation with the defendant on or before the first day of November 2016, but instead first filed its application for exemption on February 14, 2017. In view of the foregoing, the court finds that, as of October 1, 2016, the Property was exempt from taxation by the defendant pursuant to 12-81 (50). Accordingly, the assessment on the 2016 grand list by the defendant, both the basic assessment and the penalty was improper. The William W. Backus Hospital v. Town of Stonington Withdrawal of Appeal to Decision, September 3, 2024 Supreme Court Decision July 12, 2024 We agree with the town’s argument that the rehabilitation facility had been ‘‘acquired’’ by Hartford Healthcare for purposes of 12-66a, thus negating the charitable and hospital tax exemptions provided by General Statutes 12-81(7) and (16), respectively, that otherwise would be applicable to the personal property at issue. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. Town appeals ruling that Backus Hospital is exempt from taxes at an outpatient rehab facility Date Argued: 2/14/2024 Supreme Court Oral Argument: https://ct-n.com/ctnplayer.asp?odID=22612 Original Appeal The William W Backus Hospital v. Town of Stonington (CV 21 6067052 S) October 7, 2022 Decision has been appealed by the Town of Stonington October 24, 2022 Tax Exempt Status of Personal Property in an Outpatient Rehabilitation Facility This matter is a property tax appeal by The William W. Backus Hospital (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Stonington (defendant) of certain personal property owned by the plaintiff and located at 100 Perkins Farm Drive, Suite 201, in Mystic, Connecticut. The plaintiff is a general hospital and is licensed as such by the Connecticut Department of Health and provides outpatient medical services which consist of medical rehabilitation services including physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, and specialized therapies to address neurological conditions, movement disorders, musculoskeletal conditions and sports medicine (collectively, “Rehabilitative Services”). The parties have each filed motions for summary judgment which the court has ruled on through this memorandum of decision. Conclusion: The court grants the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denies the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court enters judgment for the plaintiff on all counts. The Personal Property may not be taxed on the grand lists for 2020 and 2021. Stonington has 20 days to determine if they will appeal. Big Sky Properties, LLC v. Danbury (CV 23 6046287 S) March 12, 2024 RE: Failure to submit Appraisal by Statutory Deadline – Motion to Dismiss Order On Pre-Appeal Application for Certification pursuant to G.S. 52-265a SC230305 June 27, 2024 Big Sky Properties, LLC Opposition to Defendant’s Application for Certification for a Public Interest Appeal June 25, 2024 Pursuant to Practice Book 66-2 and 83-1, Big Sky Properties LLC (“Big Sky Properties”) opposes the Defendant’s application for certification for a public interest appeal (the “Application”). The trial court’s June 12, 2024 order clearly explains that its March 12, 2024 order conflicted with that trial court’s prior decisions involving essentially identical fact patterns and in which the trial court held that there cannot be a loss of jurisdiction when the statute gives the court discretion to dismiss. This Application has no merit and should be denied. Motion to Open Judgment as amended and Motion to Reargue June 12, 2024 The court believes the interests of justice warrant the reopening of the judgment and the re-argument of the matter which was allowed at the short calendar hearing. The court notes that should future matters with similar fact patterns come before it, the court still retains the ability to exercise its discretion to dismiss such matters where it is argued that there has been a failure to comply with statutory deadlines for the filing of appraisals. This is true given that similarly situated plaintiffs are now acutely aware of the language of General Statutes 12-117a (as may be amended). Application for Certification to File Public Interest Appeal June 20, 2024 The City is filing applications for certification of public interest appeals in each of these seven cases. If these applications are granted, the City respectfully requests permission to pursue a single joint appeal under Practice Book 61-7. The original decision includes six additional cases; March 12, 2024 Gary Beach Et Al v. Town of Hamden (CV 20 6106243 S) March 27, 2024 Due Process and Equal Protection Appeal – Revaluation Company Documentation Each of the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were appealing from a June 3, 2020 action by the defendant board. They each specifically alleged their property address in the Town of Harnden and the amount of the town’s assessment for their property. They each alleged that the basis of their appeal was: “The assessment has been based on secret formulae created and used by the Town’s agent, Vision Appraisal, which the Town has refused to disclose to my clients despite several proper requests for such information. Specifically:
The assessment . . . because of this unlawful secrecy, manifestly deprives them of property without procedural due process of law and constitutes an arbitrary, and presumptively irrational, use of municipal taxing power. The defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs have not established that they are aggrieved such that they have standing to bring their claim under Section 12-117a. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs only can be statutorily aggrieved for purposes of Section 12-117a if the plaintiffs’ properties have been over-assessed. Because these plaintiffs do not claim that their properties were over-assessed, the defendant argues that they are not statutorily aggrieved. Prior FOIA case regarding Revaluation Company files and documents. Devine v. City of Middletown (Docket #FIC 1998-373) June 30, 1999 FPP, LLC v. Town of West Hartford (CV 22 6072391 S) June 6, 2024 Overvaluation – Large Single Family Home The subject property consists of 3.91 acres of flat, well landscaped, and generally open land that abuts the Hartford Golf Club. Ledyard Street is a quiet, residential road. The private home situated on the subject property is a stone house constructed in 1919 in the style of an English manor house. The house has 12,971 square feet of gross living area. The house consists of eighteen total rooms, eight bedrooms, numerous bathrooms, eight fireplaces, a 6,700 square foot finished basement (including a bar area, wine cellar, sauna, gaming area, and exercise room), a roof top patio with jacuzzi, a pool, and a three-car garage. Both parties submitted appraisals of the subject property. Both Mr. Gottesdiener and Mr. Franke are experienced, licensed appraisers who are well qualified to offer their opinions of value. West Hartford set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $2,400,000 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2021. Mr. Gottesdiener found the FMV of the subject property to be $1,500,000 as of the date of assessment. West Hartford’s appraiser, Mr. Franke, appraised the FMV of the subject property at $2,400,000 as of the date of the assessment. Both appraisers considered the comparable sales method to be the most appropriate method of valuing the subject property. The court finds that the fair market value of the subject property is $2,000,000, as of the date of the assessment, October 1, 2021. James R. Brennan v. Town of Seymour BAA (AC 46258) June 6, 2024 On the basis of our careful review of the record, we conclude that there is ample evidence in it to support the court’s determination that the current use of the plaintiff’s excess property did not constitute farm use. The judgement is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Original Appeal James R. Brennan v. Town of Seymour BAA (CV 21 6042688) January 26, 2023 Declassification of Farm Land The plaintiff, James R. Brennan, brought this administrative appeal challenging the assessment of his residential property and the declassification of his farm property. The plaintiff appealed these decisions to the defendant, the Town of Seymour Board of Assessment Appeals, which upheld the assessor’s decision. The plaintiff has abandoned count one of this appeal. The parties also agreed that the only decision for the court to make is whether there was a change of use of the 7.26 acres of the plaintiff s property located at 124 Bungay Road in Seymour, Connecticut (Seymour property). Property designated as farm land is assessed based on its current use. General Statutes 12-63(a). “The fact that a tax assessor makes no actual change in the classification for many years after the occurrence of one of the triggering events in 12-504h is irrelevant.” In this present case, “it would be in direct conflict with the statutory scheme to retain a farm land classification on land that no longer qualifies as such and then assess it based on its non-farm current use.” Lee Memorial United Methodist Church of Norwich v. City of Norwich (CV 22 6074602 S) June 5, 2024 Partial Exemption of a Religious Property The plaintiff, The Lee Memorial Church of Norwich, Connecticut a/ka/ Lee Memorial United Methodist Church (Lee Memorial), appeals the decision of the defendant, the City of Norwich, denying Lee Memorial a tax exemption under General Statutes 12-81 (14) for that portion of Lee Memorial’ s property which is owned by Lee Memorial, but leased to an unaffiliated, for-profit company for use as a daycare facility (the subject property). Norwich argues that because Lee Memorial does not operate the daycare center, the subject property is not exempt from taxation under 12-81 (14). By its plain terms, and as relevant to this appeal, 12- 81 (14) requires only that exempt property be owned by a religious organization and that it be used exclusively as a daycare facility. Section 12-81 (14) includes no additional requirement that the day care center also be operated by the religious organization. Because it is undisputed that the subject property is owned by Lee Memorial, that Lee Memorial is a religious organization, and that the subject property is exclusively used as a daycare facility, the court holds that the subject property is entitled to the tax exemption set forth in General Statutes 12- 81 (14). Therefore, the court sustains this appeal. Jeffrey A Reiner, Trustee and JAR Partners v. Town of West Hartford (CV 22 6072277 S) April 24, 2024 Overvaluation – 18 Unit Apartment Building The subject property consists of a .41 acre, rectangular parcel of land on which sits a 12,879 square foot, 18 unit, residential apartment building. The apartment building on the subject property was constructed in 1962 and consists of one and two bedroom market rent apartments. The building is reasonably well maintained, but its interior fixtures and amenities are somewhat dated. It is a C class building. There is limited parking at the subject property. Rents include heat and hot water, but not electricity. It is not disputed that the highest and best use of the property is as a residential apartment building. West Hartford set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $1,692,700 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2021. Mr. Lo Monte found the FMV of the subject property to be $1,335,000 ($1,450,000 via the comparable sales approach $1,260,000 via the income approach) as of the date of assessment. West Hartford’s appraiser, Mr. Kerin, appraised the FMV of the subject property at $1,855,000 ($1,870,000 via the comparable sales approach $1,850,000 via the income approach) as of the date of the assessment. As set forth in the case, the court finds that the fair market value (FMV) of the subject property is $1,850,000 as of October 1, 2021, the date of assessment. Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Town of Canterbury (CV 23 6026705 S) April 10, 2024 Motion to Strike a portion of the original appeal The original complaint included allegations for the years of 2019-2021 and included three counts alleging excessive valuation, disproportionate tax burden and wrongful assessment. On November 6, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to strike (#104) alleging that counts two, five and eight of the amended complaint are legally insufficient. Count two alleges disproportionate tax burden for the year 2019, count five alleges disproportionate tax burden for the year 2020 and count eight alleges disproportionate tax burden for the year 2021. H D Danbury, LLC v. City of Danbury (CV 23 6046280 S) March 12, 2024 RE: Motion to Dismiss – Failure to submit Appraisal by Deadline Presently before the court is the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Docket Entry No. 108. The defendant argues that the plaintiff s complaint must be dismissed on the ground of a lack of statutory standing pursuant to General Statutes 12-l l 7a. The plaintiff objects to the defendant’s motion. Docket Entry No. 110. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff, H D Danbury, LLC, in a three-count complaint filed with the court on May 19, 2023, alleges the following facts. The plaintiff appeals a decision from the action of the defendant, the city of Danbury, through the Danbury Board of Assessment Appeals (hereinafter “the Board”), concerning a tax assessment of the real property located at 53 Federal Road, Danbury, Connecticut. On July 12, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, supported by a memorandum of law, on the ground of a lack of statutory standing pursuant to General Statutes 12-l l 7a. Docket Entry Nos. 101 and 102. Following the plaintiff s objection to the motion, the plaintiff moved to modify the statutory requirements to file an appraisal within 120 days of the filing of the appeal. Docket Entry No. 103; Docket Entry No. 104. On August 28, 2023, the court (Shaban, J.) found good cause for the extension of the September 16, 2023, deadline for the filing of the appraisal and granted the plaintiff a sixty-day extension to November 15, 2023, to do so. Docket Entry No. 104.01. The defendant then filed another motion to dismiss on December 15, 2023, following the expiration of the extension period, arguing the same grounds as the first motion. Docket Entry No. 108. The plaintiff has objected to the defendant’s motion. Given that the plaintiff was granted an extension to file its appraisal, and having failed to file the appraisal with the court by the extended deadline, the court exercises its discretion to dismiss the action pursuant to 12-ll 7a (a) (2). New Exchange Place LLC, Et Al v. City of Waterbury (CV 18 6040197S) March 1, 2024 Subsidized Housing Assessment Appeal The Property is an 11-story 150-unit multi-family rental property with five commercial rental units on the ground floor. The Property consists of 0.43 acres and a building located in downtown Waterbury. The Property is subject to and benefitted by a long-term Section 8 contract with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) which subsidizes the rents being paid. The tenants of the Property are low- income elderly or disabled people. The rents to be charged are approved by HUD. The Section 8 contract with HUD is a 20-year contract which expires on December 31, 2033, and may be renewed thereafter. The contract can be transferred from one owner of the Property to a succeeding owner with the approval of HUD. In fact, the plaintiff received assignment of the contract when it purchased the Property on February 1, 2017. A contract with HUD has been in place in connection with this Property since 1983. The William W. Backus Hospital v. Town of Stonington Town appeals ruling that Backus Hospital is exempt from taxes at an outpatient rehab facility Date Argued: 2/14/2024 Supreme Court Oral Argument: https://ct-n.com/ctnplayer.asp?odID=22612 Original Appeal The William W Backus Hospital v. Town of Stonington (CV 21 6067052 S) October 7, 2022 Decision has been appealed by the Town of Stonington October 24, 2022 Tax Exempt Status of Personal Property in an Outpatient Rehabilitation Facility This matter is a property tax appeal by The William W. Backus Hospital (plaintiff) concerning the valuation and taxation by the Town of Stonington (defendant) of certain personal property owned by the plaintiff and located at 100 Perkins Farm Drive, Suite 201, in Mystic, Connecticut. The plaintiff is a general hospital and is licensed as such by the Connecticut Department of Health and provides outpatient medical services which consist of medical rehabilitation services including physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, and specialized therapies to address neurological conditions, movement disorders, musculoskeletal conditions and sports medicine (collectively, “Rehabilitative Services”). The parties have each filed motions for summary judgment which the court has ruled on through this memorandum of decision. Conclusion: The court grants the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denies the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court enters judgment for the plaintiff on all counts. The Personal Property may not be taxed on the grand lists for 2020 and 2021. Stonington has 20 days to determine if they will appeal. Fuel Cell Energy, Inc. v. Town of Groton Fuel Cell – Do they constitute “Class One Renewables” for exemption 12-81 (57) Supreme Court Oral Argument: https://ct-n.com/ctnplayer.asp?odID=22580 Original Appeal Fuelcell Energy Inc. v. Town of Groton (CV 17 6038440 S) October 18, 2022 Personal Property Appeal. Four Fuel Cell Modules – Exemption application not timely filed December 22, 2021 Memorandum of Decision (counts three through eight) The property at issue is certain personal property (ID No. 299473) comprising four fuel cell modules and related equipment designed to produce 5.6 megawatts of electrical power located at the Pfizer Inc (Pfizer) campus at 445 Eastern Point Road in Groton (Property). The defendant taxed the Property as of October 1, 2016, as construction in progress and assigned a value of $8,192,800 on the 2016 grand Notice of the foregoing valuation and taxation was issued on January 31, 2017. On February 6, 2017, the defendant issued a Personal Property Change Notice adding an additional $2,048,200 to the valuation of the Property on the 2016 grand list, representing a 25% penalty for the plaintiff s failure to file a personal property declaration for the Property. In its December 22, 2021 decision on summary judgment, this court (Klau J) determined that the Property, as of the 2017 though 2019 grand lists, was a fuel cell exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statute 12-81 (57). The plaintiff did not file a written application for exemption from taxation with the defendant on or before the first day of November 2016, but instead first filed its application for exemption on February 14, 2017. In view of the foregoing, the court finds that, as of October 1, 2016, the Property was exempt from taxation by the defendant pursuant to 12-81 (50). Accordingly, the assessment on the 2016 grand list by the defendant, both the basic assessment and the penalty was improper. Michael Camilini v. Town of Thomaston (CV 22 5031657 S) January 25, 2024 Single Family Home – Over-assessed On October 1, 2021, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Mr. Camilini. The subject property consists of approximately .4 acres of slightly sloping land in a rural, residential area of Thomaston. The house located on the subject property is a two story, colonial style home built in 1968. Thomaston set the FMV of the real property and improvements at the subject property at $223,000 as of the assessment date, October 1, 2021. Mr. Camilini did not present an appraisal of the subject property at trial. Nevertheless, Mr. Camilini did present a comparative market analysis done by Ms. Mirabilio, who is a local real estate agent (and also Mr. Camilini’s grandmother) with decades of experience in the Thomaston residential real estate market. The defendant’s appraiser, Ms. Wicks, appraised the FMV of the subject property at $225,000 using the sales comparison approach. Shelbourne CT, LLC v. City of Hartford (CV 22 6073442 S) January 24, 2024 Assessment Appeal – Downtown High Rise Office Building The subject property is located at 20 Church Street in Hartford and is colloquially known as the “Stilts Building” because the entirety of its upper floors sit on concrete stilts. On October 1, 2021, the real property and improvements at the subject property were owned by Shelbourne CT, LLC. The subject property is a 23-story, class A commercial office building constructed in 1981. The subject property is well maintained and generally up to date for a Class A commercial office building. The subject property has 418,807 square feet of net rentable area. Konstantin Anikeev v. Town of Brookfield (CV 22 5031651 S) January 24, 2024 Residential Property – Over-assessed The plaintiff, Konstantin Anikeev, appeals the real property municipal tax assessment levied by the defendant, the town of Brookfield, on the real property and improvements located at 16 Obtuse Rocks Road in Brookfield, Connecticut. Mr. Anikeev proceeds pro se and pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a. This matter was tried to the court on December 5, 2023. The court heard from Mr. Anikeev, testifying on this own behalf, and Christopher Kerin, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the town of Brookfield. McHenry Solar LLC v. Town of Hampton (CV 22 6078896 S) January 2, 2024 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reargue/Reconsider January 10, 2024 The plaintiff alleges that the town assessor failed to apply the tax exemption to the gross assessment and valuation of the personal property and instead listed the personal property as taxable. Whether the generation of electricity constitutes manufacturing for the purposes of an exemption from personal property taxes is an issue of statutory interpretation. The plaintiff argues that the facts are undisputed, and the only issue is whether the plaintiff’s solar electric equipment qualifies for the exemption from personal property taxation under 12-81 (76) as a matter of law. SG Pequot 200, LLC v. Town of Fairfield (AC 45863) January 10, 2024 Timely Filing to the Board of Assessment Appeals The plaintiff, SG Pequot 200, LLC, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Fairfield (town), by the trial court in this municipal tax appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes 12-117a. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s municipal tax appeal on the basis that the plaintiff’s petition to the town’s board of assessment appeals (board) was untimely under General Statutes 12-111 (a) (1) and 12-112. The plaintiff mailed its petition to appeal the valuation to the board on Friday, February 18, 2022, via Federal Express (FedEx) standard overnight shipping. The town’s municipal offices were closed Saturday, February 19, 2022, through Monday, February 21, 2022, Washington’s Birthday. On February 22, 2022, the board received the plaintiff’s petition, and on February 23, 2022, the board notified the plaintiff that its petition would not be heard because it was received after the statutory deadline of February 20. |